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In November 2014, the Duke Law Judicial Studies Center, which became the Bolch 
Judicial Institute in 2018, held a conference on the discovery proportionality amendments with 
more than 70 practitioners and 15 federal judges. Drafting teams were subsequently formed, 
consisting of 32 practitioners, who worked for nine months on an initial draft set of GUIDELINES 
AND PRACTICES prepared by Judge Lee Rosenthal and Prof. Steven Gensler. The team’s work 
product, the GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE 2015 DISCOVERY 
AMENDMENTS TO ACHIEVE PROPORTIONALITY, was published in 99 Judicature, no. 3, Winter 
2015, along with several related articles. Most of the GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES’ 
recommendations represented general consensus views, but a handful were not universally 
endorsed. To address these and future unforeseeable concerns, the Institute planned to regularly 
revise and update the GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES in light of case-law developments and actual 
practice. 
 
The Institute’s efforts took its first steps with an invitation to the ABA Section of 
Litigation to co-host programs on the discovery amendments in 13 cities, beginning in November 
2015, to learn from judges and practitioners how the amendments were operating. The Litigation 
Section agreed to select, in consultation with the Institute, four local judges and four Section-
leading practitioners to serve on two panels at each location, moderated by Judge Rosenthal and 
Prof. Gensler. The programs quickly became known as the “discovery proportionality 
roadshows” and expanded to 17 cities. In total, nearly 70 judges and 70 practitioners appeared 
on panels speaking to more than 2,500 lawyers. 
 
The roadshows presented an unprecedented opportunity to learn first-hand from the bench 
and bar how the amendments were working across the country. At the same time, the months of 
experience with the amendments, and the information and insights gathered from working with 
and talking to lawyers and judges in 17 cities across the country, have provided a basis for 
refinements, clarifications, and additions that are helpful, timely, and need not be delayed until 
a later comprehensive review a few years from now. Much of what was learned is consistent 
with the recommendations in the GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES. The changes in the GUIDELINES 
AND PRACTICES account for these experiences and new case law, refining and updating the 
document. 
 
Many of the refinements are to the organization, not the content. Some GUIDELINES or 
PRACTICES are moved to better reflect their relationship to the overall proportionality concept 
and to some of the practices parties and judges are using or considering in implementing the 
concept. Several changes account for case law. The bulk of the other changes, particularly in 
the PRACTICES, are examples of discovery techniques recommended by judges and practitioners 
at the roadshows who use and promote them. 
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The GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES, as revised by the project’s reporters, Hon. Lee 
Rosenthal and Prof. Steven Gensler, were circulated to members of the original drafting teams, 
lawyers and judges attending the 2014 conference and others, and posted for three weeks on the 
Institute’s web site for comment. The reporters revised the draft in light of comments received, 
and the final version was reviewed by a select Institute editorial board consisting of Hon. Paul 
Grimm, Paul Grewal (former magistrate judge and Facebook deputy counsel), and Dena Sharp 
(Girard & Gibbs). 
 
Although the Rule amendments have been in place for months, more case law, more 
experience, and more information are needed before deciding whether to substantially change 
the GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES to make them more useful. More significant changes will 
require more time and work to analyze the developing case law and the diverse experiences of 
lawyers and judges applying the amended Rules in a variety of cases. That diversity has been 
critical to the 2015 Rule amendments from the outset. 
 
In addition, the Institute has commissioned several studies evaluating the amendments and 
held three regional bench-bar conferences beginning in May 2017 surveying major bar 
organizations and judges, reviewing discovery-cost invoices submitted by outside counsel, and 
studying cost data from ESI vendors. These studies, which will be considered at a major bench 
bar conference in Washington, DC, on June 21-22, 2019, will inform future revisions of the 
GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES. 
 
The second edition of the GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES is posted on the Bolch Judicial 
Institute at https://judicialstudies.duke.edu/conferences/publications/. 
 
                         
                          John K. Rabiej, Deputy Director 
                                Bolch Judicial Institute, Duke Law School 
     
                 Malini Moorthy, Chair, Advisory Council, Distinguished Lawyers’ Conferences 
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I. PROPORTIONALITY GUIDELINES 
The GUIDELINES for applying the 2015 “proportionality” amendments to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure discuss what the amendments mean, what they did and did not change, and 
ways to understand their impact and meaning.  The GUIDELINES add some flesh to the bones of the 
Rule text and Committee Notes and explore how the proportionality amendments intersect with 
other Rule provisions.2
  
GUIDELINE 1:  Rule 26(b)(1) defines the scope of discovery as “any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs 
of the case.”1   Proposed discovery must be both relevant2 and proportional to be 
within the scope that Rule 26(b)(1) permits.3  Information that is within the scope 
of discovery is discoverable even if it would not be admissible in evidence. The 
Rule 26(b)(1) amendments do not alter the parties’3 discovery obligations or create 
new burdens.4
 
Discovery that seeks relevant and nonprivileged information is within the permitted scope 
of discovery5 only if it is proportional to the needs of the case.6 
 
The 2015 amendments continue to express the longstanding principle that information does 
not itself have to be admissible in evidence in order to be discoverable.   This is because the 
gathering of that information can itself be very valuable in obtaining admissible evidence.  For 
example, it remains a staple of deposition practice to ask witnesses to testify to what they have 
heard other persons say, without regard to whether the statements would be inadmissible as 
hearsay, because the questioner can use that information to identify and examine the person whose 
alleged statement was repeated.    
 
The phrase “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” is 
deleted because it was often misapplied, despite earlier revisions to clarify its meaning.7  Some 
lawyers and judges misunderstood the phrase to expand the scope of discovery to include irrelevant 
information if it was “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of” relevant information.  That 
was and is wrong; discovery was and is limited to relevant information, revised in 2015 to add 
proportionality to what defines the scope of permissible discovery.  The new phrasing deletes the 
“reasonably calculated” phrase and replaces it with a statement clearly rejecting admissibility as a 
limit on discoverability but just as clearly limiting the scope of discovery to relevant and 
proportional information.    
 
Lawyers and judges must be careful when quoting older cases defining or describing the 
scope of discovery because some of the passages from those cases may have been construing rule 
text that has been superseded.  For example, the Supreme Court stated in 1978 that the scope of 
discovery “has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably 
could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”  Oppenheimer 
                                                             
2 The GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES are, of course, not part of the rules and have no binding effect.  They are a resource 
for judges, lawyers, and litigants who must understand the amendments and their impact to use and comply with the 
rules governing discovery.  
3 The GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES use the word “parties” to cover lawyers and represented litigants, although many 
of the practices apply usefully to cases involving unrepresented litigants a well. 
2 
 
Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).  At the time of that case, however, the text of 
Rule 26(b)(1) linked the scope of discovery to “the subject matter involved,” and the Court 
specifically stated that it was interpreting that “key phrase.” Since then, the 2000 amendments 
altered the scope to permit subject-matter discovery only upon a showing of good cause and the 
2015 amendments eliminated subject-matter discovery completely.  Oppenheimer was decided 
before the concept of proportionality was added to Rule 26, first in the 1983 amendments adding 
limits to permissible discovery and explicitly in the 2015 amendments limiting the scope of 
permissible discovery to both relevant and proportional information.   
 
The statement in Oppenheimer that describes the breadth of the relevance inquiry remains 
intact.  In the discovery context, relevance is “construed broadly to encompass any matter that 
bears on” the matter in question.  Oppenheimer, 437 U.S. at 351. The difference today is that the 
relevance inquiry is linked only to claims and defenses—not subject matter—and is joined by 
proportionality in defining scope. 
 
The rule text no longer specifically states that discovery into the sources of information—
discovery into the existence, description, or nature of documents, or the identity of witnesses—is 
part of the scope of discovery. The Committee Note explains that the language was deleted solely 
out of a belief that “[d]iscovery of such matters is so deeply entrenched in practice that it is no 
longer necessary to clutter the long text of Rule 26 with these examples.” Information about the 
existence and location of sources of information is relevant because it “bears on” the claims and 
defenses, and is therefore within the scope of discovery so long as it is proportional to the needs 
of the case. 
   
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Information is discoverable under revised Rule 26(b)(1) if it is relevant to any party’s claim or 
defense and is proportional to the needs of the case. The considerations that bear on proportionality 
are moved from present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii), slightly rearranged and with one addition.” 
 
“The former provision for discovery of relevant but inadmissible information that appears 
‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ is also deleted. The phrase 
has been used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery. As the Committee Note to 
the 2000 amendments observed, use of the ‘reasonably calculated’ phrase to define the scope of 
discovery ‘might swallow any other limitation on the scope of discovery.’ The 2000 amendments 
sought to prevent such misuse by adding the word ‘Relevant’ at the beginning of the sentence, 
making clear that ‘relevant’ means within the scope of discovery as defined in this subdivision . . 
. .’ The ‘reasonably calculated” phrase has continued to create problems, however, and is removed 
by these amendments. It is replaced by the direct statement that ‘Information within this scope of 
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.’ Discovery of nonprivileged 







GUIDELINE 2:  Rule 26(b)(1) identifies six factors for the parties and the judge to 
consider in determining whether proposed discovery is “proportional to the needs 
of the case.”8  As discussed further in GUIDELINE 3, the degree to which any 
factor applies and the way it applies depend on the facts and circumstances of 
each case.  
   
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“The present amendment restores the proportionality factors to their original place in defining the 
scope of discovery. This change reinforces the Rule 26(g) obligation of the parties to consider 
these factors in making discovery requests, responses, or objections.” 
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 2(A):  “Importance of Issues at Stake”—This factor focuses on 
measuring the importance of the issues at stake in the particular case.9  This factor 
recognizes that many cases raise issues that are important for reasons beyond any 
money the parties may stand to gain or lose in a particular case.10 
 
An action seeking to enforce constitutional, statutory, or common-law rights, including a 
case filed under a statute using attorney fee-shifting provisions to encourage enforcement, can 
serve public and private interests that have an importance beyond any damages sought or other 
monetary amounts the case may involve.11    
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“The 1983 Committee Note recognized “the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in 
philosophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy 
spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far 
beyond the monetary amount involved.” Many other substantive areas also may involve litigation 
that seeks relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but that seeks to vindicate vitally 
important personal or public values.” 
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 2(B):  “Amount in Controversy”—This factor examines what the 
parties stand to gain or lose financially in a particular case as part of deciding what 
discovery burdens and expenses are reasonable for that case.12  The amount in 
controversy is usually the amount the plaintiff claims or could claim in good faith.   
 
If a specific amount in controversy is alleged in the pleadings and challenged, or no specific 
amount is alleged and the pleading is limited to asserting that the amount exceeds the jurisdictional 
minimum, the issue is how much the plaintiff could recover based on the claims asserted and 
allegations made.  When an injunction or declaratory judgment is sought, the amount in 
controversy includes the pecuniary value of that relief. The amount in controversy calculation can 
change as the case progresses, the claims and defenses evolve, and the parties and judge learn more 




OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“It also is important to repeat the caution that the monetary stakes are only one factor, to be 
balanced against other factors.”  
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 2(C):  “Relative Access to Information”---This factor addresses the 
extent to which each party has access to relevant information in the case.13  The 
issues to be examined include the extent to which a party needs formal discovery 
because relevant information is not otherwise available to that party. 
 
In a case involving “information asymmetry” or inequality, in which one party has or 
controls significantly more of the relevant information than other parties, the parties with less 
information or access to it depend on discovery to obtain relevant information. Parties who have 
more information or who control the access to it are often asked to produce significantly more 
information than they seek or are able to obtain from a party with less.   
 
The fact that a party has little discoverable information to provide others does not create a 
cap on the amount of discovery it can obtain.  A party’s ability to take discovery is not limited by 
the amount of relevant information it possesses or controls, by the amount of information other 
parties seek from it, or by the amount of information it must provide in return. Discovery costs and 
burdens may be heavier for the party that has or can easily get the bulk of the essential proof in a 
case.14   
  
When a case involves information asymmetry or inequality, proportionality requires 
permitting all parties access to necessary information, but without the unfairness that can result if 
the asymmetries are leveraged by any party for tactical advantage.  Unfairness can occur when a 
party with significantly less information imposes unreasonable demands on the party who has 
voluminous information.  Unfairness can also occur when a party with significantly more 
information takes unreasonably restrictive or dilatory positions in response to the other party’s 
requests.    
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“The direction to consider the parties’ relative access to relevant information adds new text to 
provide explicit focus on considerations already implicit in present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). Some 
cases involve what often is called “information asymmetry.” One party — often an individual 
plaintiff — may have very little discoverable information. The other party may have vast amounts 
of information, including information that can be readily retrieved and information that is more 
difficult to retrieve. In practice these circumstances often mean that the burden of responding to 







GUIDELINE 2(D): “Parties’ Resources”—This factor examines what resources are 
available to the parties for gathering, reviewing, and producing information and for 
requesting, receiving, and reviewing information in discovery.  “Resources” means 
more than a party’s financial resources.  It includes the technological, 
administrative, and human resources needed to perform the discovery tasks.15   
 
In general, more can be expected of parties with greater resources and less of parties with 
scant resources, but the impact of the parties’ reasonably available resources on the extent or timing 
of discovery must be specifically determined for each case.   
 
As with all of the factors, this factor is only one consideration.  Even if one party has 
significantly greater resources, this factor does not require that party to provide all or most of the 
discovery proposed simply because the party is able to do so.  Nor does this factor mean that parties 
with limited resources can refuse to provide relevant information simply because doing so would 
be difficult for financial or other reasons.16  A party’s ability to take discovery is not limited by 
the resources it has available to provide discovery in return. 
 
The basic point is what resources a party reasonably has available for discovery, when it is 
needed.  Evaluating the resources a party can reasonably be expected to expend on discovery may 
require considering that party’s competing demands for those resources.    
  
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“So too, consideration of the parties’ resources does not foreclose discovery requests addressed to 
an impecunious party, nor justify unlimited discovery requests addressed to a wealthy party. The 
1983 Committee Note cautioned that “[t]he court must apply the standards in an even-handed 
manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, 
whether financially weak or affluent.” 
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 2(E):  “Importance of Discovery” —This factor examines the 
importance of the discovery to resolving the issues in the case.17 
 
One aspect of this factor is to identify what issues or topics are the subject of the proposed 
discovery and how important those issues and topics are to resolving the overall case.18  Discovery 
relating to a central issue is more important than discovery relating to a peripheral issue. 19  
 
Another aspect is the role of the proposed discovery in resolving the issue to which the 
discovery is directed.  Discovery that is essential to resolving that issue is more important than 
discovery that is cumulative or only tangentially related to that issue.20  
 
Understanding the importance of proposed discovery may involve assessing what the 
requesting party is realistically able to predict about what added information the proposed 




GUIDELINE 2(F):  “Whether the Burden or Expense Outweighs Its Likely 
Benefit”—This factor identifies and weighs the burden or expense of the discovery 
in relation to its likely benefit.21  There is no fixed burden-to-benefit ratio that 
defines what is or is not proportional. 
 
The “importance of discovery factor” discussed in GUIDELINE 2(E) addresses the likely 
benefits of proposed discovery based on its importance to resolving issues and the importance of 
those issues to resolving the case.   
 
In general, proposed discovery that is likely to return important information on issues that 
must be resolved will justify expending more resources than proposed discovery seeking 
information that is unlikely to exist, that may be hard to find or retrieve, or that is on issues that 
may be of secondary importance to the case, that may be deferred until other threshold or more 
significant issues are resolved, or that may not need to be resolved at all. 
 
If the information sought is important to resolving an issue, discovery to obtain that 
information can be expected to yield a greater benefit and justifies a heavier burden, especially if 
the issue is important to resolving the case or materially advances resolution.  If the information 
sought is of marginal or speculative usefulness in resolving the issue, the burden is harder to justify, 
especially if the issue is not central to resolving the case or is unlikely to materially advance case 
resolution.22  
 
This factor focuses on the benefits of the information to be obtained and the burdens or 
expenses of obtaining that information. It is to be considered along with the other factors, which 
separately address and take into account the importance of the issues at stake and any resulting 
benefit to society associated with litigation of those issues.23 
 
GUIDELINE 6 separately addresses which party bears the burden of providing specific 
information about the burdens, expense, or benefits of proposed discovery when proportionality 
disputes arise. 
  
Rule 26(b)(2)(B) addresses a specific type of burden argument—that discovery should not 
proceed with respect to a particular source of electronically stored information because accessing 
information from that source is unduly burdensome or costly.  Examples might include information 
stored using outdated or “legacy” technology or information stored for disaster recovery rather 
than archival purposes that would not be searchable or even usable without significant effort.  Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) has specific provisions for discovery from such sources.  Those provisions do not 











OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“The parties may begin discovery without a full appreciation of the factors that bear on 
proportionality. A party requesting discovery, for example, may have little information about the 
burden or expense of responding. A party requested to provide discovery may have little 
information about the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues as understood by the 
requesting party. Many of these uncertainties should be addressed and reduced in the parties’ Rule 
26(f) conference and in scheduling and pretrial conferences with the court. But if the parties 
continue to disagree, the discovery dispute could be brought before the court and the parties’ 
responsibilities would remain as they have been since 1983. A party claiming undue burden or 
expense ordinarily has far better information — perhaps the only information — with respect to 
that part of the determination. A party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues 
should be able to explain the ways in which the underlying information bears on the issues as that 
party understands them.25 The court’s responsibility, using all the information provided by the 
parties, is to consider these and all the other factors in reaching a case-specific determination of 
the appropriate scope of discovery.” 
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 3:  Applying the six proportionality factors depends on the informed 
judgment of the parties and the judge analyzing the facts and circumstances of each 
case.  The weight or importance of any factor varies depending on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.   
 
The significance of any factor depends on the case. The parties and the judge must consider 
each factor to determine the degree to which and the way the factor applies in that case.26 The 
factors that apply and their weight or importance can vary at different times in the same case, 
changing as the case proceeds. 
 
No proportionality factor has a prescribed or preset weight or significance. No one factor 
is intrinsically more important or entitled to greater weight than any other.27 
 
The order in which the proportionality factors appear in Rule 26(b)(1) does not signify 
preset importance or weight in a particular case.  The 2015 amendments reordered some of the 
factors to defeat any argument that the amount in controversy was the most important factor 
because it was listed first. 
 
GUIDELINE 4:  The 2015 rule amendments do not require a party seeking discovery 
to show in advance that the proposed discovery is proportional. 
  
The 2015 amendments do not alter the parties’ existing discovery obligations. The 
obligations unchanged by the amendments include obligations under:   
 
Rule 26(g), requiring parties to consider discovery burdens and benefits before requesting 
discovery or responding or objecting to discovery requests and to certify that their discovery 




Rule 34, requiring parties to conduct a reasonable inquiry in responding to a discovery 
request; and 
 
Rule 26(c), Rule 26(f), Rule 26(g), and Rule 37(a), among others, requiring parties to 
communicate with each other about discovery planning, issues, and disputes. The need for 
communication is particularly acute when questions concerning burden and benefit arise because 
one side often has information that the other side may not know or appreciate.  
 
The 2015 amendments do not require the requesting party to make an advance showing of 
proportionality.28  Unless specific questions about proportionality are raised by a party or the 
judge, there is no need for the requesting party to make a showing of or about proportionality. The 
amendments do not authorize a party to object to discovery solely on the ground that the requesting 
party has not made an advance showing of proportionality.  As discussed in GUIDELINE 5, the 
amendments do not authorize boilerplate, generalized objections to discovery on the ground that 
it is not proportional.    
 
The amendments do not alter the existing principles or framework for determining which 
party must bear the costs of responding to discovery requests.  
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Restoring the proportionality calculation to Rule 26(b)(1) does not change the existing 
responsibilities of the court and the parties to consider proportionality, and the change does not 
place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations.” 
 
“Nor is the change intended to permit the opposing party to refuse discovery simply by making a 
boilerplate objection that it is not proportional. The parties and the court have a collective 





GUIDELINE 5:  The 2015 rule amendments do not authorize boilerplate, blanket, or 
conclusory objections or refusals to provide discovery on the ground that it is not 
proportional. 
 
The addition of proportionality to the Rule 26(b)(1) definition of the scope of discovery 
does not authorize a party to assert boilerplate, blanket, or conclusory objections to discovery or 
refusals to provide discovery.29  To the contrary, Rule 34 is amended to require parties to state 
with specificity the grounds for objections or for refusals to produce documents or electronically 
stored information.  Boilerplate objections or refusals to respond to discovery requests risk 
violating Rule 26(g). Objections that state with specificity why the proposed discovery is not 






OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 34 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Rule 34(b)(2)(B) is amended to require that objections to Rule 34 requests be stated with 
specificity. This provision adopts the language of Rule 33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt that less 
specific objections might be suitable under Rule 34. The specificity of the objection ties to the new 
provision in Rule 34(b)(2)(C) directing that an objection must state whether any responsive 
materials are being withheld on the basis of that objection. An objection may state that a request 
is overbroad, but if the objection recognizes that some part of the request is appropriate the 
objection should state the scope that is not overbroad.31 Examples would be a statement that the 
responding party will limit the search to documents or electronically stored information created 
within a given period of time prior to the events in suit, or to specified sources. When there is such 
an objection, the statement of what has been withheld can properly identify as matters “withheld” 
anything beyond the scope of the search specified in the objection.” 
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 6:  When proportionality disputes arise, the party in the best position 
to provide information about the burdens, expense, or benefits of the proposed 
discovery ordinarily will bear the responsibility for doing so. Which party that is 
depends on the circumstances. 32   In general, the party from whom proposed 
discovery is sought ordinarily is in a better position to specify and support the 
burdens and expense of responding, while the party seeking proposed discovery 
ordinarily is in a better position to specify the likely benefits by explaining why it 
is seeking and needs the discovery.33 
  
If a party objects that it would take too many hours, consume unreasonable amounts of 
other resources, or impose other burdens34 to respond to the proposed discovery,35 the party should 
specify what it is about the search, retrieval, review, or production process that requires the work 
or time or that imposes other burdens.36   
 
If a party objects to the expense of responding to proposed discovery, the party should be 
prepared to support the objection with an informed estimate of what the expenses would be and 
how they were determined, specifying what it is about the source, search, retrieval, review, or 
production process that requires the expenses estimated.37  
If a party requests discovery and it is objected to as overly burdensome or expensive, the 
requesting party should be prepared to specify why it requested the information and why it expects 
the proposed discovery to yield that information.38  Assessing whether the requesting party has 
adequately specified the likely benefits of the proposed discovery may involve assessing the 
information the requesting party already has, whether through its own knowledge, through publicly 
available sources, or through discovery already taken.39   
 
A party with inferior access to discoverable information relevant to the claims or defenses 
may also have inferior access to the information needed to evaluate the benefit, cost, and burden 
of the discovery sought. 40   Assessing the benefits of proposed discovery may also involve 
assessing how well the requesting party is able to predict what added information the proposed 




Party cooperation is particularly important in understanding the burdens or benefits of 
proposed discovery and in resolving disputes.41  The parties should be prepared to discuss with the 
judge whether and how they communicated with each other about those burdens or benefits. The 
parties should also be prepared to suggest ways to modify the requests or the responses, when 
appropriate, to reduce the burdens and expense or to increase the likelihood that the proposed 
discovery will be beneficial to the case.42    
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 1 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Rule 1 is amended to emphasize that just as the court should construe and administer these rules 
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, so the parties share the 
responsibility to employ the rules in the same way. Most lawyers and parties cooperate to achieve 
these ends. But discussions of ways to improve the administration of civil justice regularly include 
pleas to discourage over-use, misuse, and abuse of procedural tools that increase cost and result in 
delay. Effective advocacy is consistent with — and indeed depends upon — cooperative and 
proportional use of procedure. 
 
This amendment does not create a new or independent source of sanctions. Neither does it abridge 
the scope of any other of these rules.” 
 
************************************** 
GUIDELINE 7:  If a party asserts that proposed discovery is not proportional because 
it will impose an undue burden, and the opposing party responds that the proposed 
discovery will provide important benefits, the judge should assess the competing 
claims under an objective reasonableness standard.43 
 
In deciding whether a discovery request is proportional to the needs of the case, only 
reasonable (or the reasonable parts of) expenses or burdens should be considered.  
 
Changes in technology can affect the context for applying the objective reasonableness 
standard.  It is appropriate to consider claims of undue burden or expense in light of the benefits 
and costs of the technology that is reasonably available to the parties.44     
 
It is generally not appropriate for the judge to order a party to purchase or use a specific 
technology, or use a specific method, to respond to or to conduct discovery.  In assessing discovery 
expenses and burdens and the time needed for discovery, however, it may be appropriate for the 
judge to consider whether a party has been unreasonable in choosing the technology or method it 











II.   BEST PRACTICES 
 
The following practices suggest useful ways to achieve proportional discovery in specific 
cases.  There is no one-size-fits-all approach.  While practices that would advance proportional 
discovery in one case might hinder it in others, the suggestions may be helpful in many cases and 
worth considering in most. The suggestions are framed in terms of parties’ as well as judges’ case-
management practices and are intended to provide help in carrying out the shared responsibility 
for discovery proportional to the needs of the case.     
 
BEST PRACTICE 1:  The parties should engage in early, ongoing, and meaningful 
discovery planning. 46  The parties should begin to work internally and with 
opposing parties on relevance and proportionality in discovery requests and 
responses from the outset, which can be well before a case is filed or served and 
before the Rule 26(f) meet-and-confer, the Rule 26(f) report, and the Rule 16 
conference with the judge.  The judge should make it clear from the outset that the 
parties are expected to plan for and work toward proportional discovery. 47 
 
The parties and judge share responsibility for ensuring that discovery is proportional to the 
needs of the case.48 
 
The parties are usually in the best position to know which subjects and sources will most 
clearly and easily yield the most promising discovery benefits.  In many cases, the parties use their 
knowledge of the case to set discovery plans that achieve proportionality.49  When that does not 
occur, or when discovery disputes nonetheless arise, judges play a critical role by taking 
appropriate steps to ensure that discovery is proportional to the needs of the case. 50 
  
Parties and judges have a variety of practices to work toward proportionality.  They 
include: (1) practices for the parties to identify and work together beginning early in the case to 
create and implement a discovery and case-management order that works toward proportional 
discovery; (2) orders that judges issue early in the case communicating the judge’s expectations 
about how the parties will conduct discovery; (3) ways for parties to identify discovery disputes 
promptly, attempt to resolve them, and if unsuccessful to bring them to the judge for timely, 
efficient, and fair resolution; (4) orders that judges issue early in the case setting procedures for 
the parties to promptly bring discovery disputes and related matters that they cannot resolve to the 
judge; (5) procedures for the parties to engage the judge promptly and efficiently when discovery 
and related pretrial disputes make it necessary; and (6) orders that judges issue communicating the 
willingness to be available when necessary.51   
 
The practices that follow provide examples of specific approaches that judges and parties 
across the country have used to work toward proportionality in discovery, including timely and 
efficiently resolving discovery disputes.52    
 
While the judge has the ultimate responsibility for determining the boundaries of 
proportional discovery, the process of achieving proportional discovery is most effective and 




OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Restoring proportionality as an express component of the scope of discovery warrants repetition 
of parts of the 1983 and 1993 Committee Notes that must not be lost from sight. The 1983 
Committee Note explained that “[t]he rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the 
discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-
regulating basis.” The 1993 Committee Note further observed that “[t]he information explosion 
of recent decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the 
potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.” What seemed an 
explosion in 1993 has been exacerbated by the advent of e-discovery. The present amendment 
again reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in the cases that do not yield 
readily to the ideal of effective party management. It is expected that discovery will be effectively 
managed by the parties in many cases. But there will be important occasions for judicial 
management, both when the parties are legitimately unable to resolve important differences and 
when the parties fall short of effective, cooperative management on their own.” 
 
“Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) is amended to reflect the transfer of the considerations that bear on 
proportionality to Rule 26(b)(1). The court still must limit the frequency or extent of proposed 
discovery, on motion or on its own, if it is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” 
 
************************************** 
BEST PRACTICE 2:  As soon as possible and both before and in the Rule 26(f) meet-
and-confer,53 the parties should talk in person or at least by telephone to discuss 
what the case is about and what information will be needed and to plan for 
proportional discovery. 54  The parties’ discussions should result in a proposed 
discovery/case-management plan with enough detail and specificity to demonstrate 
to the judge that the parties are working toward proportional discovery.  The judge 
should consider issuing an order early in the case that clearly communicates what 
the judge expects the parties to discuss, to address in their Rule 26(f) report, and to 
be prepared to discuss at a Rule 16 conference with the judge. 
 
Early discussions between the parties, in person or by telephone, provide the best 
opportunity to meaningfully discuss what the discovery will be, where it should begin, and how it 
might relate to the overall case plan.  Email or written exchanges alone are much less effective at 
facilitating detailed discovery planning or establishing a framework for identifying and resolving 
discovery and other pretrial disputes. 
 
The parties’ discussions, including in the Rule 26(f) meet-and-confer, and report should 
cover more than dates for pleading amendments, expert designations, discovery deadlines, 
motions, and trial, and should go beyond the Rule 26(f) required topics of preservation, protection 
against privilege waiver, and form of production.  The discussions should result in a proposed 
discovery/case management plan detailed and specific enough to demonstrate to the judge that the 





The judge should make clear—by order or other manner the judge chooses—that the parties 
are expected to have a meaningful discussion and exchange of information during the Rule 26(f) 
meet-and-confer and what the parties are expected to cover. The judge should also make clear that 
the Rule 26(f) report will be reviewed and addressed at the Rule 16 conference.  Judges following 
this practice often issue a form order that is routinely sent shortly after the case is filed, along with 
the order sent to set the dates to file the Rule 26(f) report or to hold the Rule 16 conference. 
  
In a case in which the judge has a basis to expect that discovery will be voluminous or 
complex, or in which there is likely to be significant disagreement about discovery, the judge might 
consider scheduling a conference call with the parties before they hold their Rule 26(f) meet-and-
confer and draft their joint discovery/case-management plan. 
 
Some districts address these practices in their local guidelines or rules.  
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 16 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“At the same time, a new provision recognizes that the court may find good cause to extend the 
time to issue the scheduling order. In some cases it may be that the parties cannot prepare 
adequately for a meaningful Rule 26(f) conference and then a scheduling conference in the time 
allowed. Litigation involving complex issues, multiple parties, and large organizations, public or 
private, may be more likely to need extra time to establish meaningful collaboration between 
counsel and the people who can supply the information needed to participate in a useful way. 
Because the time for the Rule 26(f) conference is geared to the time for the scheduling conference 
or order, an order extending the time for the scheduling conference will also extend the time for 
the Rule 26(f) conference. But in most cases it will be desirable to hold at least a first scheduling 




BEST PRACTICE 3:  On the judge’s own initiative or on the parties’ request, the judge 
should consider holding “live” Rule 16(b) case-management and other conferences, 
in person if practical or by a conference call, videoconference, or other means of 
having a real-time conversation if distance or other obstacles make in-person 
attendance too costly or difficult. 
 
A “live” interactive conference, in person if possible or if not by telephone, 
videoconference, or other means for having a real-time, interactive conversation, even among 
multiple parties, provides the judge and the parties the best opportunity to meaningfully discuss 
what the discovery will be, where it should focus and why, and how the planned discovery relates 
to the overall case plan.  The parties and the judge should take advantage of technology to facilitate 
live interactive case-management and other conferences and hearings when in-person attendance 
is impractical. 
 
A live interactive conference allows the judge to ask follow-up questions and probe the 
responses to obtain better information about the benefits and burdens likely to result from the 
proposed subjects and sources of discovery.  A live interactive conference also provides the judge 
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an opportunity to explore related matters, such as whether an expected summary judgment motion 
might influence the timing, sequence, or scope of planned discovery. 
 
A live interactive case-management conference allows the judge to identify early the 
relatively few cases that require more extensive case management.  The conference provides the 
court the most effective way to monitor all cases with little judge or law clerk time required to 
determine whether the parties are planning proportional discovery, and to limit more extensive 
case management to the cases that need it.  
 
In some cases, more than one live case-management conference might be appropriate.  In 
a case in which discovery is likely to be voluminous or complex, or in which there is likely to be 
significant disagreement about discovery, the judge and parties should consider whether to 
schedule periodic live conferences or hearings, which can be canceled if not needed. 
 
In cases involving complex or extensive electronic discovery, the parties and judge might 
consider whether to have IT personnel, records management personnel, or electronic discovery 
consultants attend the case-management conference. 
   
Some districts address this practice in their local guidelines or rules. 
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 16 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“The provision for consulting at a scheduling conference by “telephone, mail, or other means” is 
deleted. A scheduling conference is more effective if the court and parties engage in direct 
simultaneous communication. The conference may be held in person, by telephone, or by more 
sophisticated electronic means.” 
 
************************************** 
BEST PRACTICE 4:  The judge should ensure that the parties have considered what 
facts can be stipulated to or are undisputed and can be removed from discovery.55 
 
Discovery about matters that are not in dispute and to which the parties can stipulate is 
often inherently disproportionate because it yields no benefit.  The judge should ensure—through 
an order, in a Rule 16 conference, or in another manner—that the parties are not conducting 
discovery into matters subject to stipulation.  The judge should also work with the parties to 












BEST PRACTICE 5:  In many cases, the parties will start discovery by seeking 
information relevant to the most important issues in a case, available from the most 
easily accessible sources. 56  In a case in which the parties have not done so, or in 
which discovery is likely to be voluminous or complex, or in which there is likely 
to be significant disagreement about relevance or proportionality, the parties and 
the judge should consider and discuss starting discovery with the subjects and 
sources that are most clearly proportional to the needs of the case.57  The parties 
and the judge can use the results of that discovery to guide decisions about further 
discovery.   
 
The information available at the start of the case is often enough to allow the parties to 
discuss with clients and each other the subjects and sources of information that are highly relevant 
to important issues in the case and can be obtained without undue burden or expense.58  Discovery 
into those subjects and from those sources is usually proportional to the needs of the case because 
it is likely to yield valuable information with relatively less cost and effort.   In many cases, the 
parties begin discovery on these subjects and sources without judicial involvement and without 
explicitly labeling it as “proportional” or “focused.”  The process is simply the familiar one 
of making smart choices about the most productive steps to get the information the parties need 
most and first.     
 
If the parties have not thought through discovery, or the discovery is likely to be 
voluminous or complex, or there is likely to be significant disagreement about relevance or 
proportionality, the judge should encourage the parties to consider starting discovery with the 
information central to the most important subjects, available from the most easily accessible 
sources of that information.59  The parties and the judge can use this information to guide decisions 
about further discovery.60  For example, the parties can use the information to decide whether to 
make additional discovery requests or how to frame them.  The judge can use the information to 
help understand and resolve proportionality or other questions that may arise during further 
discovery.  This approach does not foreclose additional discovery or predetermine that it will be 
required.    
 
The objective of this approach is to identify good places for discovery to begin, deferring 
until later more difficult questions about where discovery should end.  If more discovery is sought, 
no heightened showing is required.  The parties and the judge will have more information to assess 
proportionality, but the factors and their application do not change simply because some discovery 
has occurred. 
 
In some cases, the parties may want to start discovery by obtaining enough information to 
decide whether to file a dispositive motion, to try the case, or to work toward prompt settlement.61  
It may make sense for the parties and the judge to start discovery by seeking information directed 
to a particular issue, claim, or defense.  For example, a case may raise threshold questions such as 
jurisdiction, venue, or limitations that are best decided early because the answers impact whether 
and what further discovery is needed.  In some cases, this may be clear after initial disclosures are 
exchanged.  In other cases, the parties may want to start by seeking information bearing on 
damages to make decisions about settlement value or how aggressively to pursue claims or 




In some cases, it may be necessary for the parties to exchange more information to identify 
where to start discovery.  In other cases, with relatively few disputed issues and limited 
discoverable information available from relatively few sources, setting discovery priorities may 
not be necessary or useful at all.    
  
A judge who holds a live Rule 16 conference can address with the parties the potential 
benefits of starting with focused or targeted discovery and his or her expectations about how the 
parties will conduct it.  The judge can address concerns that one or more parties will misunderstand 
the process or engage in inappropriate tactics.  The judge might consider discussing with the parties 
what objections typically would or would not be appropriate.  If the parties have reached agreement 
on starting discovery to get the most important information from the most accessible sources, there 
should be few occasions for objections on relevance or proportionality grounds. 
 
Judges should consider using other tools designed to facilitate and accelerate the exchange 
of information on issues central to the case.  For example, judges should consider using the Initial 
Discovery Protocols for Employment Cases Alleging Adverse Action in cases where they apply. 
Developed jointly by experienced plaintiff and defense attorneys, these protocols are pattern 
discovery requests that identify documents and information that are presumptively not 
objectionable and that must be produced at the start of the lawsuit. The self-described purpose of 
these protocols is to “encourage parties and their counsel to exchange the most relevant 
information and documents early in the case, to assist in framing the issues to be resolved and to 
plan for more efficient and targeted discovery.” The protocols are another way to work toward 
proportional discovery and have been used effectively in courts around the country.  It is expected 
that work will be undertaken to develop similar subject-specific discovery protocols for other 
practice areas. 62 
 
BEST PRACTICE 6:  In a case in which discovery will start with particular subjects 
or sources of information, the judge should consider including guidance in the Rule 
16(b) case-management order. 
 
While starting discovery by seeking less information than the maximum conceivably 
allowed can advance the goal of proportionality, it can also cause concern to some litigants.  Some 
may worry that it will be used as a tool to restrict discovery, fearing that they will be required to 
make a special case for proportionality before any additional discovery will be allowed.  Others 
may worry that it will be used as a tool to protract discovery if additional rounds of discovery are 
viewed to be allowed as a given regardless of how robust the initial efforts were or what 
information they yielded.  Still others may worry that expressing an interest in starting with less-
than-maximum discovery will be mischaracterized or misunderstood as a desire for a rigidly 
phased or staged discovery process.  Absent any guidance from the judge, these and other concerns 
may lead parties to forego or resist setting priorities for discovery even when it would make sense 
to do so. 
 
The judge should consider taking steps to avoid misunderstanding and provide clarity. The 
judge might consider including a statement in the Rule 16(b) case-management order 
acknowledging that the parties are starting with discovery into certain issues or from certain 
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sources and will use the results to guide decisions about further discovery.63 The order can convey 
the judge’s willingness to consider additional discovery and to be available when the parties 
disagree over whether that is proportional to the needs of the case.    
 
The parties might consider asking the judge to divide the discovery period, using an interim 
deadline for completing early discovery and a later deadline for completing further discovery that 
is warranted.  The parties might also consider asking the judge to schedule a discovery status 
conference or ask for a report after the early discovery is complete.  The point is not to impose 
rigid “bifurcated” or “staged” discovery, but to work toward and implement a case-specific plan 
that is tailored to the needs of the case and flexible enough to evolve with the case. 
 
If discovery starts with particular subjects or sources, the parties and the judge should 
consider whether this may require some individuals to be deposed more than once, or require the 
responding party to search a source more than once.64  The parties and the judge should address 
and consider ways to avoid repeat work, including by allowing the witness to be deposed on all 
matters in the case or by allowing a broad search from that source. 65  
   
If the parties reach agreement on starting discovery with particular subjects or sources, a 
party stipulation or a court order might also specify ways to streamline that discovery, including 
arranging for the informal exchange of information.   
 
BEST PRACTICE 7:  If there are discovery disputes the parties cannot resolve, the 
parties should promptly bring them to the judge.  The judge should make it clear 
from the outset that he or she will be available to promptly address the disputes.66 
 
Procedures for the parties to promptly engage the judge in resolving discovery disputes 
that the parties are unable to resolve on their own are important to avoiding the costs and delays 
that frustrate efficient and cost-effective case management and defeat proportionality.  Prompt 
resolution of discovery disputes prevents them from growing in intensity and complexity and 
allows discovery, motions, and pretrial preparations to continue rather than entirely stop while the 
dispute is pending.  The judge should consider including in an order issued early in the case a 
procedure that makes clear the judge’s availability to work with the parties in timely resolving 
discovery disputes.   
 














BEST PRACTICE 8:  On the judge’s own initiative or on the parties’ request, the judge 
should consider requiring the parties to request an in-person or telephone 
conference with the court after conferring with opposing parties and before filing a 
motion seeking to compel or to protect against discovery.67  Some judges require 
the parties to request a conference on the basis of limited motions or short briefs.68  
These and similar practices avoid the often unnecessary costs and delays of fully 
briefed discovery motions. 
 
A live pre-motion or limited-motion conference between the parties and the court is often 
an effective way to promptly, efficiently, and fairly resolve a discovery dispute at considerably 
less judge- and law-clerk time than reading fully briefed motions, responses, and replies with 
attachments and issuing a written opinion.69  The parties and the judge save time, work, and 
resources.   
 
The live pre-motion or limited-motion conference can often be held shortly after the parties 
inform the judge’s case manager or judicial assistant that a discovery dispute has arisen.  The 
conference lets the parties tell the judge what the party seeking the discovery needs and what the 
party resisting the discovery is able to produce without undue burden, cost, or expense.   
 
The live, interactive conference exchange allows the parties and the judge to productively 
focus on practical solutions to practical problems rather than on disagreements over jurisprudence.  
The conference exchange often resolves the discovery dispute, either by leading to an agreed 
resolution or by providing the judge with the information needed to rule fairly and accurately.  
Discovery can continue, allowing the case to stay on track instead of stopping while the judge 
reads extensive motions and briefs and writes a written opinion.  The parties are saved the cost and 
delay of filing full motions and briefs, and the judge and her clerks are saved the work and time 
needed to read those motions and briefs and issue a written opinion.    
 
If the pre-motion or limited-motion conference indicates that some briefing or additional 
information on specific issues would be helpful, the judge can focus further work on the specific 
issues that require it. 
 
The judge might consider requiring the party requesting a pre-motion or limited-motion 
conference on a discovery dispute to send a short communication—often limited to two pages—
describing (not arguing) the issues that need to be addressed and allowing a similarly limited 
response.  
 
The judge might consider the best way to memorialize the results of the conference.   
Approaches can vary.  Some judges have a court reporter present for the conference and hold it in 
the courtroom.  Others hold the conference in chambers, sometimes with a court reporter and other 
times with a law clerk taking notes for a brief minute entry in the court’s docket sheet.  Other 
judges may ask one of the parties to draft and circulate a proposed order.  Some cases may be 
better served by the courtroom formality and others by the more relaxed exchange in chambers.     
 
The judge can include a pre-motion or limited-motion conference requirement and 
procedure in the case-management order issued under Rule 16(b).  The procedure can include 
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provisions for using telephone or video conferences if one or more of the parties cannot attend in 
person.    
 
Some districts address this practice in their local guidelines or rules.70 
 
OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 16 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Finally, the order may direct that before filing a motion for an order relating to discovery the 
movant must request a conference with the court. Many judges who hold such conferences find 
them an efficient way to resolve most discovery disputes without the delay and burdens attending 
a formal motion, but the decision whether to require such conferences is left to the discretion of 
the judge in each case.” 
 
************************************** 
BEST PRACTICE 9:  When proposed discovery would not or might not be 
proportional if allowed in its entirety, the judge should consider whether it would 
be appropriate to grant the request in part and defer deciding the remaining issues. 
 
Allowing proposed discovery in part can further an iterative process.  The discovery 
allowed may be all that is needed, or it may clarify what further discovery is appropriate.71  
Deferring a decision on whether to allow the rest of the proposed discovery gives the judge and 
parties more information to decide whether all or part of it is proportional. 
  
Sampling can be used to determine whether the likely benefits of the proposed discovery, 
or the burdens and costs of producing it, warrant granting all or part of the remaining request at a 
later time. 72 
 
If a modified request would be proportional, the judge ordinarily should permit the 
proportional part of the discovery.  However, the judge is under no obligation to do so and may 
rule on the discovery request as made. 
 
BEST PRACTICE 10:  The parties and judge should consider other discovery rules 
and tools that may be helpful in achieving fair, efficient, and cost-effective 
discovery. In particular, the parties should consider delivering discovery requests 
before their Rule 26(f) meet-and-confer. 
 
Other discovery rule changes and tools, not part of the proportionality amendments, should 
be considered as part of the judge's and parties' overall plan for fair, workable, efficient, and cost-
effective discovery and case resolution.73  
 
Rule 26(d) is amended to allow a requesting party to deliver document requests to another 
party before the Rule 26(f) conference.  The requests are not considered served until the meeting, 
and the 30-day period to respond does not start until that date.  The early opportunity to review the 
proposed requests allows the responding party to investigate and identify areas of concern or 
dispute.  The parties can discuss and try to resolve those areas at the Rule 26(f) conference on an 
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informed basis.  If disputes remain, the parties should use the Rule 26(f) report and the Rule 16(b) 
conference to bring them to the court for early resolution.   
 
As an alternative to the formal mechanism that now exists under Rule 34, some lawyers 
may prefer to share draft, unsigned document requests, interrogatories, and requests for admission.  
Both the formal and informal practices prompt an informed, early conversation about the parties’ 
respective discovery needs and abilities. 
 
Rule 26(c) makes explicit judges’ authority to shift some or all of the reasonable costs of 
discovery on a good cause showing if a party from whom discovery is sought moves for a 
protective order. 74  A judge may, as an alternative to denying all of the requested 
discovery, order that some or all of the discovery may proceed on the condition that the requesting 
party bear some or all of the reasonable costs to respond.  The longstanding presumption in federal-
court discovery practice is that the responding party bears the costs of complying with discovery 
requests.75  That presumption continues to apply.   The 2015 amendments to Rule 26(c) make that 
authority explicit but do not change the good cause requirement or the circumstances that can 
support finding good cause. 76 
  
Rule 37(e) is amended to clarify when and how a judge may respond to a party’s inability 
to produce electronically stored information because it was lost and the party failed to take 
reasonable steps to preserve it.  It provides a nationally uniform standard for when a judge may 
impose an adverse inference instruction or other serious sanctions.  It responds to the concern that 
some persons and entities were over-preserving out of fear their actions would later be judged 
under the most demanding circuit standards.  Working toward proportionality in preservation is an 
important part of achieving proportionality in discovery overall. Other rule amendments 
emphasize the need for careful attention to preservation issues. Rule 26(f) has been amended to 
add preservation of electronically stored information to the list of issues to be addressed in the 
parties’ discovery plan.  Rule 16(b) is amended to add preservation of electronically stored in 
formation to the list of issues the case-management order may address. 
 
Rule 16(b) and Rule 26(f) have been amended to encourage the use of orders under Rule 
502(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence providing that producing information in the litigation does 
not waive attorney-client privilege or work-product protection, either in that litigation or in 
subsequent litigation. Nonwaiver orders under Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) can promote 
proportionality by reducing the time, expense, and burden of privilege review and waiver disputes. 
 
Questions impacting and approaches to discovery are usually best explored in a live 
conference between the judge and the parties, preferably before formal discovery-related motions 
(such as under Rule 26(c) or Rule 37(a)) and accompanying briefs are filed.  A live Rule 16 or pre-
motion conference enables the judge and the parties to examine how the various discovery tools 








OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 16 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“The [Rule 16 scheduling] order also may include agreements incorporated in a court order under 
Evidence Rule 502 controlling the effects of disclosure of information covered by attorney-client 





OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 26 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Rule 26(c)(1)(B) is amended to include an express recognition of protective orders that allocate 
expenses for disclosure or discovery. Authority to enter such orders is included in the present rule, 
and courts already exercise this authority. Explicit recognition will forestall the temptation some 
parties may feel to contest this authority. Recognizing the authority does not imply that cost-
shifting should become a common practice. Courts and parties should continue to assume that a 
responding party ordinarily bears the costs of responding.” 
 
“Rule 26(d)(2) is added to allow a party to deliver Rule 34 requests to another party more than 21 
days after that party has been served even though the parties have not yet had a required Rule 26(f) 
conference. Delivery may be made by any party to the party that has been served, and by that party 
to any plaintiff and any other party that has been served. Delivery does not count as service; the 
requests are considered to be served at the first Rule 26(f) conference. Under Rule 34(b)(2)(A) the 
time to respond runs from service. This relaxation of the discovery moratorium is designed to 
facilitate focused discussion during the Rule 26(f) conference. Discussion at the conference may 
produce changes in the requests. The opportunity for advance scrutiny of requests delivered before 
the Rule 26(f) conference should not affect a decision whether to allow additional time to respond.” 
 
* * * * 
“The burden or expense of proposed discovery should be determined in a realistic way. This 
includes the burden or expense of producing electronically stored information. Computer-based 
methods of searching such information continue to develop, particularly for cases involving large 
volumes of electronically stored information. Courts and parties should be willing to consider the 
opportunities for reducing the burden or expense of discovery as reliable means of searching 














OFFICIAL COMMITTEE NOTE, RULE 34 (DEC. 1, 2015) 
 
“Rule 34(b)(2)(A) is amended to fit with new Rule 26(d)(2). The time to respond to a Rule 34 
request delivered before the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference is 30 days after the first Rule 26(f) 
conference.”  
 
“Rule 34(b)(2)(C) is amended to provide that an objection to a Rule 34 request must state whether 
anything is being withheld on the basis of the objection. This amendment should end the confusion 
that frequently arises when a producing party states several objections and still produces 
information, leaving the requesting party uncertain whether any relevant and responsive 
information has been withheld on the basis of the objections. The producing party does not need 
to provide a detailed description or log of all documents withheld, but does need to alert other 
parties to the fact that documents have been withheld and thereby facilitate an informed discussion 
of the objection. An objection that states the limits that have controlled the search for responsive 




BEST PRACTICE 11:  The parties must frame discovery requests and responses after 
considering the burdens and benefits.  Rule 34 emphasizes this obligation by 
prohibiting general, boilerplate objections to production requests and requiring the 
responses to state objections with specificity, to state whether documents are being 
withheld on the basis of objections, and to state when discovery will be completed.77   
When necessary, the parties should ask the judge to enforce these discovery 
obligations, and judges should make themselves available to do so promptly and 
efficiently.   
 
A judge’s prompt enforcement of the Rule 34 prohibition on conclusory and boilerplate 
objections, including to a lack of proportionality, can be a critical part of managing and achieving 
discovery that is both proportional and fair.  Enforcing requirements for specific and clear 
objections can be as important to proportionality as limiting discovery requests to enforce the Rule 
26(b)(1) definition of scope.  Similarly, enforcing the requirements to state when documents will 
be produced and whether documents are being withheld on the basis of objections can help ensure 
proportionality by avoiding uncertainties that often led to more objections and disputes. 
 
The Rule 34 requirements are consistent with the Rule 26(g) requirements to consider 
discovery burdens and benefits before requesting or objecting to discovery and to certify that the 
requests, responses, and objections meet the rule requirements.   
 
The parties should identify ways to engage the judge when necessary to efficiently enforce 
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BEST PRACTICE 12:  The parties and the judge should consider using technology to 
help achieve proportional discovery. 
 
Technology can help proportionality by decreasing the burden or expense, or by increasing 
the likely benefit, of the proposed discovery. 
 
When the discovery involves voluminous amounts of electronically stored information, the 
parties and judge should consider using technologies designed to categorize or prioritize 
documents for human review.78 
    
Because technology evolves quickly, the parties and the judge should not limit themselves 
in advance to any particular technology or approach to using it. Instead, the parties and the judge 








1 Scope of Discovery. 
• 1st Cir. Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Opechee Constr. Corp., 2016 WL 865232, at *3 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2016) (employer is 
not required to interview former employees for discoverable information because, e.g., it would be 
disproportional).  
• 2d Cir. Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 2016 WL 1718387, at *11 (S.D. N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016) (U.S. Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, instead of Hague Convention procedures, governed discovery of documents protected under 
European Data Protection laws after court applied comity analysis); see also Creighton v. City of N.Y., 2016 WL 
1178648, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2016) (in cases involving “state statutes[, which] establish confidentiality 
under amended Rule 26(b)(1) is not as broad as subject matter); see also Neogenix Oncology, Inc. v. Gordon, 
2017 WL 1207558, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (“Substantiation [that discovery request is relevant and 
proportional is most] important where . . . [party] seeks a broad universe of discovery as well as a deposition 
testimony from a non-party to lawsuit.”). 
• 4th Cir. f 
• 5th Cir. In re: Trevino, 2017 WL 123756, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2017) (“scope of discovery, while still broad, 
was condensed in the 2015 amendment's inclusion of a proportionality requirement”); Celanese Corp. v. Clariant 
Corp., 2016 WL 1074573, at*6–7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2016) (proportionality applies to issuance of nonparty 
witness subpoena). 
• 6th Cir. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Warren Chiropractic & Rehab Clinic, P.C., 2016 WL 3450834, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. May 11, 2016) (“Although Rule 26(b) applies equally to discovery of nonparties, the fact of nonparty 
status may be considered by the court in weighing the burdens imposed in the circumstances.”) (quoting Katz v. 
Batavia Marine & Sporting Supplies, Inc., 984 F.2d 422, 424 (Fed. Cir. 1993)); see also Martin v. Posey, 2017 
WL 412876, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017) (“[D]espite other changes to Rule 26, it is still the case that 
information need not be admissible in evidence in order to be discoverable.”); Simon v. Northwestern Univ., 2017 
WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017) (“The 2015 amendments confirmed the concept of ‘proportionality’ by 
adding it to the language of Rule 26(b)(1).”); Commerce and Indus. Ins. Co. v. Century Surety Co., 2017 WL 
946984, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2017) (in dispute over insurer’s duty to defend defendant-employer after 
accident between defendant’s employee and employee of another contractor, interrogatory requests concerning 
scope employee’s work duties and status of work performed by defendant was not disproportional because it 
concerned “the issue at the heart of th[e] case”); United States v. Quicken Loans Inc., 2017 WL 2306444, at *2 
(E.D. Mich. May 26, 2017) (“It is not uncommon for relevant information to be discoverable, even if such 
information falls outside the timeframe of actionable activity set out in a complaint.”). 
• 8th Cir. Schultz v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3149686, at *3 (D.S.D. June 3, 2016) (“the scope of discovery 
under Rule 26(b) is extremely broad.”).  
• 9th Cir. MicroTechnologies, LLC v. Autonomy, Inc., 2016 WL 1273266, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) 
(deposition pursuant to letter rogatory was subject to proportionality).  
• 10th Cir. Rickaby v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1597589, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2016) (in 
ERISA cases, courts must consider goals of ERISA and necessity of discovery, which “militate against broad 
discovery”). 
• 11th Cir. In re: Subpoena Upon NeJames Law, P.A., 2016 WL 1599831, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2016) (“In 
every civil case, questions concerning the scope of discovery start with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).”); see also Graham 
& Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1319697, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2016) (“Courts must accord 
discovery a broad and liberal scope in order to provide parties with information essential to the proper litigation of 
all relevant facts, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement.”); Steel Erectors, Inc. v. AIM Steel Int’l, Inc., 
312 F.R.D. 673, 676 n.4 (S.D. Ga. Jan 4, 2016) (“It remains true today . . . the court is inclined to err in favor of 
discovery rather than against it.”).  
Cf.  
• 1st Cir. Ferring Pharms. Inc. v. Braintree Labs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 355, 363 (D. Mass. 2016) (judge’s failure to 
“expressly reference proportionality in her ruling does not render her ruling contrary to law.”).  
• 3d Cir. Solid Waster Servs., Inc. v. United States, 2016 WL 687182, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 2016) (court’s 
failure to explicitly apply proportionality analysis in IRS enforcement action was not in error when court instead 
applied Powell factors from United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964)).  
• 5th Cir. In re: Application of RSM Prod. Corp., 2016 WL 3477244, at *6 (S.D. Tex. June 27, 2016) 
(finding discovery of information in foreign country in accordance with § 1782 to be overly burdensome and 
disproportionate).  
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2 Discovery must be relevant. 
• 1st Cir. Primarque Prod. v. Williams West & Witt’s Prod. Co., 2016 WL 6090715, at *3 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2016) 
(finding discovery request for defendant’s nationwide sales information as a basis for comparison irrelevant 
because the dispute concerned only sales in New England). 
• 2d Cir. Marom v. City of N.Y., 2016 WL 7048053, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) (court granted discovery 
request because requested documents were “highly relevant to plaintiffs’ theory of the case,” as they might show 
required protocol was not followed). 
• 4th Cir. Prusin v. Canton’s Pearls, LLC, 2016 WL 7408840, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2016) (though they contained 
sensitive information, defendant’s tax returns were relevant, as they might show whether defendant’s minimum 
wage obligations were offset). 
• 5th Cir. In re: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods., 313 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D. La. 2016) (to obtain discovery of 
employee’s personnel files in advance of depositions, party must demonstrate relevancy on witness-by-witness 
basis); see also ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Portland, IMO No. 9497854, 2016 WL 3365426, at *8 n.12 (M.D. La. June 
16, 2016) (“Relevance itself, a discrete and separate yet oft merged requirement, remains a relatively low 
threshold.”); Williams v. U.S. Envtl. Servs., LLC, 2016 WL 617447, at *7 (M.D. La. Feb. 16, 2016) (in 
employment discrimination case, other complaints of discrimination against employer are relevant if limited to: 
(a) same form of discrimination; (b) same department or agency at which plaintiff worked; and (c) reasonable time 
before and after discrimination occurred, usually three to five years); Murillo Modular Grp, Ltd. v. Sullivan, 2016 
WL 6139096, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016) (discovery of “information relevant to a party’s or witness’s 
credibility is relevant”; Howard v. Seadrill Americas, Inc., 2016 WL 7012275, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2016) 
(denying discovery request for phone records because, while they would give information about the exact time a 
relevant phone call was placed, timing of call was “likely not important to resolving dispute”); Leal v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, 2017 WL 68528, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2017) (court denied discovery request for all database and pay 
data for all employees, regardless of their position, that worked in the same stores as plaintiff over a 14-year 
period as overly broad and irrelevant); United States v. Wyeth, 2017 WL 191258, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Jan. 13, 2017) 
(in attorneys’ fees dispute between pharmaceutical company and law firm, court denied discovery of one lawyer’s 
medical school grades and attendance because it was irrelevant); Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 
2017 WL 1429108, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 21, 2017) (denying depositions of certain individuals because no 
evidence suggested that their depositions would be relevant); Waste Mgmt. of La., LLC v. River Birch, Inc., 2017 
WL 2271982, at *4 (E.D. La. May 24, 2017) (court denied discovery that, while broadly connected to issues 
before court, was not relevant to specific claims alleged in complaint).  
• 6th Cir. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Health Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 6822014, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 
18, 2016) (terms of settlement agreement that are relevant and proportional to needs of case are discoverable); 
Queen v. City of Bowling Green, 2017 WL 4355689, at *5-8 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2017) (court limited discovery 
of party’s employment records and tax returns to period following his destructive discharge; previous records 
were irrelevant)..   
• 7th Cir. Southport Bank v. Miles, 2016 WL 7366885, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 2016) (Plaintiff’s argument that it 
needs loan policies to veil pierce “seem[s] to be much more relevant to an independent, and as yet unfiled, claim . 
. . than to the more narrow purpose for which these post-judgment proceedings are designed.”); see also Crabtree 
v. Angie’s List, Inc., 2017 WL 413242, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2017) (Court held that defendant’s “broad 
request” for plaintiff’s emails, texts, and social media posts “would clearly encompass personal communications” 
and had “absolutely no relevance to lawsuit.”); Simon v. Northwestern Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 3, 2017) (Court limited discovery of after-the-fact-evidence because, “[w]hile ‘other acts’ that occur after an 
event may be relevant to showing ‘knowledge’ or ‘intent’ at the time of the event [for purposes of Evidence Rule 
404(b)], there is a steadily diminishing value of relevance . . . the further out in time the ‘other acts’ occur.”). 
• 8th Cir. Leseman, LLC v. Stratasys, Inc., 2016 WL 1117411, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2016) (in patent 
infringement lawsuit, magistrate judge correctly denied plaintiffs’ motion to compel business records for product 
that was experimental and limited in use).  
• 9th Cir. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC, 2016 WL 3200104, at *1–2 (D. Nev. June 6, 
2016) (finding discovery request for, e.g., two years of defendant’s litigation history irrelevant); see also Am. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Haw. Nut & Bolt, Inc., 2017 WL 80248, at *5, 7 (D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2017) (personnel files of 
employees and third-party contractors who handled plaintiff’s insurance claim were relevant and therefore 
permissible, provided that certain information was redacted to protect the individuals’ privacy); Silva v. Allpak 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
asserted that it fired plaintiff solely because of company-wide layoffs, and therefore plaintiff’s attendance and 
veracity in filing worker’s compensation forms were not relevant); Ayala v. Cty. Of Riverside, 2017 WL 1734021, 
at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017) (court permitted discovery of personnel files of five defendants within last five 
years, as they might be relevant to “proving a pattern of failing to investigate and discipline officers for improper 
use of force,” but denied discovery of personnel files for all employees); Caballero v. Bodega Latina Corp., 2017 
WL 3174931, at *1 (D. Nev. July 25, 2017) (“The 2015 amendments did not change this [relevancy] language 
from the previous version.”); Heyman v. State of Nev., 2017 WL 5559912, at *4–5 (D. Nev. Nov. 17, 2017) (court 
held that evidence of defendant’s sexual history was not relevant or proportional to needs of the case; defendant’s 
controlled substance or alcohol use was relevant because they affect a person’s memory of certain events, but 
plaintiff needed to limit requests to times at issue).  
• 10th Cir. Gilmore v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 2017 WL 2439552, at *4 (D. Kan. June 6, 2017) (in suit regarding late 
delivery of machinery for oil well, court denied discovery of cost to build other wells, as it would “shed no light 
on whether [p]laintiff’s reason for a late delivery was legitimate,” and also denied broad discovery of all 
defendant’s email, which  “clearly would encompass wholly irrelevant information”); Gordon v. T.G.R. Logistics, 
Inc., 2017 WL 1947537, at *3 (D. Wyo. May 10, 2017) (court granted-in-part discovery request regarding party’s 
social media account; “it must be the substance of the communication that determines relevance”). 
• 11th Cir. O’Boyle v. Sweetapple, 2016 WL 492655, at *5 (S.D. Fl. Feb. 8, 2016) (“Permitting this subpoena to 
proceed would cause the parties to run down a rabbit hole chasing irrelevant information on collateral matters, 
resulting in the needless and wasteful expenditure of time and money by the parties.”); Emery v. Allied Pilots 
Ass’n, 2017 WL 3412234, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2017) (in action against insurance company for breach of fair 
representation in settlement, un-redacted settlement agreement and settlement terms were relevant to whether 
defendant breached its duty and damages). 
 
3 Proportional discovery continues to be required. 
• 2d Cir. Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (amendments to Rule 
26(b)(1) restored importance of proportionality factors in defining scope of discovery); see also Robertson v. 
People Magazine, 2015 WL 9077111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2015) (amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) restored 
importance of proportionality factors in defining scope of discovery); Abbott v. Wyo. Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2017 
WL 2115381, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (“The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
emphasized the need to focus on proportionality.”); Grief v. Nassau Cty, 2017 WL 3588936, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
18, 2017) (“Those proportionality factors have now been restored to the place of their intended importance by 
their incorporation into the very definition of permissible discovery.”); Levin v. Johnson & Johnson, 2017 WL 
5592684, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2017) (the “proportionality factors have now been restored to the place of their 
intended importance by their incorporation into the very definition of permissible discovery”); Lozada v. Cty. of 
Nassau, 2017 WL 6514675, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2017) (“While the proportionality factors have now been 
incorporated into [Rule 26(b)(1)], those factors were already a part of federal discovery standards.”). 
• 3d Cir. Trask v. Olin Corp., 2016 WL 1255302, at *2 n.5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2016) (amendments to Rule 26 did 
not alter importance of considering proportionality and under both new and old versions of Rule 26; “the Court is 
to consider all of the facts and circumstances of the pending action.”); see also Dixon v. Williams, 2016 WL 
631356, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb 17, 2016) (amendments did not change responsibilities of court and parties in 
considering proportionality). 
• 4th Cir. Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. Jan. 25, 2016) (amendments to Rule 
26(b)(1) did not change existing responsibilities of court and parties in considering proportionality). 
• 5th Cir. Cottonham v. Allen, 2016 WL 4035331, at *1 n.2 (M.D. La. July 25, 2016) (result of discovery dispute 
under amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) would be the same as under previous Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) proportionality 
provision); see also ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Portland, IMO No. 9497854, 2016 WL 3365426, at *8 n.12 (M.D. La. 
June 16, 2016) (“While the Rules were amended effective December 1, 2015, the relevance standard for discovery 
has not changed. Instead, the proportionality factors once set in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) have now been moved into 
Rule 26(b)(1) so as to reemphasize the fact that evidence's discoverability is subject to the proportionality test first 
adopted in 1983.”); InforMD, LLC v. DocRX, Inc., 2016 WL 2343854, at *2 n.13 (M.D. La. May 3, 2016) 
(amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) restored importance of proportionality calculation); see also Braud v. Geo Heat 
Exchangers, L.L.C., 2016 WL 1274558, at *4 (M.D. La. Mar. 31, 2016) (amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) restored 
importance of proportionality consideration); Odeh v. City of Baton Rouge, 314 F.R.D. 386, 389 (M.D. La. 2016) 
(amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) restored proportionality consideration but did not change existing responsibilities 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(M.D. La. Feb. 16, 2016) (amendments did not change existing responsibilities of court and parties in considering 
proportionality); Hume v. Consol. Grain & Barge, Inc., 2016 WL 7385699, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 21, 2016) (In 
denying discovery of a third party’s information, court noted that the “impact of inclusion of the proportionality 
concept within Rule 26(b)(1)’s threshold scope of discovery indicate[s] ‘that non-parties have greater protections 
from discovery and that burdens on non-parties will impact the proportionality analysis.’”) (quoting E. Laporte 
and J. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 
9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 57 (2015)). 
• 6th Cir. In re: ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 2017 WL 27455, at *3, 4–5 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 3, 2017) (in a post-
judgment discovery dispute, discovery of third-party’s records, such as emails, permissible to potentially 
determine an affiliation between defendant and third-party because “discovery . . . must be calculated to assist in 
judgment collection”); King v. Chipotle Serv., LLC, 2017 WL 3193655, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. July 27, 2017) 
(“[R]equiring Chipotle to collect and review information regarding wrongful discharge lawsuits filed in other 
states . . . without an established connection, would constitute a burden disproportionate to the anticipated benefits 
of discovery.”).; Kitchen v. Heyns, 2017 WL 4349283, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 2, 2017) (request for all 
communications to or from defendant regarding transfer or any prisoner “has unlimited breadth” and is not 
proportional; defendant complied with discovery request by producing documents relating only to plaintiff’s 
transfer). 
• 7th Cir. Garner v. St. Clair Cty., 2016 WL 146691, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 2016) (amendments to Rule 
26(b)(1) did not change factors considered in assessing proportionality); see also Noble Roman's, Inc. v. 
Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 311 (S.D. Ind., 2016) (“relevancy” alone is insufficient); Hespe v. City 
of Chi., 2016 WL 7240754, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2016) (court not required to consider plaintiff’s undue burden 
or cost compared with defendant’s “good cause” for requesting discovery; discovery may be limited based on 
other proportionality and timeliness considerations); Simon v. Northwestern Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. 
Ill. Feb. 3, 2017) (“The 2015 amendments confirmed the concept of ‘proportionality’ by adding it to the language 
of Rule 26(b)(1).”). 
• 8th Cir.  Harper v. Unum Grp., 2016 WL 4508238, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2016) (court rejected as 
disproportional request for records from all employees making disability decisions but allowed separate request 
limited to five reviewing individuals); Schultz v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3149686, at *7 (D.S.D. June 3, 2016) 
(court declined to retreat from earlier position in Gowan, noting that “rule [26], and the case law developed under 
the rule, have not been drastically altered.”); see also Gowan v. Mid -Century Insur. Co., 2016 WL 126746, at *5 
(D.S.D. Jan. 11, 2016) (proportionality requirements are “hardly new”). 
• 9th Cir. Wit v. United Behavioral Health, 2016 WL 258604, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016) (amendments 
“restore[d] and reinforce[d] the focus on proportionality in discovery” but did not change existing responsibilities 
of court and parties in considering proportionality); see also Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016 WL 
6963039, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2016) (“For Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality mandate to be meaningful, it must 
apply from the onset of the case.”); Centeno v. City of Fresno, 2016 WL 749634, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) 
(Court granted in part and denied in part a discovery request for prior complaints of misconduct by police officers, 
holding that such claims are only “discoverable when sufficiently similar to the claims brought in the instant 
suit.”); Strickland Real Estate Holdings, LLC v. Texaco, Inc., 2016 WL 7243711, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 
2016) (Court granted discovery request because “the requested discovery goes to the heart of the dispute” and 
defendant “is the type of litigant that can respond to such a request.”); Sci. Games Corp. v. AGS LLC, 2017 WL 
3013251, at fn. 3 (D. Nev. July 13, 2017) (“Because the scope of permissible discovery under Rule 45 parallels 
the scope of discovery permitted by Rule 26, these proportionality considerations apply to third-party discovery 
disputes.”); Does I-XIX v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2017 WL 3841902, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017) (“the 2015 
amendment was merely intended to codify principles that have long been implicit in this analysis”). 
• 10th Cir. In re: Vicki Milholland, 2017 WL 895752, at fn. 28 (10th Cir. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, Mar. 7, 
2017) (“For more than thirty years, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have stressed the need for courts to 
actively manage discovery to prevent parties from using it to ‘wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a 
party, whether financially weak or affluent,’ and have emphasized the concept of proportionality.”; XTO Energy, 
Inc. v. ATD, LLC, 2016 WL 1730171, at *12–19 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2016) (describing extensive background of Rule 
26 amendments, leading up to 2015 amendments); see also Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., 2016 WL 
2772210, at *3 (D. Kan. May 13, 2016) (“The consideration of proportionality is not new, as it has been part of 
the federal rules since 1983.”); Arenas v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 223, 2016 WL 6071802, at *4 (D. Kan. Oct. 17, 
2016) (“Although proportionality has long been a factor in ruling on discovery motions, the recent amendment to 
Rule 26 requires courts to be vigilant to concerns of proportionality.”); Pertile v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2016 WL 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ark. River Power Auth. v. The Babcock & Wilson Co., 2016 WL 192269, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2016) 
(amendments did not change responsibilities of court and parties in considering proportionality); Diesel Power 
Source v. Crazy Carl’s Turbos, 2017 WL 57791, at *2 (D. Utah Jan. 5, 2017) (“recent amendments place greater 
emphasis on this important principle”). Singh v. Shonrock, 2017 WL 698472, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2017) (in 
employment discrimination case, plaintiff-employee’s request to depose employees of co-defendant to determine 
whether other employees were “disciplined, counseled, and/or nonrenewed” for same failure to follow common 
policy rubric allegedly giving rise to plaintiff’s termination was not disproportional in light of similar, prior 
document production and deposition testimony, because witnesses in that prior production and testimony could 
not “recall such information”); City of Orem v. Evanston Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2841219, at *2 (D. Utah July 3, 2017) 
(in personal injury lawsuit, discovery request for all of underwriter’s policy writing materials was overly broad 
and not proportional; court limited discovery to documents used to write defendant city’s policy). 
• 11th Cir. Herrera-Velasquez v. Plantation Sweets, Inc., 2016 WL 183058, at *4 n.6 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 14, 2016) 
(amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) elevated proportionality factors in different order); Strickland v. Tristar Prods., 
Inc., 2017 WL 2874621, at fn. 3 (S.D. Ga. July 5, 2017) (“The recent changes . . . do not change the definition of 
relevance. Instead, they reemphasize . . . requirements already present in the Rules, like proportionality.”). 
• D.C. Cir. United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016) (amendments did not change 
court’s responsibility to consider proportionality but instead moved proportionality factors to make “proportionality 
considerations unavoidable.”). 
Cf. 
• 9th Cir. Adamov v. Pricewaterhouse Coopers, LLP, 2017 WL 6558133, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2017) (“[I]n 2015, 
a proportionality requirement was added to Rule 26. Under the amended Rule 26, relevance alone will not justify 
discovery; discovery must also be proportional to the needs of the case.”). 
 
4 Rule does not change parties’ existing discovery burdens.  
• 1st Cir. Cont’l W. Insur. Co. v. Opechee Constr. Corp., 2016 WL 865232, at *1 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2016) (“[P]arty 
seeking an order compelling discovery responses over the opponent’s objection bears the initial burden of 
showing that the discovery requested is relevant. . . . Once a showing of relevance has been made, the objecting 
party bears the burden of showing that discovery request is improper.”) (citations omitted).  
• 2d Cir. A.M. v. Am. Sch. for the Deaf, 2016 WL 1117363, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 22, 2016) (“The burden of 
demonstrating relevance remains on the party seeking discovery, and the newly-revised rule ‘does not place on the 
party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations.’ . . . Conversely, the ‘party 
resisting discovery has the burden of showing undue burden or expense.’”) (citation omitted) (quoting State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fayda, 2015 WL 7871037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015)); see also Torcasio v. New 
Canaan Bd. of Educ., 2016 WL 299009, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 2016) (party resisting discovery has burden of 
showing why discovery should be denied); Lightsquared, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 2015 WL 8675377, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) (party that seeks to compel discovery from additional custodians “bears the burden of 
establishing the relevance of the documents it seeks from those custodians”); Robertson v. People Magazine, 2015 
WL 9077111, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2015) (“2015 amendment does not create a new standard”).  
• 3d Cir. Haines v. Cherian, 2016 WL 831946, at * 3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2016) (party resisting discovery has 
burden to show why discovery should be denied).  
• 5th Cir. Mir v. L-3 Commuc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P., 2016 WL 3959009, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 22, 2016) 
(“[A]mendments to Rule 26 do not alter the burdens imposed on the party resisting discovery.”); see also 
Hightower v. Grp. 1 Auto., Inc., 2016 WL 3430569, at *3 (E.D. La. June 22, 2016) (“[T]he 2015 amendments to 
the Rule did not change the law. Permissible discovery extends only to that which is nonprivileged, relevant to 
claims and defenses in the case and within the Rule's proportionality limits.”) (emphasis in original); Richmond v. 
SW Closeouts, Inc., 2016 WL 3090672, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 2, 2016) (“[T]he amendments to Rule 26(b) do not 
alter the basic allocation of the burden on the party resisting discovery to – in order to successfully resist a motion 
to compel – specifically object and show that the requested discovery does not fall within Rule 26(b)(1)'s scope of 
relevance (as now amended) or that a discovery request would impose an undue burden or expense or is otherwise 
objectionable.”); Gondola v. USMD PPM, LLC, 2016 WL 3031852, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2016) 
(amendments to Rule 26(b) did not alter existing discovery burdens); McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. 
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3033544, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 26, 2016) (“The amendments to Rule 26 do not 
alter the burdens” set out in Rules 26 and 45); Orchestratehr, Inc. v. Trombetta, 2016 WL 1555784, at *24 (N.D. 
Tex. Apr. 18, 2016) (“But the amendments to Rule 26(b) and Rule 26(c)(1) do not alter the basic allocation of the 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
fall within Rule 26(b)(1)'s scope of relevance (as now amended) or that a discovery request would impose an 
undue burden or expense or is otherwise objectionable.”); Harrison v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 
1392332, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2016) (“[A]mendments to Rule 26 do not alter the burdens imposed on the 
party resisting discovery”); Celanese Corp. v. Clariant Corp., 2016 WL 1074573, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18, 2016) 
(amendments did not change burdens on party resisting discovery); Robinson v. Dallas Cty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 
2016 WL 1273900, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb.18, 2016) (“amendments to Rule 26 do not alter the burdens imposed on 
the party resisting discovery”); McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins., 2016 WL 98603, at *3 
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016) (amendments did not alter burdens placed on party resisting discovery; party resisting 
discovery must show that “requested discovery was overbroad, burdensome, or oppressive by submitting 
affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.”); Nguyen v. Versacom, LLC, 2015 WL 
8316436, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2015) (amendments did not change burden placed on party resisting discovery 
to show that discovery request is not relevant, proportional, or “otherwise objectionable”); Carr v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins., 312 F.R.D. 459 (N.D. Tex. 2015) (party resisting discovery must show why discovery request is 
not relevant or “otherwise objectionable, as, for example, overly broad, burdensome, or oppressive.”); Keycorp v. 
Holland, 2016 WL 6277813, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2016) (“A party seeking to resist discovery . . . still bears 
the burden of making a specific objection and showing that discovery” is not proportional); Murillo Modular Grp, 
Ltd. v. Sullivan, 2016 WL 6139096, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2016) (“The amendments . . . do not alter the basic 
allocation of the burden.”); CGC Royalty Inv. I, LLC v. Bluewater Moorings, LLC, 2017 WL 106795, at *4 (N.D. 
Tex. 2017) (“But a party seeking to resist discovery . . . still bears the burden of making a specific objection and 
showing that the discovery fails the proportionality calculation.”). Samsung Elec. Am. Inc. v. Chung, 2017 WL 
896897, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017) (“[A]mendments to Rule 26(b) do not alter the basic allocation of the 
burden on the party resisting discovery to . . . specifically object.”); Carter v. H2R Rest. Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 
2439439, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2017) (“amendment [] to Rule 26(b) . . . do[es] not alter the basic allocation of 
the burden on the party resisting discovery”). 
• 6th Cir. William Powell Co. v. Nat. Indemnity Co., 2017 WL 1326504, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017) 
(“Commentary from the rulemaking process bolsters the position that the amended rule did not shift the burden of 
proving proportionality to the party seeking discovery.”) (citation omitted). 
• 7th Cir. In re: Cook Med., Inc., 2016 WL 2854169, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 12, 2016) (party moving for protective 
order has burden to show that discovery request is burdensome); see also Design Basics LLC v. Best Built Inc., 
2016 WL 1060253, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2016) (“[A]mendment of Rule 26(b) to make the proportionality 
requirement explicit does not relieve the responding party of the burden to explain how a discovery request is 
burdensome.”); Nerium Skincare, Inc. v. Olson, 2017 WL 277634, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 20, 2017) (“[T]he 
amendments to Rule 26 do not alter the burdens imposed on the party resisting discovery. . . . [A] party seeking to 
resist discovery . . . still bears the burden of making a specific objection and showing that the discovery fails the 
proportionality calculation.”). 
• 8th Cir. Cor Clearing, LLC v. Calissio Res. Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 2997463, at *2 (D. Neb. May 23, 2016) (quoting 
pre-amendment case law for the proposition that a “party seeking discovery must satisfy some threshold showing 
of relevancy before discovery is required.” But, “[o]nce that threshold has been met, the resisting party ‘must 
show specifically how . . . each . . . [request for production] is not relevant or how the discovery is overly broad, 
burdensome, or oppressive.”) (citations omitted); see also Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Andrew, 2016 WL 2350115, at 
*2 (D. Neb. May 4, 2016) (“Mere speculation that information might be useful will not suffice; litigants seeking 
to compel discovery must describe with a reasonable degree of specificity the information they hope to obtain and 
its importance to their case.”); Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court, 316 F.R.D. 254, 276  
(D.S.D. Feb. 26, 2016) (requesting party must show that “requested information falls within the scope of 
discovery under Rule 26(b)(1). . . . Once the requesting party has satisfied its threshold showing, the burden then 
shifts to the party resisting discovery to show specific facts demonstrating that the discovery is irrelevant or 
disproportional.”).  
• 9th Cir. Stoba v. Saveology.com, LLC, 2016 WL 3356796, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 3, 2016) (“Once the party seeking 
discovery establishes that the request meets this broadly-construed relevancy requirement, ‘the party opposing 
discovery has the burden of showing that the discovery should be prohibited, and the burden of clarifying, 
explaining or supporting its objections’”); see also Dao v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 2016 WL 796095, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (“[W]hile the language of the Rule has changed, the amended rule does not actually place a 
greater burden on the parties with respect to their discovery obligations, including the obligation to consider 
proportionality, than did the previous version of the Rule.”); Clymore v. Fed. R.R. Admin., 2015 WL 7760086, at 
*2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015) (party requesting discovery has burden of showing that it has satisfied the 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Nev. July 6, 2017) (“Generally, the party opposing discovery has the burden of showing that it is irrelevant, overly 
broad, or unduly burdensome. When a request is overly broad on its face or when relevancy is not readily 
apparent, however, the party seeking discovery has the burden to show the relevancy of the request.”); Fernandez 
v. Cox, 2017 WL 4873066, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2017) (plaintiff appealed order denying discovery on 
proportionality grounds and claimed that party seeking discovery does not bear burden of proving proportionality; 
decision was upheld because Advisory Committee Notes say that restoring proportionality calculation does not 
change court’s responsibility to consider proportionality). 
• 10th Cir. Bd. of Comm’rs of Shawnee Cty. v. Daimler Trucks N. Am., LLC, 2015 WL 8664202, at *2 (D. Kan. 
Dec. 11, 2016) (“where the relevance of a particular request is not readily apparent, the proponent of a discovery 
request must, in the first instance, show the relevance of the requested information to the claims or defenses in the 
case. Where relevance is apparent, or the proponent of the evidence has shown it is relevant, the burden then shifts 
to the objecting party to establish a lack of relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery either does not 
come within the scope of relevance as defined by Rule 26(b)(1) or is of such marginal relevance that the potential 
harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad discovery.”); see also 
Frick v. Henry Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 6966971, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 2016) (opposing party failed to meet 
burden of demonstrating that discovery was disproportionate); Duffy v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 2016 WL 
7386413, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2016) (The amendments “do not place on the party seeking discovery the burden 
of addressing all proportionality considerations[, but instead,] the parties’ responsibilities remain the same as 
under the pre-amendment Rule.”); Gilmore v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 2017 WL 2439552, at *2 (D. Kan. June 6, 2017) 
(“parties’ responsibilities remain the same as under the pre-amendment Rule”); Yater v. Powderhorn Ski Co., 
LLC, 2018 WL 776361, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2018) (“[W]hen discovery appears to be relevant on its face, the 
responding party bears the burden of establishing that the requested discovery does not come within the scope of 
relevant evidence, or is of such marginal relevance that the potential benefit of discovery is outweighed by the 
harm.”). 
• 11th Cir. Edmonson v. Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, 2016 WL 7048363, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2016) (“Plaintiffs here 
must make a ‘threshold showing’ and confront reality that ‘[m]ere speculation that information might be useful 
will not suffice.’”) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court, 316 F.R.D. 254, 263 
(D.S.D. Feb. 26, 2016)); Clark v. Hercules, Inc., 2017 WL 3316311, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2017) (“Restoring 
the proportionality calculation . . . does not change the existing responsibilities of the court and the parties to 
consider proportionality, and the change does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing 
all proportionality calculations. Nor is the change intended to permit the opposing party to refuse discovery 
simply by making a boilerplate objection that it is not proportional.”). 
• D.C Cir. United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA., Inc., 2016 WL 74394, at *8 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2016) (“Once the 
relevancy of the materials being sought has been established, the objecting party then bears the burden of ‘showing 
why discovery should not be permitted.’”). 
 
5 Federal rules contemplate liberal discovery. 
• 2d Cir. Am. Fed’n of Musicians v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 2016 WL 2609307, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016) 
(“2015 amendments did not alter the underlying concept of relevance, which ‘is a matter of degree, and the 
standard is applied more liberally in discovery than it is at trial’”) (quoting Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp, 2015 
WL 616386, at * 11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016)). 
• 4th Cir. Scott Hutchison Enters., Inc. v. Cranberry Pipeline Corp., 2016 WL 5219633, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 
20, 2016) (“[N]otwithstanding Rule 26(b)(1)’s recent amendment placing an emphasis on the proportionality of 
discovery, the discovery rules, including Rule 26, remain subject to ‘broad and liberal construction.’”) (quoting 
Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. Jan. 25, 2016));  In re: American Med. Sys., Inc., 
2016 WL 3077904 (S.D. W. Va. May 31, 2016) (“[N]otwithstanding Rule 26(b)(1)'s recent amendment placing an 
emphasis on the proportionality of discovery, the discovery rules, including Rule 26, are still ‘to be accorded 
broad and liberal construction.’”) (quoting Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. Jan. 25, 
2016).  
• 5th Cir. ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Portland, IMO No. 9497854, 2016 WL 3365426, at *2 (M.D. La. June 16, 2016) 
(“[T]he scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is broad, bounded by a few construed 
limits.”). 
• 6th Cir. He v. Rom, 2016 WL 5682012, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2016) (“2015 amendments do not alter the basic 
tenet that Rule 26 is to be liberally construed to permit broad discovery.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
expansive discovery”); South Pointe Wholesale, Inc. v. Vilardi, 2017 WL 3877860, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 
2017) (court distinguished between impermissible discovery request fishing for new claims and permissible 
discovery request seeking additional facts in support of claim articulated in complaint). 
• 8th Cir. Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Andrew, 2016 WL 2350115, at *2 (D. Neb. May 4, 2016) (“[R]elevance is to be 
broadly construed for discovery purposes.”).  
• 10th Cir. Med Flight Air Ambulance v. MGM Resorts Int’l, 2017 WL 4142573, at *1 (D.N.M. Sept. 18, 2017) 
(citing Rule 26(b)—“unless otherwise limited by a court order”— court held that proportionality provision did not 
apply; rather, discovery requests  must be narrowly tailored to address inconvenient forum according to Peay v. 
BellSouth Med. Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000)).  
 
6 Proportionality related to relevance. 
• 2d Cir. Am. Fed’n of Musicians v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 2016 WL 2609307, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2016) 
(producing party need not present evidence addressing burdens of broad discovery, if requested information is not 
relevant); see also Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (discovery 
that is relevant is more likely to be proportionate). 
• 3d Cir. CDK Glob., LLC v. Tulley Auto. Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 1718100, at *8 (D.N.J Apr. 29, 2016) (magistrate 
judge found “a nexus between the requested information” and defendant’s counterclaims after weighing 
proportionality factors in denying plaintiff’s motion to quash non-party subpoenas); Harrington v. Bergen Cty., 
2017 WL 4387373, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 3, 2017) (Court upheld magistrate judge’s denial of discovery request; it 
was not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable for [the judge] to conclude that relevancy and proportionality 
requirements in Rule 26 precluded burdensome and speculative inquiry into single, unrelated case” from nine 
years prior); Nanticoke Lenni-Lenape Tribal Nation v. Porrino, 2017 WL 4155368, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2017) 
(documents relating to plaintiff’s tribal status, including drafts, were highly relevant to procedural due process and 
equal protection claims; relevance, along with no material burden or expense for production, rendered discovery 
proportional); Spear v. Alliance Holdings, Inc. Emp. Stock Ownership Plan, 2017 WL 5454459, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 14, 2017) (“Even where the documents sought are plainly relevant, Rule 26 requires production to be 
proportional to the needs of the case.”). 
• 5th Cir. Brand Serv., LLC v. Irex Corp., 2017 WL 67517, at *2–3 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2017) (Court denied plaintiff’s 
request for discovery of defendant’s entire computer. But, because parties agreed that information on the 
computer was relevant, court ordered ESI keyword discovery “to control costs and to keep discovery proportional 
to the needs of this case.”); First Am. Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Bus. Tech., Inc., 2017 WL 2267149, at *3 (E.D. La. 
May 24, 2017) (court denied request for “broad-ranging forensic imaging of defendant’s computer/server 
systems” because it was neither relevant nor proportional); Dumas v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 
2573956, at *2 (M.D. La. June 13, 2017) (“Any information sought that is not relevant to a party’s claim or 
defense is not discoverable, regardless of proportionality.”); Trident Mgmt. Grp., LLC v. GLF Constr. Corp., 2017 
WL 3011144, at *4 (E.D. La. July 14, 2017) (court denied discovery because requests sought “almost the entirety 
of the Defendant’s dealings” and made “almost no attempt to limit to relevant aspects of the instant litigation”). 
• 6th Cir. Waters v. Drake, 2016 WL 4264350 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2016) (court found discovery request was not 
proportional because it was not relevant to plaintiff’s claims); see also Owens v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of 
Boston, 2016 WL 6156182, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2016) (rejecting proportionality challenge because 
magistrate judge significantly narrowed requested scope of discovery to relevant information); Escalera v. Bard 
Med., 2017 WL 4012966, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 12, 2017) (court granted discovery request for employees’ sales 
information where request was relevant to specific claim; therefore, “requests [were] proportional”); Kitchen v. 
Corizon Health, Inc., 2018 WL 286425, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2018) (discovery request denied where 
requesting party only discussed relevance, but where proportionality was not addressed or demonstrated).  
• 7th Cir. Elliott v. Superior Pool Prods., LLC, 2016 WL 29243, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (“[A]pplication of the 
concept of proportionality often turns on how ‘central’ (or relevant) the proposed discovery may be to overcome 
any number of objections.”) (quoting Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathon M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to 
Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 9 FED. CT. L. REV. 20, 53 (2015)); U.S. 
ex rel. Schutte v. Supervalu, Inc., 2017 WL 1381651, at *3 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2017) (In suit relating to price-
match program, court permitted discovery of price evidence for one year before program began, but denied 
discovery of information related to all other discount programs because it was not relevant and was therefore not 
proportional.). 
• 8th Cir. Smith v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2017 WL 1425993, at *6 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 21, 2017) (court permitted 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
evidence of substantially similar products, discovery request denied in part due to “the immense burden” of that 
discovery. 
• 9th Cir. Arias v. Ruan Transp. Corp, 2017 WL 1427018, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2017) (“relevancy alone is no 
longer sufficient to obtain discovery, the discovery requested must also be proportional to the needs of the case”); 
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, 2016 WL 7425923, at * (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2016) (plaintiff “fail[ed] to even address 
the importance” of proposed discovery; because plaintiff did not assert relevance, discovery was not 
proportional); Blanton v. Torrey Pines Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 2017 WL 2291752, at *4 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2017) 
(documents sought by plaintiff were irrelevant and therefore disproportionate); Hancock v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 
2017 WL 3085744, at *6 (W.D. Wash. July 20, 2017) (when plaintiff claimed that defendants breached fiduciary 
duty by failing to adequately train employees, discovery of employees’ duties, tasks, and training was relevant and 
therefore proportional; however, court limited discovery to employees who worked on plaintiff’s claim). 
• 10th Cir. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Cimarron Crossing Feeders, LLC, 2017 WL 4770702, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 
19, 2017) (court denied discovery that required testing of trains in conditions dissimilar from those in incident at 
issue, and where data—albeit less reliable and more limited data—was available elsewhere).  
• 11th Cir. Noveshen v. Bridgewater Assocs. LP, 2016 WL 3902542, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2016) (court found 
discovery request to be relevant, proportional, and not burdensome); see also Flynn v. Square One Distrib., Inc., 
2016 WL 2997673, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 25, 2016) (court noted that to be discoverable information on 
development of product warning label must be relevant and proportional); Steel Erectors, Inc. v. AIM Steel Int’l, 
Inc., 312 F.R.D. 673, 676–77 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2016) (court denied plaintiff’s motion to compel irrelevant material 
to prevent needless litigation costs, which would defeat Rule 26(b)(1)’s goal of proportionality); Edmonson v. 
Velvet Lifestyles, LLC, 2016 WL 7048363, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2016) (“Proportionality and relevance are 
‘conjoined’ concepts; the greater the relevance . . . the less likely its discovery will be found to be 
disproportionate.”) (quoting Viagasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016)). 
Cf. 
• 2d Cir. Black v. Buffalo Meat Serv., 2016 WL 6962444, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2016) (Although information 
was relevant, “relevant is [but] one aspect of what is now discoverable under the amended Rule 26; a key factor is 
the proportionality of obtaining relevant material.”).  
• 4th Cir. Miller v. Garibaldi’s, Inc., 2016 WL 7257035, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2016) (“If the documents are 
irrelevant, the overbreadth objection is moot.”); Ashmore v. Williams, 2017 WL 2437082, at *4 (D.S.C. June 6, 
2017) (because defendants had “only argued relevance and not sufficiently argued proportionality,” court granted 
plaintiff’s motion to compel). 
7 “Reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence” phrase deleted.  
• 2d Cir. Edebali v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4621077, at *1 (E.D. N.Y. Sept. 6, 2016)  (“[R]ationale 
behind the elimination of [the phrase “reasonably calculated to lead”] is the finding that it ‘has been used by some, 
incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery.’”) (quoting Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at * 13 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016)); Sibley v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 2015 WL 9413101, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) 
(“[N]otably absent from the present Rule 26 is the all too familiar, but never correct, iteration of the permissible 
scope [of] discovery as including all matter that is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to’ the discovery of admissible 
evidence.”); Pothen v. Stony Brook Univ., 2017 WL 1025865, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2017) (same); see also 
Bagley v. Yale Univ., 2015 WL 8750901, at *8 (D. Conn. Dec. 14, 2015) (amendments to Rule 26 deleted 
“reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence' language); see also Henry v. Morgan’s Hotel Grp., Inc., 
2016 WL 303114, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2016) (“Defendant has mistakenly invoked the ‘reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ standard of the prior version of Rule 26(b)(1). That rule was 
amended last year and this language, long relied on by counsel to seek wide-ranging discovery, has now been 
eliminated.”); Grief v. Nassau Cty, 2017 WL 3588936, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (“[T]he new Rule disposes 
of this language, ending the incorrect, but widely quoted, misinterpretation of the scope of discovery.”). 
• 3d Cir. Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark Inc., 2016 WL 5025751, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 20, 2016) 
(“Supreme Court in Oppenheimer did not construe just the term ‘relevant;’ rather, the Supreme Court construed 
the phrase ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,’ which is a phrase that no longer appears 
in amended Rule 26(b)(1).  The Court’s definition of ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending 
action,’ therefore, has no application to the text of amended Rule 26(b)(1), and it would be inappropriate to 
continue to cite to Oppenheimer for the purpose of construing the scope of discovery under amended Rule 
26(b)(1).”); In re: Symbol Tech. Inc. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1233842, at *7, *10–*11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
relevance and proportionality,” and granted discovery despite plaintiff’s assertion that it would not lead to 
admissible evidence.). 
• 4th Cir. In re: American Medical Sys., Inc., 2016 WL 3077904, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. May 31, 2016) (“Although the 
rule was recently amended to remove language permitting the discovery of ‘any matter relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the action’ . . . and ‘relevant information . . . reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence,’ the rule in its current form still contemplates the discovery of information relevant to the 
subject matter involved in the action, as well as relevant information that would be inadmissible at trial.”) 
(emphasis in original).  
• 5th Cir. Mendoza v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 2017 WL 636069, at *4–6 (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 2017) (Court allowed, as 
proportional and relevant, discovery of a handwritten settlement agreement with certain terms scratched out, 
because it found that agreement was relevant to plaintiffs’ claim that defendants used settlement agreement “to 
manufacture a right to removal”); Lafleur v. Leglue, 2017 WL 2960541, at *8 (M.D. La. July 11, 2017) (“the 
question as it pertains to the scope of discovery is relevance and proportionality, not admissibility”); Alston v. 
Prarie Farms Dairy; 2017 WL 4274858, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2017) (“As do other jurisdictions, the Court 
adheres to the ‘fishing expedition rule,’ . . . wherein a request for discovery needs to be relevant in light of the 
case.”). 
• 6th Cir. Quality Mfg. Sys., Inc. v. R/X Automation Sol., Inc., 2016 WL 1244697, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2016) 
(amendments to Rule 26 deleted “reasonably calculated” phrase); see also Raub v. Moon Lake Prop. Owners 
Ass’n, 2016 WL 6275392, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2016) (the phrase was “deleted to address concerns that the 
exemption was swallowing the limitations placed on the scope of discovery”). 
• 7th Cir. Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, 2016 WL 614144, at *5, 7 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 
2016) (amendments to Rule 26 removed language that relevant information does not need to be admissible if it “is 
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” but settlement documents, inadmissible as 
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 408, remain discoverable).  
• 9th Cir. In re: Bard IVC Filters Prods. Liability Litig., 2016 WL 4943393, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2016) (“Thus, 
just as a statute could effectively overrule cases applying a former legal standard, the 2015 amendment effectively 
abrogated cases applying a prior version of Rule 26(b)(1). The test going forward is whether evidence is ‘relevant 
to any party’s claim or defense,’ not whether it is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.’”); 
Centeno v. City of Fresno, 2016 WL 749634, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2016) (same); Caballero v. Bodega Latina 
Corp., 2017 WL 3174931, at *2 (D. Nev. July 25, 2017) (referring to “reasonably calculated to lead to admissible 
evidence” as discovery standard is improper); Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 2016 WL 146574, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 13, 2016) (“No longer is it good enough to hope that the information sought might lead to the discovery 
of admissible evidence. In fact, the old language to that effect is gone); see also Dao v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. 
of Boston, 2016 WL 796095, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (amendments to Rule 26 deleted language that 
permitted discovery of any information that “might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”); San Diego 
Unified Port Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburg, Pa., 2017 WL 3877732, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 
2017) (court upbraids defendant’s counsel who “appears unaware” of December 2015 rule change, misstating 
Rule twice and saying that “[w]ith more than 1100 lawyers in 41 offices in the United States, the firm should have 
received news of the amendments by now”); Estate of Sandra Vela v. Cty. Of Monterey, 2017 WL 6316737, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2017) (On appeal, although trial judge’s “comment regarding the potential impact of 
production on trial . . . was not an adequate basis for denying production . . . the comment does not appear to have 
been critical to his ruling,” so ruling was upheld). 
• 10th Cir. XTO Energy, Inc. v. ATD, LLC, 2016 WL 1730171, at *12 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2016) (“A district court is 
not . . . ‘required to permit plaintiff to engage in a ‘fishing expedition’ in the hope of supporting his claim.’”); see 
also Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., 2016 WL 2772210, at *3 (D. Kan. May 13, 2016) (“The amendment 
deleted ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence’ phrase, however, because it was 
often misused to define the scope of discovery and had the potential to ‘swallow any other limitation.’”); Duffy v. 
Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 2016 WL 7386413, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2016) (same); Gilmore v. L.D. Drilling, 
Inc., 2017 WL 2439552, at *1 (D. Kan. June 6, 2017) (same); Landry v. Swire Oilfield Serv., LLC, 2018 WL 
279749, at *11 (D.N.M. Jan. 3, 2018) (“The rule change signals to the court that it has the authority to confine 
discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no 
entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses that are not already identified in the pleadings.”). 
Cf. 
• 1st Cir. Green v. Cosby, 2015 WL 9594287, at *2 (C.D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2015) (amendments to Rule 26 deleted 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
instructed, because discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues, the limits set forth in Rule 
26 must be construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other 
matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.”).  
• 2d Cir. Lightsquared, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 2015 WL 8675377, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) (“[R]elevance is 
still to be ‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter 
that could bear on’ any party’s claim or defense.”) (citing Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 
(1978)).  
• 3d Cir. Haines v. Cherian, 2016 WL 831946, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2016) (“[D]iscovery need not be confined 
to items of admissible evidence but may encompass that which appears reasonable calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”); see also Dixon v. Williams, 2016 WL 631356, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb 17, 2016) 
(discoverable information is item that is “relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant information.”); Wertz v. 
GEA Heat Exchangers Inc., 2015 WL 8959408, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2015) (under Rule 26’s liberal discovery 
policy, discoverable information is item that is “relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant information.”).  
• 4th Cir. Arrow Enter. Computing Sols., Inc. v. BlueAlly, LLC, 2016 WL 4287929, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2016) 
(“A discovery request is relevant if it is ‘reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence.’”); 
Townsend v. Nestle Healthcare Nutrition, Corp., 2016 WL 1629363, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 22, 2016) (“[R]ule 
26(b)(1) does not precisely define relevancy. . . . Although the rule was recently amended to remove language 
permitting the discovery of ‘any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action’ . . . and ‘relevant 
information . . . reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,’ the rule in its current form 
still contemplates the discovery of information relevant to the subject matter involved in the action, as well as 
relevant information that would be inadmissible at trial.”); see also Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co. v. United Advisory 
Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 632025, at *4 (D. Md. Feb. 17, 2016) (discoverable information must be “reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,”); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. Operating Corp. v. 
Conifer Physician Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 430494, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2016) (denial of request for tax returns 
because information would not “reasonably lead to relevant information” pertinent to parties’ claims); White v. 
Sam’s E., Inc., 2016 WL 205494, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2016) (discoverable information need not be 
admissible if it is “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”); Columbia Gas 
Transmission, LLC v. Balt. Cty., Md., 2016 WL 7167979, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 8, 2016) (“Information sought need 
only appear to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of permissible evidence.”) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
• 5th Cir. La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n- W. v. Mallard Basin, Inc., 2015 WL 8074260, at *2 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 
2015) (relevancy means “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, 
any issue that is or may be in the case.”); Stancu v. Hyatt Corp., 2018 WL 888909, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 
2018) (although some Rule 34(a) requests in non-class action lawsuit aimed at pattern-or-practice method of proof 
may satisfy Rule 26(b), court denied such requests because they were “neither narrowly crafted nor reasonably 
calculated to obtain evidence to prove claim”). 
• 6th Cir. Bentley v. Highlands Hosp. Corp., 2016 WL 762686, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 23, 2016) (court should allow 
plaintiffs access to information necessary for investigating their claims but should also prevent “fishing 
expeditions”); see also Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., 2016 WL 471364, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 
8, 2016) (court must balance party’s “right to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’”); Hadfield 
v. Newpage Corp., 2016 WL 427924, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 3, 2016) (relevance to be “construed broadly to 
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on any party’s 
claim or defense.”).  
• 7th Cir. Murillo v. Kohl’s Corp., 2016 WL 4705550, at *2 (E.D. Wisc. Sept. 8, 2016) (“For the purpose of 
discovery, relevancy is construed broadly to encompass ‘any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to 
other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’”); Elliott v. Superior Pool Prods., LLC, 
2016 WL 29243, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (relevancy refers to requirement that discoverable information must 
be “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of relevant information.”).  
• 8th Cir. Orduno v. Pietrzak, 2016 WL 5853723, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2016) (favorably quoting Oppenheimer 
passage); Harper v. Unum Grp., 2016 WL 4508238, at *1 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 2016) (“Relevance under Rule 26 
has been construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter 
that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.”); Schultz v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3149686, at *3 
(D.S.D. June 3, 2016) (“Relevancy is to be broadly construed for discovery issues and is not limited to the precise 
issues set out in the pleadings. Relevancy . . . encompass[es] ‘any matter that could bear on, or that reasonably 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
LLC v. Calissio Res. Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 2997463, at *2 (D. Neb. May 23, 2016) (“The United States Supreme 
Court has held that discovery under Rule 26 should be ‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, 
or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.’”); Hodges 
v. Pfizer, Inc., 2016 WL 1222229, at *2 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016) (discoverable information is “any matter that 
bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case”). 
• 9th Cir. Gonzales v. City of Bakersfield,, 2016 WL 4474600, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (“Relevancy to a 
subject matter is interpreted ‘broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other 
matter that could bear on any issue that is or may be in the case.’”); Gibson v. SDCC, 2016 WL 845308, at *4 (D. 
Nev. Mar. 2, 2016) (relevant information is “information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence.”); Lauris v. Novartis, 2016 WL 7178602, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (same).  
• 10th Cir. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty., 2016 WL 3079740, at *3 (D. Utah May 31, 
2016) (“Relevance is ‘construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to 
other matter that could bear on’ any party's claim or defense.”); see also XTO Energy, Inc. v. ATD, LLC, 2016 WL 
1730171, at *17 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2016) (“Relevance is still [post-2015 amendments] to be ‘construed broadly to 
encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on’ any party’s 
claim or defense.”) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Fayda, 2015 WL 7871037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 
2015)); Arenas v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 223, 2016 WL 5122872, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2016)  (“Relevance is 
still to be "construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter 
that could bear on’ any party's claim or defense,” despite acknowledging that amendments deleted the phrase.); 
Roberts v. C.R. Eng., Inc., 2017 WL 5312116, at *6 (D. Utah Nov. 13, 2017) (“The evidence sought also has an 
equally plausible purpose of being sought for trial.”).  
• D.C. Cir. United States ex rel. Shamash v. CA, Inc., 2016 WL 74394, at *6–7 (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2016) (amendments 
to Rule 26 deleted “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” phrase because it was 
“often misconstrued to define the scope of discovery,” but “relevance is still to be ‘construed broadly to encompass 
any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on’ any party's claim or 
defense.”) (quoting Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)). 
 
8 Proportionality depends on needs of case. 
• 2d Cir. Sky Med. Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claim Servs., 2017 WL 1133349, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2017) 
(because claims in insurance dispute were narrow in scope and pertained to three-year time period, requested 
discovery of sensitive financial information for ten-year period was not proportional because it was overly broad 
and would present undue burden that would outweigh potential benefits of production). 
• 3d Cir. Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 2017 WL 4012051, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2017) (court granted  
motion to compel production of documents from four custodians out of requested nine, (court initially ordered six 
of 31 requested custodians to produce documents) , because of seriousness of allegations, amount in controversy, 
size of enterprise, and potential evidentiary value of documents in custodians’ possession). 
• 6th Cir. Buchanan v. Chi. Transit Auth., 2016 WL 7116591, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2016) (court denied request 
for records supporting defendant’s claim that leave-notice procedure was “usual and customary,” in FMLA case, 
because plaintiff “vastly overstated the need” for employees’ records substantiating compliance with notice 
requirements, burden to retrieve information was substantial, and there were other methods of discovery available 
to collect same information); In re: ClassicStar Mare Lease Litig., 2017 WL 27455, at *3, 4–5 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 3, 
2017) (“The particular context—attempting to ‘follow the money’ in collecting a judgment through evaluating the 
interconnectivity of numerous related entities—indicates to the Court that the creditors here have highly restrained 
access to the information sought, suggesting subpoenaed production is appropriate.”). 
• 9th Cir. Morrison v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 2016 WL 355120, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Jan. 27, 2016) (under 
amended Rule 26(b)(1), “lawyers must size and shape their discovery requests to the requisites of a case.”); 
McCall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3174914, at *9 (D. Nev. July 26, 2017) (“The mere fact that 
an insurer contracts with a vendor . . . does not subject all aspects of the insurer/vendor relationship to discovery;” 
there must be connection to claims at issue). 
Cf. 
• 2d Cir. Shipstad v. One Way or Another Prods., LLC, 2017 WL 2462657, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017) (in 
motion for sanctions, defendants cannot raise proportionality objections after court granted motion to compel). 
• 5th Cir. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 2016 WL 5922315, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
persuasive demonstration of the importance of the issues at stake here, the value of the case, and that the parties 
have significant resources available to them. Proportionality is thus not at issue in this discovery dispute.”) 
• 11th Cir. Nielsen Audio, Inc. v. Clem, 2017 WL 4402518, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2017) (because “the nexus of 
the parties’ dispute is the Tampa market,” the magistrate judge was correct to deny discovery of documents 
relating to plaintiff’s business throughout the United States).  
 
9 Importance of issues at stake critical in proportionality analysis. 
• 3d Cir. Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp., 2017 WL 386646, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017) (“Although this is not a 
case involving, for instance, constitutional rights or matters of national significance, to these particular litigants, it 
[serious bodily injures] is a matter of grave import.”); but cf. Liberty Int’l Underwriters Can. v. Scottsdale Ins. 
Co., 2017 WL 721105, at *4 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2017) (“even if facts are ‘vital, highly probative, and directly 
relevant or go to the heart of an issue,’ this does not justify a privilege waiver”); Hooper v. Safety-Kleen Sys., Inc., 
2017 WL 2720288, at *1 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2017) (issues at stake were of importance since plaintiff “sustained 
severe injuries” that “are more than significant and are long-lasting,” and also “incurred hefty medical bills and 
other losses,” justifying requested deposition of apex executive who had personal knowledge). 
• 5th Cir. OJ’s Janitorial and Sweeping Serv., LLC v. Syncom Space Serv., LLC, 2017 WL 3087905, at *3 (E.D. La. 
July 20, 2017) (court denied discovery request after considering importance of discovery request because it was 
“unclear how important—if at all”— the requested discovery was or how relevant it was in relation to issues in 
litigation”); 
• 6th Cir. In re: E/I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. C-8 Pers. Inj. Litig., 2016 WL 5884964, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 7, 
2016) (“importance of the issues at stake cannot be overstated” because requested information linking disease and 
exposure to C-8 chemical is relevant to claims of more than 3500 plaintiffs in MDL); Cratty v. City of Wyandotte, 
2017 WL 5589583, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2017) (in suit against city alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of 
process, conspiracy, and conversion, court held that issues at stake were of high importance in protecting 
constitutional rights of citizens).  
 
10 Proportionality addresses whether discovery would assist in vindicating personal or public values.  
• 1st Cir. Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 2015 WL 9048225, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2015) (court should consider 
whether discovery would assist in resolving issues that vindicate personal or public values).  
• 3d Cir. Vay v. Huston, 2016 WL 1408116, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (court considered public value of 
vindicating constitutional rights). 
• 4th Cir. Santiago v. S. Health Partners, 2016 WL 4435229, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016) (“For proportionality 
purposes, however, the reduced monetary stakes represents ‘only one factor, to be balanced against other 
factors.’”).  
• 5th Cir. Cain v. City of New Orleans, 2016 WL 7156071, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2016) (“As to the specific 
proportionality factors, the issues at stake [due process rights to neutral judge abused when portion of court-
imposed fines finance court functions] are important matters of civil rights and public interest.”).  
• D.C. Cir. Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2017 WL 4011136, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 
2017) (court ordered discovery on basis of proportionality, where party resisting discovery stated that favorable 
ruling would benefit all of America’s shippers and consumers because it would stop “abusive behavior” that 
prevents competition and “shortchanges the American consumer”). 
 
11 Public policy considerations. 
• 1st Cir. U.S. ex rel. Drennen v. Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc., 2017 WL 1217118, at fn. 2 (D. Mass. Mar. 
31, 2017) (“The need for proportionality is especially relevant here,” where potential costs and delay caused by 
locating additional patient files and charts are so high). 
• 2nd Cir. Pothen v. Stony Brook Univ., 2017 WL 1025865, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2017) (denying discovery of 
non-party’s personnel file due to privacy concerns and because information could be obtained elsewhere); Carl v. 
Edwards, 2017 WL 4271443, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2017) (granting discovery of business documents, but 
denying request for tax documents because plaintiff failed to meet the higher burden for production of tax 
documents: (1) relevance; (2) compelling need because information is not obtainable elsewhere).    
• 4th Cir. Chen v. Md. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygeine, 2017 WL 1533988, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2017) (in 
case involving denial of unemployment benefits, court denied discovery of plaintiff’s tax returns and limited 
discovery of plaintiff’s financial records to records dated after plaintiff’s termination, because both requests were 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
information); In re: Va. Dep’t of Corrections v. Jordan, 2017 WL 5075252, at *19 (E.D. Va. Nov. 3, 2017) 
(discovery denied where “Virginia’s ability to secure the drugs necessary to carry out legal injections would be 
jeopardized, if not totally frustrated, should the supplier of those drugs be disclosed”). 
• 5th Cir. Butler v. Craft, 2017 WL 1429896, at *2, 3 (W.D. La. Apr. 19, 2017) (“[S]trong public policy disfavors 
disclosure of personnel records because disclosure would invade employees’ privacy, and because firms might 
cease to frankly criticize and rate employee performance for fear of potential discovery…. Thus, courts must 
balance the legitimate discovery value of potential impeachment evidence with the legitimate interests of an 
employer —particularly a non-party employer—in safeguarding sensitive information about employees.”). 
• 6th Cir. Barber v. Heslep, 2017 WL 3097495, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. July 20, 2017) (“[W]hen comparing the potential 
litigation benefits associated with a release of [plaintiff’s teenage mental health] records against the need to 
protect their confidentiality, the importance of the records is substantially outweighed by the Plaintiffs[’] right to 
keep those records confidential [under West Virginia law].”); NetJets Aviation, Inc. v. NetJets Ass’n of Shared 
Aircraft Pilots, 2017 WL 3484101, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2017) (“[R]evealing the identities of the individuals 
posting on the message board may chill associational rights and deter membership due to fears of reprisal. 
However, producing the documents with all identifying information redacted removes the chilling effect.”); 
Annabel v. Frost, 2017 WL 4349282, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2017) ( “request is both irrelevant and non-
discoverable because of institutional security concerns . . . [which] also runs counter to the proportionality 
standard”). 
• 7th Cir. Perez v. Mueller, 2016 WL 3360422, at *1 (E.D. Wis. May 27, 2016) (in ERISA case by Secretary of 
Labor, court considered cost of litigation to public in determining proportionality of defendants’ discovery 
requests); see also id. at *3 (court viewed government’s pursuit of litigation over several years at taxpayers’ 
expense as indicative of important public-policy weight in assessing whether discovery request was proportional 
to needs of case); Simon v. Northwestern Univ., 2017 WL 467677, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2017) (court noted “the 
loss of liberty alone” resulting from fabricating false evidence in criminal trial was an “extremely significant” 
public policy consideration, but found “this case to be of utmost importance” because it questioned “the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system”). 
• 8th Cir. Hurd v. City of Lincoln, 2017 WL 6542123, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 21, 2017) (denying deposition of mayor 
where requesting party had already spent 40 hours deposing witnesses and 6,500 relevant emails were produced, 
none of which was to or from the mayor; court imposed higher burden for deposing government official and held 
that requesting party had failed to demonstrate that deposition was necessary in light of that burden). 
• 9th Cir. Anderson v. Pacific Crane Maint. Co., 2017 WL 3534576, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2017) (court 
allowed discovery of privacy material retained by third party asserting that “Defendant can rely on the parties' 
stipulated protective order …, make redactions as allowable under the rules, or seek protection of the Court”;  
Amsel v. Gerrard et al., 2017 WL 1383443, at *2 (D. Nev. Apr. 12, 2017) (Tax documents may be discoverable, 
but “public policy against unnecessary public disclosure arises from the need, if the tax laws are to function 
properly, to encourage taxpayers to file complete and accurate returns”); Does I-XIX v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2017 
WL 3841902, at *4-6 (D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017) (court granted discovery of records of complaints and claims of 
sexual assault; even though they “contain sensitive material and implicate significant privacy concerns,” a 
protective order and redactions “mitigate[s] these concerns”); Acosta v. Wellfleet Comm’ns, LLC, 2017 WL 
5180425, at *6–7 (D. Nev. Nov. 8, 2017) (court recognized that although individuals have no privacy right in their 
bank accounts, privacy may be considered in discovery requests; court ordered discovery of bank account 
information for businesses associated with defendant’s address only for those businesses that plaintiff could 
demonstrate were connected to defendant).  
• 10th Cir.  Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Centura Health, 2017 WL 3821781, at *10 (D. Co. Sept. 1, 2017) 
(“The Court is not aware of [precedent] that addresses . . . whether non-charging employees’ privacy interests in 
their medical information require the EEOC to make a heightened showing of need, or require additional 
protection . . .”). 
• 11th Cir. Gilmore v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 2017 WL 3116576, at *2 (D. Kan. July 21, 2017) (court denied discovery 
of plaintiff’s bank records and credit card statements within four years that reflect purchases at locations that sold 
alcohol because defendant failed to address proportionality factors other than relevance, and request was 
overbroad, unduly burdensome, and embarrassment outweighed potential relevance). 
Cf. 
• 4th Cir. Chen v. Md. Dept. of Health and Mental Hygeine, 2017 WL 1533988, at *2 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2017) 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
records were private information, in part because plaintiff had already produced some financial information 
without objection). 
• 10th Cir. Parker v. Delmar Gardens of Lenexa, Inc., 2017 WL 1650757, at *6 (D. Kan. May 2, 2017) (“It is well-
established that confidentiality of information [employment personnel records] does not equate to a privilege 
against its production.”). 
 
 
12 Weight of amount in controversy. 
• 2d Cir. Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. City of N.Y., 2017 WL 4012051, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2017) (court deemed 
four additional custodians out of requested eight to be proportional, due to allegations, amount of money at 
stake—“tens of millions of dollars”— size of enterprise, and value of custodians’ documents). 
• 3d Cir. First Niagara Risk Mgmt. v. Folino, 2016 WL 4247654 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) (court found that 
amount-in-controversy factor weighed in favor of party resisting discovery because amount was unknown at time 
of request and resisting party maintained that “unknown damages cannot justify exorbitant discovery requests.”); 
Bell v. Reading Hosp., 2016 WL 162991, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016) (amount-in-controversy factor weighs in 
favor of discovery when discovery costs would certainly not exceed amount in controversy).  
• 4th Cir. TBC, Inc. v. DEI Sales, Inc., 2017 WL 4151261, at *7 (D. Md. Sept. 19, 2017) (court held that production 
time of five days and cost of $5,000 was not unduly burdensome in comparison to amount in controversy; rather, 
it was “readily accessible and of critical importance to the claims”). 
• 5th Cir. Fidelis Grp. Holdings, LLC v. Chalmers Auto., LLC, 2016 WL 6157601, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2016) 
(“Given that the amount in controversy is barely above [$75,000] . . . the request[s] are disproportionate and 
beyond the scope discovery”). 
• 6th Cir. Greif Int’l Holding BV v. Mauser USA, LLC, 2017 WL 2177638, at *4 (S.D. Ohio May 18, 2017) (court 
deferred bifurcating liability and damages issues in patent case partly because “[w]ith little idea about the amount 
in controversy, the Court will be hindered in making proportionality assessment”). 
• 9th Cir. Gottesman v. Santana, 2017 WL 5889765, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017) (Defendants argued that 
“preliminary numbers” showed that amount in controversy was minimal, but requested information was 
nevertheless relevant because “plaintiff seeks the information at issue, in part, to establish the amount in 
controversy.”).  
 
13 Relative access to information. 
• 1st Cir. Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Opechee Constr. Corp., 2016 WL 865232, at *3 (D.N.H. Mar. 2, 2016) (information 
requested of former employees was “not proportional to needs of the case . . . given the parties' relative access to 
the requested information and their respective resources.”). 
• 3d Cir. Vay v. Huston, 2016 WL 1408116, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (defendant’s greater access to 
information weighed in favor of finding extensive discovery to be proportional).  
• 6th Cir. Albritton v. CVS Caremark Corp., 2016 WL 3580790, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 28, 2016) (court held that 
information in the sole possession of defendant is a fact weighing in favor of proportionality; the “touchstone” of 
revised scope of discovery); see also Kelley v. Apria Healthcare, Inc., 2016 WL 737919, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 2, 
2016) (court considered defendant’s lack of access to confidential final settlement agreement in ordering 
production subject to protective order).  
• 7th Cir. Maui Jim, Inc. v. Smartbuy Guru Enter., 2018 WL 894619, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2018) (court granted 
discovery of supply chain information despite confidentiality objections, reasoning that, since parties were 
engaged in business, requesting party was already familiar with producing party’s supply chain). 
• 8th Cir. Schultz v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3149686, at *6 (D.S.D. June 3, 2016) (court determined that 
defendant insurance company’s greater access to proof weighed in favor of finding that plaintiff’s discovery 
requests were proportional); see also Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 643 (W.D. Mo. May 
9, 2016) (court considered defendant’s “national presence, with sophisticated access to data” in ordering that it 
answer plaintiff’s interrogatories); Ortiviz v. Follin, 2017 WL 3085515, at *6 (D. Colo. July 20, 2017) (court 
approved subpoena of documents when no other method was available to obtain discoverable information). 
• 10th Cir. Digital Ally, Inc. v. Util. Assocs., 2016 WL 1535979, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2016) (plaintiff argued that 





                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 11th Cir. Williams v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 3456927, at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 21, 2016) (court found 
proportionality analysis weighed in favor of compelling plaintiff to authorize disclosure of private social security 
disability records because only plaintiff had access to them). 
14 Ease of Access to Information. 
• 2d Cir. Patient A v. Vt. Agency of Human Servs., 2016 WL 880036, at *3 (D. Vt. Mar. 1, 2016) (court found 
plaintiff’s discovery request proportional because defendant healthcare service admitted to possessing some 
responsive data and was obligated under its contract with the state to “track and report information that [was] 
responsive to certain elements of the proposed deposition topic.”); see also Marom v. City of N.Y., 2016 WL 
7048053, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) (discovery request for eight officers’ memo book entries and 108 
documents, which were on “readily accessible database,” was not unduly burdensome); Winfield v. City of N.Y., 
2018 WL 840085, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018) (where party objected that requested depositions were 
burdensome because they would require depositions of multiple witnesses over several days but each witness 
would only have certain information, parties agreed to “committee” deposition, where all witnesses would be 
deposed at once). 
• 3d Cir. Emp. Ins. Co. of Wasau v. Daybreak Express, Inc., 2017 WL 2443064, at *4–5 (D.N.J. June 5, 2017) 
(court ordered discovery, despite purported burden and expense, because it was relevant and it would not be 
unduly burdensome, since some of the evidence was previously produced for audit). 
• 5th Cir. In re: Trevino, 2017 WL 123756, at *20, 23 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2017) (Court denied request that 
“appear[ed] to be an attempt . . . to shift researching public information from [p]laintiffs to . . . [d]efendants under 
the guise of the discovery process,” noting that “[p]laintiffs have utterly failed to carry their burden of 
demonstrating that the requested discovery falls within Rule 26.”); Hernandez v. Baylor Univ., 2017 WL 
1628992, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2017) (court denied deposition request because information sought could be 
obtained from other sources).  
• 6th Cir. Owens v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 2016 WL 6156182, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 21, 2016) 
(Although defendant “does not maintain the requested records nor does it have employees whose job duties are 
dedicated to performing the claim file analysis required,” discovery was warranted because of information’s 
relevance.). 
• 8th Cir. Prime Aid Pharm. Corp. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 2017 WL 67526, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2017) (Court 
rejected defendant’s proportionality objection because it “amounts to an assertion that it does not maintain its 
records in a searchable format,” which is inadequate to establish undue burden.). 
• 9th Cir. Boy Scouts of Am., 2017 WL 3841902, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept. 1, 20170 (although files documenting sexual 
abuse were posted on Los Angeles Times website, court required defendant to produce and authenticate files, 
because there was little additional burden and plaintiff asserted website was not complete). 
• 11th Cir. Pilver v. Hillsborough Cty., 2016 WL 4129282, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2016) (court found discovery 
request to be disproportional because it sought information that “can be obtained from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive,” i.e., records in PACER). 
Cf.  
• 4th Cir. In re: NC Swine Farm Nuisance Litig., 2016 WL 3661266, at *3 (E.D.N.C. July 1, 2016) (court held 
defendant did not have possession, custody, or control of information and never reached defendant’s argument 
that plaintiffs’ request for discovery for documents in control of non-party with parent-subsidiary relationship was 
not proportional because information could be better accessed through subpoenas to third party).  
• 5th Cir. Dotson v. Edmonson, 2017 WL 4310676, at *5 (E.D. La. Sept. 28, 2017) (Notion that “mere access is not 
possession, custody, or control” governs in discovery disputes where employees (e.g., government employees) can 
access documents but do not have the authority to disclose them). 
 
15 Burden on personnel resources.  
• 6th Cir. Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., 2016 WL 471364, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 8, 2016) 
(expenditure of significant personnel resources to comply with unsupported discovery request outweighed benefits 
of production). 
• 10th Cir. Panel Specialists, Inc. v. Tenawa Haven Processing, LLC, 2017 WL 3503354, at *3 (D. Kan. Aug. 16, 
2017) (court denied discovery request in part because it would provide minimal probative value and responding 
party is “small, family owned corporation,” with only one employee in the office who would be responsible for 
producing all requested material, for whom doing so would take “significant time”). 
 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 9th Cir. Salazar v. McDonald Corp., 2016 WL 736213, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (“Consideration of the 
parties’ resources does not foreclose discovery requests addressed to an impecunious party, nor justify unlimited 
discovery requests addressed to a wealthy party.”); see also Goes Int’l, AB v. Dodur Ltd., 2016 WL 427369 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (“although it is a concern, the defendant’s financial wherewithal is not decisive” in producing 
requested discovery). 
• 11th Cir. Llanten v. Am. Sec. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 951629, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2017) (“The mere fact that 
compliance with an inspection order will cause great labor and expense or even considerable hardship . . . does not 
of itself require denial of the motion” to compel.) 
Cf.  
• 3d Cir. Vay v. Huston, 2016 WL 1408116, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (defendant’s greater resources weighed 
in favor of finding extensive discovery to be proportional).  
 
17 Importance of discovery to resolving case. 
• 2d Cir. Creighton v. City of N.Y., 2016 WL 1178648, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2016) (“Even where relevance may 
be established, proportionality considerations concerns look to, inter alia, ‘the importance of the discovery in 
resolving the issues’ in the case.”). 
• 3d Cir. In re: Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 3519618, at *7 
(E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016) (discovery was proportional where information went to “heart” of one theory of 
liability).  
• 4th Cir. Holcombe v. Helena Chem. Co., 2016 WL 2897942, at *3 (D.S.C. May 18, 2016) (court permitted two 
additional interrogatory questions beyond maximum because, e.g., information sought was probative of plaintiff’s 
liability theory).  
• 5th Cir. La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n- W. v. Mallard Basin, Inc., 2015 WL 8074260, at *4 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 
2015) (on-site inspection was appropriate in case concerning environmental-impact of permits issued by U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers); Collett v. Geico Cas. Co., 2017 WL 3336614, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 3, 2017) (“In light 
of its minimal relevance, in conjunction with its inadmissibility at trial, the sought after information is not 
proportional to the needs of the case . . .”). 
• 6th Cir. D.R. v. Mich. Dept. of Ed., 2017 WL 3642131, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2017) (court granted discovery 
regarding “the only defendant shown to be utilizing and setting the policy” for the program at issue, since this 
could either advance the claim or demonstrate that other theories should be pursued, and could clarify settlement 
positions); Schall v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc., 2017 WL 4050319, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 13, 2017) (court granted 
request to obtain testimony from defendant’s corporate representative because the burden and expense was 
outweighed by its importance to plaintiff’s claim, and there was no less burdensome or expensive option). 
• 8th Cir. Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 641 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2016) (despite 
defendant’s claims that answering interrogatories would involve large amounts of time and high costs, court found 
that discovery was not disproportional because it involved “critical information” to resolution of issues). 
• 9th Cir. Leadership Studies, Inc. v.   Training and Dev., Inc., 2017 WL 2819847, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2017) 
(“A party claiming that a request is important to resolve the issues should be able to explain the ways in which the 
underlying information bears on the issues as that party understands them.”); Gramercy Grp. V. D.A. Builders, 
LLC, 2017 WL 5230925, at *4 (D. Haw. Nov. 9, 2017) (court permitted requested deposition when deposition 
was only way of accessing information, and information was “crucial to the preparation of the case”).   
• 10th Cir. Boone v. Tfi Family Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 3124850, at *2 (D. Kan. June 3, 2016) (denying request for 
protective order in case involving death of child in custody of family services where, e.g., defendant “failed to 
establish that its resources or burden of the potential expense outweigh[ed] the undeniably important nature of the 
issues at stake in th[e] case.”).  
• 11th Cir. Herman v. Seaworld Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 2016 WL 3746421, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 13, 2016) (denying 
defendant’s motion to compel disclosure of undisputed, unrelated contracts, as irrelevant and, correspondingly, 
disproportional because they had “no ‘importance’ or ‘likely benefit’ in resolving” contract dispute).  
Cf. 
• 7th Cir. AVNET, Inc. v. MOTIO, Inc., 2016 WL 3365430, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 15, 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ 
motion to strike expert reports in part and rejecting plaintiff’s argument that expert reports that are duplicative and 
cumulative of earlier expert reports run counter to purpose of proportionality rule and “would inexorably lead to 
needless increase in cost of litigation.”);  
• 11th Cir. Bingham v. Baycare Health Sys., 2016 WL 4467213, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 24, 2016) (“[D]iscovery 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
another source have been produced], the rules provide that discovery must be proportional to the needs of the 
case…and must be limited if the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, or can be obtained 
from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive.”). 
 
18 Discovery for purposes of class-action certification. 
• 3d Cir. Bell v. Reading Hosp., 2016 WL 162991, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016) (discovery was not 
disproportionate because information would assist in determining whether final certification of class was 
appropriate); see also In re: Riddell Concussion Reduction Litig., 2016 WL 4119807, at *4 (D.N.J July 7, 2016) 
(discovery request was proportional because, e.g., information was “relevant to important class certification 
requirements.”).  
• 6th Cir. Sobol v. Imprimis Pharm., 2017 WL 5035837, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 26, 2017) (“The existence of 
customer orders are highly important to resolving the issues at case . . . because concrete evidence of consent from 
a sizable sample of customers could defeat [plaintiff’s] motion for class certification.”).  
• 7th Cir. Miner v. Gov’t Payment Serv., Inc., 2017 WL 3909508, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2017) (The 
“proportionality standard further supports the notion that pre-certification discovery should not exceed what is 
necessary to permit the Court to make an informed decision on class certification.”). 
• 8th Cir. Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 641 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2016) (“Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has generally endorsed broad discovery prior to class certification.”); see also Klein v. TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corp., 2016 WL 7156476, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 7, 2016) (court bifurcated merits and class 
certification discovery and held that discovery  of all defendant’s clients and all communications, with no time 
frame limitation, exceeded scope of class certification issue and was not proportional for purposes of class action 
certification). 
• 9th Cir. Harris v. Best Buy Stores, 2017 WL 3948397, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2017) (in class action, court 
denied discovery of contact information of all putative class members because “random sampling [was] more 
appropriate at this juncture”); Martin v. Sysco Corp., 2017 WL 4517819, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2017) (“Court 
has discretion in controlling the scope of pre-certification discovery to balance a plaintiff’s need for discovery to 
substantiate his class allegations and concerns regarding overly burdensome discovery requests directed on a 
defendant” where plaintiff aims to support speculative claims); Calleros v. Rural Metro of San Diego, Inc., 2017 
WL 4391708, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2017) (court denied discovery of information for putative class members 
because plaintiffs offered no evidence of violations in the geographic areas from which they sought information).; 
Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016 WL 6963039, at *9 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2016) (“Limited, focused merits 
discovery will be allowed while the motions to dismiss are pending” in putative class action.); Carroll v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., 2016 WL 4696852, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2016) (“Court [found] that the 25% sample [contact 
information for putative class-action members] requested by Plaintiff [was] fair and proportional to the needs of 
the case.”); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2016 WL 107461, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016) (defendant’s request 
for names and contact information of class members, and communications between class members and class 
counsel was disproportional because discovery lacked importance to resolution of issues); Talavera v. Sun Maid 
Growers of Cal., 2017 WL 495635, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (“[D]iscovery of all putative class member pay, 
punch, and time information goes to the merits and is beyond the scope of discovery needed in preparing the class 
certification motion.”). 
• 11th Cir. Hankinson v. R.T.G. Furniture Corp., 2016 WL 1182768 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2016) (court determined 
that discovery of non-party online and out-of-state affiliates was not proportional at pre-class-action certification 
stage). 
 
19 Discovery related to central issue more important than discovery related to peripheral issue. 
• 9th Cir. Van v. Language Line Servs., ___WL___ (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2016) (party was not required to answer 
requests for production that sought “low-probative-value information”).  
• 11th Cir. Flynn v. Square One Distrib., Inc., 2016 WL 2997673, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 25, 2016) (“[R]equested 
information must also satisfy the proportionality requirement meaning it must be more than tangentially related to 
the issues that are actually at stake in the litigation.”). 
 
20 Marginal utility discovery. 
• 2d Cir. Woodward v. Afify, 2017 WL 279555, at *7–8 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (inmate “misbehavior reports 
written by defendant [officials] about other inmates while arguably relevant, do not appear to be highly probative 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (discovery reached “point of diminishing returns” after six years of discovery and 
production of approximately 1.5 million pages of documents); Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 
2016 WL 6779901, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016) (Request for “all” information, in addition to more than 1.5 
million documents previously produced to various regulatory agencies in connection with investigations of 
manipulating benchmark interest rate, was too expansive to meet marginal utility requirement.); see also Vaigasi 
v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (“Proportionality focuses on the 
marginal utility of the discovery sought.”). 
• 4th Cir. Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 WL 4577419, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 1, 2016) (court limited 
discovery to disclosure only of source code implicated by plaintiffs’ defect theory); Dwoskin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 
2016 WL 3955932, at *2 (D. Md. July 22, 2016) (court denied plaintiffs’ request for additional discovery because 
plaintiffs failed to show that discovery would contradict evidence already produced); see also Eramo v. Rolling 
Stone, LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, (W.D. Va. Jan. 25, 2016) (party resisting discovery may show that requested 
information is not relevant or is “of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery 
would outweigh the ordinary presumption of broad discovery”). 
• 5th Cir.  Garcia v. Prof’l Contract Serv., Inc., 2017 WL 187577, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 17, 2017) (denying 
defendant’s request for “fishing expedition” of past employee records from another former employer because 
defendant already had ten years of employment data, and records from company that plaintiff left voluntarily 
would likely be irrelevant). 
• 9th Cir. Abbott v. Wyo. Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2017 WL 2115381, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (at some point 
“discovery yields only diminishing returns and increasing expenses” and marginal utility must be considered 
under proportionality requirement); IDS Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fellows, 2017 WL 202128, at *4–5 (W.D. 
Wash. Jan. 18, 2017) (Because defendant had already produced approximately 6,000 emails, court held discovery 
of all emails regarding single employee’s reputation was “negligibly relevant, potentially privileged, and unduly 
burdensome,” and thus disproportional.); Lauris v. Novartis, 2016 WL 7178602, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (e-
discovery of apex executives was burdensome and unlikely to yield non-duplicative relevant information because 
of extensive discovery of key custodians); In re: Bard IVC Filters Prod. Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 4943393, at *4 (D. 
Ariz. Sept. 16, 2016) (court found burden incurred in providing ESI from custodians in foreign countries for last 
13 years outweighed benefit of “marginally relevant” evidence); Dobro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4595149, at 
*8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[A]ssertion that some of the 10,082 files may contain relevant claims was 
insufficient to justify the extremely time- and labor-intensive search.”); Santoyo v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 
2016 WL 2595199, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2016) (“In light of the slight relevance at this point, the amount in 
controversy, and the vast amount of discovery sought,” court granted protective order denying discovery request); 
Stewart v. Jovanovich, 2017 WL 4269780, at *2 (D. Mont. Sept. 25, 2017) (where “sole issue” was whether 
defendant fired plaintiff for submitting grievances, court denied discovery of defendant’s relationship with other 
staff as “improper fishing expedition”)..  
• 10th Cir. Ark. River Power Auth. v. The Babcock & Wilson Co., 2016 WL 192269, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2016) 
(“Once the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting discovery has the burden to establish lack of 
relevance or that the information is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by the 
discovery outweighs the benefit of production.”); Coleman v. Reed, 2016 WL 4523915, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 
22, 2016) (despite no evidence that truck driver was using cell phone at time of traffic accident, court granted, but 
limited, discovery request of data records of cell phone tower records, which could “potentially calculate his 
driving speeds” and use of phone); but cf. 2d Cir. Gonzalez v. Allied Concrete Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 4444789, at 
*4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (court denied request to disclose ATM receipts and cell phone records as potential 
evidence showing plaintiffs’ whereabouts in FLSA case claiming overtime compensation because request was too 
speculative). 
• 11th Cir. Steel Erectors, Inc. v. AIM Steel Int’l, Inc., 312 F.R.D. 673, 677 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2016) (court denied 
discovery request, which was “based solely on plaintiff’s speculation” that information was relevant in face of 
contrary evidence in discovery responses). 
 
21 Burden or expense outweighing benefits of discovery. 
• 1st Cir. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc. v. Zaragoza-Gomez, 152 F. Supp. 3d 67, 73 (D.P.R. 2016) (burden of producing 
discovery is not outweighed by benefits when party is able to “deliver a paper copy of the discovery to the court 
approximately two and one-half hours after [the court] ordered its production for in camera review”).  
• 2d Cir. Homeward Residential, Inc. v. Sand Canyon Corp., 2017 WL 4676806, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2017) 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
relevant to willful blindness theory, because searching would produce thousands of documents and would require 
producing party to search for irrelevant articles that make references to real estate prices). 
• 3d Cir. Capetillo v. Primecare Med., Inc., 2016 WL 3551625, at *3, n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2016) (finding 
discovery request for inmate medical care complaints over 5-10 year period unduly burdensome and limiting it to 
18-months and by subject matter because it triggered onerous manual review of database); see also Guerrido-
Lopez v. City of Allentown, 2016 WL 1182158, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2016) (court denied plaintiff’s motion for 
reconsideration because court had “impos[ed] reasonable limits on Plaintiff’s boundless discovery requests that 
permit[ed] the discovery of evidence the Plaintiff needs to prove his case without unnecessarily expanding the 
burden and cost of production”). Blackrock Allocation Target Shares v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2017 WL 
953550, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017) (denying, in breach-of-contract claim, plaintiffs’ request to conduct 
second statistical sampling of loans to determine loan breach rates in order to prove liability and damages, because 
such sampling would take several months to conduct, would cost “hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of 
dollars,” and probably would not prove liability and damages since such claims must be proven “on a loan-by-
loan and trust-by-trust basis” at summary judgment or trial); Blackrock Allocation Target Shares v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 2017 WL 3610511, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2017) (upholds magistrate judge’s decision 
that cost of sampling outweighed benefit); Royal Park Inv. v. HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Ass’n, 2017 WL 945099, at 
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2017) (same).  
• 4th Cir. White v. Sam’s E., Inc., 2016 WL 205494, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 15, 2016) (in case alleging violations 
of state law, plaintiff’s discovery requests for nationwide discovery were overbroad).  
• 5th Cir. Duvall v. BOPCO, L.P., 2016 WL 1268343, at *2 (E.D. La. April 1, 2016) (court denied plaintiff’s 
request to inspect and test barge equipment because steps were “unduly burdensome, hazardous and disruptive of 
defendant's operations”); Dumas v. O’Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc., 2017 WL 2573956, at *4 (M.D. La. June 13, 2017) 
(court denied discovery in employment discrimination action of all gender discrimination, harassment, and 
retaliation concerns, complaints, or comments made to defendant during 6-year timeframe because it would be 
“gargantuan, enormously costly and plainly unreasonable and labor intensive” given defendants’ more than 4,000 
stores). 
• 6th Cir. Rockwell Med., Inc. v. Richmond Bros., Inc., 2017 WL 1361129, at *2–*3 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2017) 
(denying, as disproportional, discovery requests because burden and expense of proposed discovery “is immense 
and doubtlessly outweighs its likely benefit, even assuming that all other factors favor Plaintiff–and it is not 
obvious that they do”); Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Anthony, 2016 WL 2997599, at *1 (N.D. Ohio May 24, 
2016) (court denied plaintiff’s motion for expedited responses to subpoena duces tecum from third party because 
request was overly broad and plaintiff “had ample opportunity to conduct discovery with [third party]… and this 
late request for expedited production of text messages, cell phone records, and metadata would be unduly 
burdensome to produce”); see also Marsden v. Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc., 2016 WL 471364, at *1–2 (S.D. 
Ohio Feb. 8, 2016) (expenditure of significant financial and personnel resources to comply with unsupported 
discovery request outweighed benefits of production); Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 2015 WL 8259548, at 
*6 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015) (court should limit scope of discovery only when compliance would “prove unduly 
burdensome, not merely expensive or time-consuming”); Murillo v. Dillard, 2017 WL 471570, at *3 (W.D. Ken. 
Feb. 3, 2017) (in dispute regarding whether 24 depositions of impoverished migrant workers would occur in 
Mexico or Kentucky, court held that defendants’ “preference for conducting the depositions in forum is 
substantially outweighed by the difficulty and expense that [p]laintiffs would incur in order to appear for their 
depositions in Kentucky”). 
• 8th Cir. Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc., 2016 WL 2986250, at *4 (D. Neb. May 20, 2016) (court affirmed magistrate 
judge’s finding that plaintiff’s discovery request was disproportional based on “a variety of factors – including the 
volume of reports Plaintiff's requests would return, the amount of irrelevant information likely to be included, and 
the number of employees who would have to be questioned”); Perez v. KDP Hosp., LLC, 2016 WL 2746926, at 
*3 (W.D. Mo. May 6, 2016) (in FSLA case, court denied defendants’ request for immigration status of informers 
and claimants because “potential damage and prejudice” outweighed relevance of information).  
• 9th Cir. Gilead Scis., Inc. v. Merck & Co., 2016 WL 146574, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2016) (cost and delay 
outweighed benefits of discovery when requests were for information that was irrelevant to disputes in case); see 
also ChriMar Systems v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 312 F.R.D. 560, 564 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (amendments to Rule 
26 balance proportionality needs of case considering burdens involved). Sec’y of Labor, United States Dep’t of 
Labor v. Kazu Constr., LLC, 2017 WL 628455, at *12 (D. Haw. Feb. 15, 2017) (in Fair Labor Standards Act case, 
denying issuance of a protective order because defendants’ requests for financial, phone, and social media records 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
proportionality,” narrowing scope of those requests to documents falling within three-month period giving rise to 
claims and modifying requests to require only names of relevant financial institutions, cell-phone carrier names, 
and social media posts produced or received by subpoenaed plaintiffs); Kellgren v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 
2017 WL 979045, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (denying plaintiff’s request to depose former employees, which 
would require defendant to track down those individuals, when their email files were already discoverable). 
• 10th Cir. Echon v. Sackett, 2016 WL 943485, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2016) (defendants’ discovery requests were 
overbroad because defendants did not provide court with information about people and entities from whom 
discovery was sought, requests were not limited to claims or defenses, and some requests were “outright 
offensive”); Gilmore v. L.D. Drilling, Inc., 2017 WL 3116576, at *2 (D. Kan. July 21, 2017) (“As for 
proportionality, clearly the embarrassment, harassment and annoyance of the request outweigh any potential 
relevance.”)  
• 11th Cir. In re: Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2889679, at *2 (N.D. Ala. July 6, 2017) 
(“[G]iven the likelihood that most of the responsive documents . . . will be subject to some privilege or work-
product protection, the burden and expense of searching for the remaining non-privileged responsive documents 
outweighs the potential benefit.”). 
• D.C. Cir. Dell Inc. v. DeCosta, 2017 WL 177618, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 17, 2017) (court denied discovery of broad 
patent-related documents because it “would impose an undue and disproportionate burden on [d]efendants to 
prepare a privilege log” and most documents would be protected by attorney-client privilege). 
Cf. 
• 9th Cir. Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 526225, at *3 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2016) (defendant’s argument 
that videotaping worksite was burdensome was not persuasive); Gottesman v. Santana, 2017 WL 5889765, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017) (in a case with multiple defendants, combined burden and expense that all defendants 
will face is unpersuasive; it is “not surprising” that each defendant will spend considerable time and effort 
responding to discovery requests).  
 
22 If burden and cost modest, balance strikes in favor of requesting party. 
• 5th Cir.Mr. Mudbug, Inc. v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 2017 WL 448575, at *3 (E.D. La. Feb. 1, 2017) (court granted 
motion to compel facility-site inspections when “[p]laintiff did not object to the inspection” and request was found 
“reasonably specific, relevant and proportional”). 
 
23  Proportionality considerations include effects on non-parties. 
• 1st Cir. Johansen v. Liberty Mut. Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 6045419, at *2 (D. Mass. Dec. 6, 2017) (third party ordered 
to produce information relating to its contractual agreement with defendant because it was relevant to defendant’s 
potential vicarious liability). 
• 5th Cir. Hahn v. Hunt, 2016 WL 1587405, at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2016) (“[N]on-parties have greater protections 
from discovery, and … burdens on non-parties . . . impact the proportionality analysis.”) (citing E. Laporte & J. 
Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 9 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 57 (2015)). 
• 9th Cir. D.F. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 2016 WL 3360515, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (court did not require 
third party to produce privilege log or otherwise “assemble a formal, detailed privilege claim” while questioning 
whether associated burden and expense outweighed benefits).  
• 10th Cir. Charles Schwab & Co. v. Highwater Wealth Mgmt., LLC, 2017 WL 4278494, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 27, 
2017) (Although Rule 26 generally imposes a heavier burden when discovery sought relates to a non-party, the 
court did not impose a higher burden because the non-party’s actions “are central to both the claims and 
counterclaims.”); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Cimarron Crossing Feeders, LLC, 2017 WL 4770702, at *5 (D. 
Kan. Oct. 19, 2017) (court denied discovery because, among other reasons, it would subject paying Amtrak 
customers to significant delays while trains were inspected).   
• 11th Cir. Williams v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 3156066, at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 3, 2016) (discovery of non-
parties’ HIPPA-protected health information was disproportional considering limited relevance of information); In 
re: Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 2017 WL 2889679, at *3 (N.D. Ala. July 6, 2017) (“as rule 45 is a type 
of discovery device, discovery requests under it must also comply with the proportionality requirement of Rule 
26(b)(1)”). 
 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 8th Cir. Duhigg v. Goodwill Industries, 2016 WL 4991480, at *3 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 2016) (court erroneously 
conflates determination of accessible information under Rule 26(b)(2)(B) with burden analysis under Rule 26(b)(1)).  
 
25 Burden on party seeking more than presumptive number of depositions.  
• 4th Cir. Miller v. Garibaldi’s, Inc., 2016 WL 7257035, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2016) (court denied additional 
depositions because defendant had not established that the depositions of each individual plaintiff were 
necessary). 
• 5th Cir. Allen-Pieroni v. Sw. Correctional, 2016 WL 4439997, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2016) (request for six 
depositions beyond ten that were taken was “proportional to the needs of case” after court found the first ten 
depositions were necessary).  
• 6th Cir. Murillo v. Dillard, 2017 WL 471570, at *5 (W.D. Ken. Feb. 3, 2017) (While “plaintiffs ha[d] the burden 
of persuading the Court that taking the depositions of the remaining 21 [p]laintiffs [was] necessary,” burden met 
where depositions would “provide evidence that is relevant to the claims and defenses . . . and proportional to the 
needs of this case” and were “not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.”). 
• 11th Cir. Williams v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 2747020, at *1 (M.D. Ala. May 2, 2016) (“party seeking to 
exceed the presumptive number of depositions must make a ‘particularized showing of why the discovery is 
necessary’” and “address Rule 26(b)(1)’s proportionality analysis”). 
• Fed. Cl. Cellcast Tech., LLC v. United States, 2016 WL 5335798, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 23, 2016) (parties allowed 
to request leave to exceed 20 oral depositions, which court found to be “proportional to the needs of the case,” on 
showing of “particularized need”).  
 
26 Court’s failure to reference proportionality. 
• 1st Cir. Ferring Pharms. Inc. v. Braintree Labs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 3d 355, 363 (D. Mass. 2016) (failure of judge 
to “expressly reference proportionality in her ruling does not render her ruling contrary to law”).  
• 2d Cir. Patient A v. Vt. Agency of Human Servs., 2016 WL 880036, at *3 (D. Vt. Mar. 1, 2016) (“Court is not 
obligated to make formal and explicit findings regarding each of the[se] factors.”) (quoting Meeker v. Life Care 
Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2015 WL 7882695, at *3 (D. Colo. Dec. 4, 2015)); In re: Catalyst Managerial Serv., 2017 WL 
716846, at *2 (2nd Cir. Feb. 23, 2017) (in affirming district court’s motion to compel production, court rejected 
intervener’s argument that district court must explicitly conduct proportionality analysis when defendant’s 
responses and responsive documents it submitted cast completeness of its disclosure into doubt and thus 
warranted additional discovery to allow plaintiffs to check accuracy of defendant’s disclosures).  
• 3d Cir. CDK Glob., LLC v. Tulley Auto. Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 1718100, at *8 (D.N.J Apr. 29, 2016) (district judge 
rejected plaintiff’s motion that magistrate judge failed to consider proportionality factors in denying discovery 
request). 
• 9th Cir. Brightedge Tech., Inc. v. Searchmetrics GMBH., 2017 WL 5171227, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017) 
(although defendant argued that discovery request was not relevant or proportional, court ordered discovery on 
basis of international privacy law).  
 
27 No priority among proportionality factors. 
• 3d Cir. Capetillo v. Primecare Med., Inc., 2016 WL 3551625, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2016) ((“[N]o single factor 
is designed to outweigh the other factors in determining whether the discovery sought is proportional.”) (quoting 
Bell v. Reading Hosp., 2016 WL 162991, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016)); Williams v. BASF Catalysts, LLC, 2017 
WL 3317295, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2017) (same).  
 
28 Requesting party does not have responsibility to make advance showing of proportionality.  
• 2d Cir. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Fayda, 2015 WL 7871037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015) (Committee Note 
to 2015 amendment explains that rule “does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all 
proportionality considerations”).  
• 5th Cir. Samsung Elec. Am. Inc. v. Chung, 2017 WL 896897, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 7, 2017) (“Rule 26(g)(1) 
does not impose on a party filing a motion to compel the burden to show relevance and proportionality in the first 
instance.”); Hightower v. Grp. 1 Auto., Inc., 2016 WL 3430569, at *3 (E.D. La. June 22, 2016) (considering 
plaintiff’s argument, which cited Duke Law Proportionality GUIDELINES AND PRACTICES, GUIDELINE 2(F), stating 
that there is no requirement to make advance showing of proportionality). 9th Cir. In re: Bard IVC Filters Prod. 
Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 4943393, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 16, 2016) (“[A]mendment does not place the burden of 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 10th Cir. Hibu Inc. v. Peck, 2016 WL 4702422, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016) (“Moving the proportionality 
provisions to Rule 26 does not place on the party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality 
considerations.”). 
 
29 Boilerplate objections insufficient. 
• 2nd Cir. Ramos v. Town of E. Hartford, 2016 WL 7340282, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2016) (“[t]he 2015 revision 
of the Federal Rules precludes the use of the type of boilerplate objections on which Defendants rely.”); Leibovitz 
v. The City of New York, 2017 WL 462515, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2017) (Court overruled defendant’s “general, 
boilerplate objections to each of plaintiff’s requests for production” because “such objections violate Fed.R.Civ.P. 
34(b)(2)(B).”). 
• 4th Cir. Arrow Enter. Computing Sols., Inc. v. BlueAlly, LLC, 2016 WL 4287929, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 15, 2016) 
(“[N]othing more than boilerplate objections: they fail to specify why the requested documents are not relevant to 
a party's claim or defense and not proportional to the needs of the case.”); Ashmore v. Williams, 2017 WL 
2437082, at *4 (D.S.C. June 6, 2017) (“Defendants’ proportionality objections are mere boilerplate language and 
such ‘boilerplate’ language in a discovery objection cannot overcome the broad scope of discovery as 
contemplated by Rule 26.”); Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 2017 WL 3621184, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 
22, 2017) (“Like the boy who cried wolf, a party that reiterates the same nonspecific objections to every response 
obscures whatever legitimate objections might exist, and hinders the Court’s ability to discern and resolve areas of 
true dispute on a timely basis.”). 
• 5th Cir. Rosalez Funez v. E.M.S.P., LLC, 2016 WL 5337981, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2016) (“General 
objections … are meaningless and constitute a waste of time for opposing counsel and the court.”); see also 
Keycorp v. Holland, 2016 WL 6277813, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2016) (Boilerplate objections failed to “provide 
specific reasons for the overly broad, overly burdensome and vague objections”); Team Contractors, LLC v. 
Waypoint NOLA, LLC, 2017 WL 3216582, at *2 (E.D. La. July 28, 2017) (“court will ignore the ‘General 
Objections’ asserted in [party’s] responses, [because] in every respect these objections are text-book examples of 
what federal courts have routinely deemed to be improper [boilerplate] objections”). 
• 6th Cir. Martin v. Posey, 2017 WL 412876, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)’s inclusion 
of the proportionality factors enforces the collective obligation to consider proportionality in discovery disputes; it 
does not, however, permit a party to refuse discovery simply by making a boilerplate objection that the 
information requested is not proportional.”); In re Haynes, 2017 WL 3559509, at *6-7 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2017) 
(extensive discussion criticizing boilerplate objections); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Morrow, 2017 WL 
4532240, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 10, 2017) (“As neither movant has provided rebuttal . . . other than broad 
generalization, neither movant has made a compelling case that the information subpoenaed lacks relevance.”).. 
• 7th Cir. Baires Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4591905, at*5 (E.D. 
Wis. Sept. 2, 2016) (“[B]oilerplate objections such as relevancy and ‘not proportional’” are insufficient).  
• 8th Cir. Schultz v. Sentinel Ins., Ltd, 2016 WL 3149686, at *7 (D.S.D. June 3, 2016) (“[B]oilerplate ‘general 
objections’ fail to preserve any valid objection at all because they are not specific to a particular discovery 
request.”); see also Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court, 316 F.R.D. 254, 264 (D.S.D. 
Feb. 26, 2016) (“Amended Rule 34(b) now prohibits boilerplate objections.”); Wollesen v. W. Cent. Cooperative, 
2018 WL 785863, at *8 (D. Iowa Feb. 8, 2018) (denying discovery because party used boilerplate objection, so 
court “simply lacks the information” to find that requested discovery was irrelevant). 
• 9th Cir. Gibson v. SDCC, 2016 WL 845308, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2016) (boilerplate objections insufficient to 
show discovery should not be allowed); Choquette v. Warner, 2017 WL 2671263, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 
2017) (court held that defendants’ requests for admission were relevant, despite plaintiff’s objections, and 
“warned” plaintiff that if “the Court again finds . . . boilerplate objections, and/or a lack of good faith in 
responding, the consequence will be the imposition of sanctions”); Anderson v. Pacific Crane Maint. Co., 2017 
WL 3534576, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2017) (court granted discovery request where objections contained 
boilerplate language, noting “Defendant can and should do better”). 
• 10th Cir. Duffy v. Lawrence Memorial Hosp., 2016 WL 7386413, at *2–3 (D. Kan. Dec. 21, 2016) (Court rejected 
boilerplate objections because they provide no explanation for the objection and they “leave the reader confused 
as to whether the answers are complete and all requested documents are identified.”). 
• 11th Cir. Polycarpe v. Seterus, Inc., 2017 WL 2257571, at *3 (M.D. Fla. May 23, 2017) (court overruled 
objections that were clearly boilerplate due to their phrasing and because they used certain terms “with little or no 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
boilerplate objections “plaintiff must answer an interrogatory, to the extent it is not objected to, separately and 
fully in writing under oath.”). 
Cf.  
• 3d Cir. Haines v. Cherian, 2016 WL 831946, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2016) (court sustained boilerplate objection 
that request was overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence). 
30 Objection to discovery request must be specific. 
• 2d Cir. Fischer v. Forrest, 2017 WL 773694 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2017), ___ F.Supp.3d ___ 2017 (“It is time, once 
again, to issue a discovery wake-up call to the Bar in this District” to state grounds for objecting to discovery 
request with specificity under Rule 34). 
• 4th Cir. Raab v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 2016 WL 2587188, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. May 4, 2016) (defendant failed to 
provide specific objection to discovery requests).  
• 5th Cir. Allen-Pieroni v. Sw. Corr., LLC, 2016 WL 1750325, at *4 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2016) (“[P]arty seeking to 
resist discovery on these grounds still bears the burden of making a specific objection and showing that the 
discovery fail[ed] the proportionality calculation mandated by Rule 26(b) by coming forward with specific 
information to address” the proportionality factors.); Harper v. City of Dallas, 2017 WL 3674830, at *6 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 25, 2017) (same); see also Orchestratehr, Inc. v. Trombetta, 2016 WL 1555784, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
18, 2016) (same); Holmes v. N. Tex. Health Care Laundry Coop. Ass’n, 2016 WL 1366269, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
6, 2016) (party resisting discovery “bears the burden of making a specific objection and showing that the 
discovery fails the proportionality calculation mandated by Rule 26(b)”); Robinson v. Dallas Cty. Cmty. Coll. 
Dist., 2016 WL 1273900, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb.18, 2016) (“[P]arty resisting discovery must show specifically how 
each discovery request is not relevant or otherwise objectionable.”). 
• 6th Cir. Commerce and Indus. Ins. Co. v. Century Surety Co., 2017 WL 946984, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2017) 
(because specific objections are required, “[p]laintiff’s general objection that discovery is unnecessary is without 
merit”). 
• 8th Cir. Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court, 316 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D.S.D. Feb. 26, 
2016) (objecting party must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting, including the reasons” and “whether 
any responsive materials are being withheld”); Murphy v. Piper, 2017 WL 5633096, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 
2017) (in upholding magistrate judge’s discovery order, court noted that  if requested information is not 
reasonably available, producing party must “articulate why that is the case with respect to the particular 
information being requested”).  
• 10th Cir. Zoobuh, Inc. v. Better Broadcasting, LLC, 2017 WL 1476135, at *4–*5 (D. Utah Apr. 24, 2017) (even 
though defendant claimed that discovery would be costly, court held that defendant failed to demonstrate that it 
would incur an undue burden because it did not provide “some quantification . . . of the material in its possession 
that [was] responsive” and thus did not provide court with any concrete indicator of burden production); N.U. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 3654759, at *2 (D. Kan. July 8, 2016) (granting plaintiff’s motion to compel in 
part because defendant relied on “conclusory assertions that the scope of the requests [was] too broad without 
adequately demonstrating that responding to the requests would pose an undue burden or that the scope of the 
requests encompasse[d] irrelevant information”); see also Digital Ally, Inc. v. Util. Assocs., Inc., 2016 WL 
1535979, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2016) (court overruled defendant’s objections to discovery requests because 
defendant failed to expound upon objections to discovery’s proportionality and relevance); Fish v. Kobach, 2016 
WL 893787, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 8, 2016) (“Objections based on undue burden must be clearly supported by an 
affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding to the discovery request.”).  
 
31 Discovery request too broad. 
• 2d Cir. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2016 WL 6779901, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016) 
(plaintiff’s “general contention that every communication and work product related to the regulatory 
investigations is “likely” to contain additional relevant information” insufficient to support broad request). 
• 4th Cir. Prusin v. Canton’s Pearls, LLC, 2017 WL 1166326, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2017) (denying discovery 
request when plaintiff failed to identify specific Quickbooks accounting records he sought, because “the 
production of entire Quickbooks programs without further limitation is excessive in most cases in light of the 
amount of irrelevant information contained therein,” including “detailed accounting records, cost and budget 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
8th Cir. Lureen v. Holl, 2017 WL 3834739, at *7 (D.S.D. Aug. 31, 2017) (court denied plaintiff’s motion to 
compel defendants to answer interrogatory because it was too broad and plaintiff failed to satisfy requirement of 
engaging in good faith effort to resolve discovery dispute in meaningful meet and confer).   
• 9th Cir. Thakkar v. Honeywell Int’l Inc. Short-Term Disability Plan, 2016 WL 6832708, at *4 (D. Ariz. Nov. 21, 
2016) (broad discovery request for all communications in company, without specifying department or employee 
level, not proportional to needs of case); Davis v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 2017 WL 3608192, at *8 (D. Colo. 
Aug. 22, 2017) (in granting summary judgment in FOIA case court also denied broad discovery request because 
plaintiff failed to make showing that discovery was essential for purposes of Rule 56(d) and was not proportional 
to needs of the case).  
 
32 Court may rely on counsel’s representations.  
• 6th Cir.  Martin v. Posey, 2017 WL 412876, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017) (FRCP do not provide for discovery 
in the form of compelling polygraph examinations of parties or other individuals); Burfitt v. Bear, 2016 WL 
5848844, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2016) (court accepted government-counsel’s representation that discovery 
requested by prisoner was burdensome particularly because it posed security risk). 
• 11th Cir. Hunter v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 2016 WL 943752, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 5, 2016) (court generally may rely 
on counsel’s representations about availability of responsive documents, absent suspicion that representation is 
false).  
Cf.  
• 2d Cir. Sky Med. Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claim Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 4703656, at *11 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 
2016) (based on counsel’s representation that no documents existed, court required “affidavit setting forth (1) the 
specific details of the search undertaken for these materials; (2) what was discovered as a result of the search; and 
(3) to the extent the Nationwide Defendants maintain[ed] that no responsive materials were found, the defendants’ 
particularized explanation as to why no materials were uncovered”). 
• 7th Cir. Elliott v. Superior Pool Prods., LLC, 2016 WL 29243, at *6 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2016) (defense counsel’s 
“factual contentions concerning the completeness of their document production to the Plaintiff ha[d] sufficient 
evidentiary support”). 
 
33 Burden of persuasion. 
• 2d Cir. Black v. Buffalo Meat Serv., Inc., 2016 WL 4363506, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016) (“Prior to the 2015 
amendments, defendants would have to show that the requests were unduly burdensome; now, the issue is whether 
the quantity of requests for relevant material is such that it is out of proportion to the scope of the case.”); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fayda, 2015 WL 7871037, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2015) (amendments did not alter 
burdens on parties; party seeking discovery must show that item is relevant, and party resisting discovery must 
show “undue burden or expense”); Sky Med. Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claim Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 4703656, at 
*2 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 2016) (“[P]arty seeking discovery must make a prima facie showing that the discovery 
sought is more than merely a fishing expedition.”); see also Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 2016 WL 7017356, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2016) (same); Edebali v. Bankers Standard Ins. 
Co., 2017 WL 3037408, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 17, 2017) (same). 
• 3d Cir. Wahab v. State of N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2017 WL 4912617, at *4–5 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2017) (court 
denied discovery where “lack of specificity suggests that Plaintiff is indeed on a fishing expedition,” and where 
plaintiff did “little to address the obvious privacy issues”). 
• 4th Cir. Santiago v. S. Health Partners, 2016 WL 4435229, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016) (amended Rule 26 
does not “require shifting the burden of persuasion” from the “parties resisting discovery[, who continue to] bear 
the burden of persuasion in a discovery dispute”); Eramo v. Rolling Stone, LLC, 314 F.R.D. 205, 209 (W.D. Va. 
Jan. 25, 2016) (party who moves to compel discovery has initial burden of showing that information is 
discoverable; party resisting discovery then has burden of proving that court should not grant motion to compel. 
Party resisting discovery may show that requested information is not relevant or is “of such marginal relevance 
that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption of broad discovery”). 
• 6th Cir. Babcock Power, Inc. v. Kapsalis, 2017 WL 2837019, at *4 (W.D. Ky. June 30, 2017) (“plaintiffs have not 
shown that the likely benefit of the proposed discovery outweighs the burden and expense in this instance”); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pointe Physical Therapy, 2017 WL 2616938, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2017) 
(“courts have, in evaluating the proportionality issue, suggested that both parties have some stake in addressing 
the various relevant factors”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pointe Physical Therapy, LLC, 2017 WL 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
met its burden of persuasion, and had not “even made any attempt to” explain why production would be unduly 
burdensome, but where requesting party had “engaged in an extensive and persuasive analysis of both relevance 
and the proportionality factors”). 
• 9th Cir. Caballero v. Bodega Latina Corp., 2017 WL 3174931, at *2 (D. Nev. July 25, 2017) (“party seeking 
discovery does not alone carry the burden to prove proportionality … [r]ather, the amendment imposes a 
collective burden on ‘[t]he parties and the court’”); Brewer v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2018 WL 882812, at *2 (D. Mont. 
Feb. 14, 2018) (citing the Sedona Conference’s proportionality principles and upholding prior denial of 
“discovery on discovery” because requesting party had not shown a specific deficiency in the production). 
• 10th Cir. Ark. River Power Auth. v. The Babcock & Wilson Co., 2016 WL 192269, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 15, 2016) 
(party seeking discovery has burden of establishing that “information sought is relevant to a claim or defense in 
the case. Once the discovery sought appears relevant, the party resisting discovery has the burden to establish lack 
of relevance or that the information is of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by the 
discovery outweighs the benefit of production”); see also Arenas v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 223, 2016 WL 
5122872, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 21, 2016) (“Moving the proportionality provisions to Rule 26 does not place on the 
party seeking discovery the burden of addressing all proportionality considerations.”); Hibu Inc. v. Peck, 2017 
WL 2472548, at *3 (D. Kan. June 8, 2017) (Court denied defendant’s requested discovery of all increases and 
decreases in revenue for every print directory and all digital products in every market nationwide from 2012 to 
present; “[i]t is Defendant’s burden to demonstrate the relevance of all such information, and Defendant has not 
met that burden.”). 
• 11th Cir. Bright v. Frix, 2016 WL 1011441, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2016) (party who moves to compel 
discovery has initial burden of proving that requested information is relevant).  
 
34 Discovery of social media information. 
• 10th Cir. Gordon v. T.G.R. Logistics, Inc., 2017 WL 1947537, at *3 (D. Wyo. May 10, 2017) (extensive 
discussion of discovery of social media information explaining court’s ruling narrowing party’s request for entire 
Facebook account history, stating that “[j]ust because the information can be retrieved quickly and inexpensively 
does not resolve the issue. Courts have long denied discovery of information which was easy to obtain but which 
was not discoverable.”). 
  
35 Use of GPS data. 
• 5th Cir. Kirk v. Invesco, Ltd., 2016 WL 4394336, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 18, 2016) (GPS records submitted to show 
whereabouts of employee for FLSA overtime compensation purposes were inconclusive and did not support 
inference that employee worked overtime).    
• 6th Cir. Raub v. Moon Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 2016 WL 6275392, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2016) 
(Property owner’s discovery request of property owners’ association’s computer and phone records, including 
passwords, GPS locations, text messages, photos, and voicemails, for past ten years in a case alleging retaliation 
for filing ADA complaint was “breathtakingly broad, burdensome, and intrusive.”); cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Papanek, 2018 WL 300170, at *5 (S.D. Ohio, Jan. 5, 2018) (court did not accept review by individual employees 
of their cell phones and instead required lawyers to search the devices and review information).  
• 7th Cir. Crabtree v. Angie’s List, Inc., 2017 WL 413242, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2017) (Court denied 
request for forensic examination of plaintiffs’ election devices to get GPS data when defendant already had 
plaintiffs’ cell phone records and log-ins data, finding that such request was “not proportional to the needs of the 
case because any benefit the data might provide is outweighed by Plaintiffs’ significant privacy and 
confidentiality interests.”).  
 
36 Consideration of burdens other than expense typically incurred in discovery.  
• 2d Cir. In re: XPO Logistics, Inc., 2017 WL 2226593, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (Court denied discovery of 
employees’ compensation, since it would not be proportional and “providing . . . personnel information beyond 
that which is already publicly available would be highly intrusive.”). 
• 4th Cir.  Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Advanced Surgery Ctr. of Bethesda, LLC, 2016 WL 7115952, at *3 (D. Md. 
Dec. 7, 2016) (court recognized potential burden of conferring with counsel from dozens of other cases who 
would need to concur with disclosure of certain deposition transcripts subject to confidentiality orders, but 
rejected the burdensome-claim, absent showing of “allege[d] specific facts that indicate the nature and extent of 
the burden”); Fish v. Air & Liquid Sys. Corp., 2017 WL 697663, at *18 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2017) (citing irrelevance 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
information, and likely work product protection, court denied request for information on auto manufacturer’s 
record retention policy, when plaintiff had not identified “any document or group of documents at issue.” 
• 5th Cir. Biggio v. H20 Hair, Inc., 2016 WL 7116025, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 2016) (deposition questions 
concerning employment histories of nonparties, including allegedly detrimental personnel actions taken against 
them, may reveal information relevant to their retaliation and willful misconduct claims, but court must balance 
parties’ interests in obtaining permissible discovery against privacy interests of individual nonparties); see also .In 
re: Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods., 313 F.R.D. 32, 38 (E.D. La. 2016) (request for employees’ personnel files 
maintained by HR department, as opposed to employees’ custodial files, raised privacy concerns and required 
“individualized showing of relevancy, proportionality, and particularity”); see also McKinney/Pearl Rest. 
Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2016 WL 2609994, at *11 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2016) (court denied plaintiff’s 
motion to squash subpoena for deposition finding that payment of attorney’s fees in connection with deposition is 
“not an undue burden under the circumstances”). 
• 6th Cir. Murillo v. Dillard, 2017 WL 2417953, at *2 (W.D. Ky. June 2, 2017) (court denied defendant’s motion 
for protective order regarding depositions that plaintiff  transient workers had requested to be made in Mexico, 
noting burden of plaintiffs to travel and attend deposition in U.S.). 
• 9th Cir. Dobro v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2016 WL 4595149, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (“Court [found] that the 
requested procedure [seeking written consent from affected individuals to disclose certain information] would 
inappropriately impact the privacy rights of numerous third-party insureds and [was] not proportional to the needs 
of this case.”); Gonzales v. City of Bakersfield,, 2016 WL 4474600, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2016) (“Court 
[found] that the privacy interests [disclosure of police personnel files were] outweighed by the need for 
disclosure.”); Amsel v. Gerrard et al., 2017 WL 1383443, at *4 (D. Nev. Apr. 12, 2017) (Court denied 
defendants’ request for plaintiffs’ financial information to show hours plaintiffs worked, because “[d]efendants’ 
credibility argument does not overcome [p]laintiffs’ privacy interests in their financial records.”). 
• 11th Cir. Williams v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 2747020, at *2 (M.D. Ala. May 2, 2016) (HIPPA privacy 
“concerns tip the scales of proportionality against disclosure” of third-party health information). 
37 Affidavits or other evidentiary proof showing burden with specificity required.  
• 2d Cir. Knight v. Local 25 IBEW, __ WL __ (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016) (defendant’s conclusory argument that 
redacting social security numbers on standard reports was burdensome was not persuasive).  
• 4th Cir. Scott Hutchison Enter., Inc. v. Cranberry Pipeline Corp., 2016 WL 5219633, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 20, 
2016) (collection of cases that require specific proof); Ashmore v. Allied Energy, Inc., 2016 WL 301169, at *3 
(D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2016) (court denied defendant’s claim that discovery was not proportional because defendant 
failed to “submit any documentation that either establishes the proposed cost of production or a cost estimate for 
an alternative form of production”). 
• 5th Cir. McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2016 WL 98603, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 
2016) (party resisting discovery must show that “requested discovery was overbroad, burdensome, or oppressive 
by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.”).  
• 8th Cir. Vallejo v. Amgen, Inc., 2016 WL 2986250, at *3, n. 6 (D. Neb. May 20, 2016) (court retained discretion 
to find discovery request not proportional when neither party provided “substantial and reasonable guidance” 
forcing court “‘to wade through generalized and conflated arguments of need, burden, and relevance’”).  
• 9th Cir. Santoyo v. Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 2016 WL 2595199, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2016) (court 
noted that party resisting discovery should provide more specific proof of cost of discovery beyond estimates 
based on lawyer’s similar prior litigation experiences). 
• 10th Cir. Fish v. Kobach, 2016 WL 893787, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 8, 2016) (“Objections based on undue burden 
must be clearly supported by an affidavit or other evidentiary proof of the time or expense involved in responding 
to the discovery request.”); Parker v. Delmar Gardens of Lenexa, Inc., 2017 WL 1650757, at *5 (D. Kan. May 2, 
2017) (although acknowledging potential abuse in employment discrimination action arising from subpoenas to 
past and current employers, court held that plaintiff could not rely on “conclusory claims of annoyance, 
harassment, and embarrassment” because “courts tend to resolve the issue on the side of the broad nature of 
discovery”).  
• 11th Cir. In re: Subpoena Upon NeJame Law, P.A., 2016 WL 1599831, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 21, 2016) 
(requested discovery was seemingly overbroad, but court nonetheless ordered it because party failed to provide 
evidence of any burden in retrieving, reviewing, or producing it); Mann v. XPO Log. Freight, Inc., 2017 WL 
3054125, at *8 (D. Kan. July 19, 2017) (discovery granted when defendant “failed to present evidentiary support 





                                                                                                                                                                                                    
38 Party requesting discovery may need to make showing.  
• 2d Cir. Blodgett v. Siemens Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 4203490, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2016) (court denied 
discovery request because requesting party failed to provide any “basis beyond speculation to believe that relevant 
information [was] likely to be uncovered as a result of requiring Defendant to undertake an additional search for 
the proposed three month period”). 
• 5th Cir. Carter v. H2R Rest. Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 2439439, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2017) (“The party 
seeking discovery, to prevail on a motion to compel or resist a motion for a protective order, may well need to 
make its own showing of many or all of the proportionality factors . . .”); McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. 
Metro. Life Ins., 2016 WL 98603, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2016) (in opposition to resisting party’s showing, party 
seeking discovery “may well need to make its own showing of many or all of the proportionality factors, 
including the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative 
access to relevant information”); see also Keycorp v. Holland, 2016 WL 6277813, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2016) 
(requesting party “may well need to make its own showing of the proportionality factors”). 
• 6th Cir. Martin v. Posey, 2017 WL 412876, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2017) (Where plaintiff asked for additional 
requests for admissions due to “defendants’ inconsistent answers,” court denied such requests because plaintiff 
“has not shown why he needs more requests for admission or how any additional requests will help him obtain the 
information he needs to prosecute his claims.”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pointe Physical Therapy, 2017 
WL 2616938, at *7 (E.D. Mich. June 12, 2017) (court granted discovery request because requesting party made 
sufficient proportionality showing for each of proportionality factors in contrast with responding party’s 
inadequate showing); Anwar v. Dow Chem. Co., 2017 WL 5895117, at *8 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2017) (Appellate 
court denied discovery where “district court granted limited discovery, and [requesting party] fail[ed] to show that 
the information would change any result or that the depositions she sought to take were within the district court’s 
limited discovery parameters.”). 
• 8th Cir. Quinonez-Castellanos v. Performance Contractors, Inc., 2017 WL 3430511, at *5–6 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 9, 
2017) (court limited discovery of discrimination practices only of worksites of company where supervisor 
allegedly practiced discrimination against employees). 
• 9th Cir. Choquette v. Warner, 2017 WL 2671263, at *5 (W.D. Wash. June 21, 2017) (court denied plaintiff’s 
discovery request for “all communications, research, reports and decisions pertaining to [the drug at issue] since 
January 1, 2012” because it “did not meet the requirement of being reasonably targeted and specific”); 
Medicinova Inc. v. Genzyme Corp., 2017 WL 2829691, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) (same); Fernandez v. Cox, 
2017 WL 4873066, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2017) (plaintiff appealed order denying discovery on proportionality 
grounds and claimed that party seeking discovery does not bear burden of proving proportionality; decision was 
upheld because the Advisory Committee Notes say that restoring the proportionality calculation does not change 
the court’s responsibility to consider proportionality). 
• 10th Cir. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Centura Health, 2017 WL 3821781, at *7 (D. Co. Sept. 1, 2017)  
(court rejects defendant’s argument that burden of reviewing thousands of hard copies of documents is 
burdensome, because defendant failed to explain why converting documents to electronic data by means of OCR 
would not be effective and inexpensive); Xmission, L.C. v. Adknowledge, Inc., 2016 WL 6108556, at *3 (D. Utah 
Oct. 19, 2016) (request denied for information “that was mooted and resolved over a year ago” because plaintiff 
“does little to explain[] the relevance of these discovery requests to the current litigation”). 
Cf. 
• 6th Cir. In re Haynes, 2017 WL 3559509, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2017) (“[T]he amended rule did not shift the 
burden of proving proportionality to the party seeking discovery.”). 
 
39 Unsupported assertions insufficient.  
• 2d Cir. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Bank of Am. Corp., 2016 WL 6779901, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2016) 
(court denied plaintiff’s requests because “plaintiffs [had] not sufficiently articulated the relevance of documents 
sought,” but plaintiffs were allowed to renew motion if requests were more specific “detailing requested 
documents or topics” (quoting Okla. v. Tyson Foods, 2006 WL 2862216, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 4, 2006)); see 
also LightSquared, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 2015 WL 8675377, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) (court denied 
plaintiff’s request to search files of additional custodians based on plaintiff’s unsupported assertions).  
• 5th Cir. Smith v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 2990287, at *6 (M.D. La. July 13, 2017) (court granted 
discovery request when requesting party “argue[d] in extensive detail that the information sought . . . [was] 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 9th Cir. Dao v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 2016 WL 796095, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2016) (court 
found that plaintiff failed to show the value of her case that exceeded actual damages and therefore burden and 
expense of broad discovery outweighed its likely benefits); Intellicheck Mobilisa, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 
2017 WL 4221091, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 21, 2017) (motion to compel was incomplete and therefore 
inadequate because party did not explain how “the information sought in each disputed RFP is relevant”).  
 
40 Inferior access to information. 
• 5th Cir. Duvall v. BOPCO, L.P., 2016 WL 1268343, at *3 (E.D. La. April 1, 2016) (court denied plaintiff’s 
request to inspect and test barge equipment despite inferior access to information when Rule 34 inspection had 
already occurred and plaintiff retained engineering expert).  
 
41 Party cooperation. 
• 6th Cir. Rui He v. Rom, 2016 WL 909405, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2016) (court noted that “parties and their 
counsel ha[d] not made a sincere attempt to cooperate in pretrial discovery and thus encourage[d] all case 
participants to try to minimize further needless frustration, time, and expense associated with the discovery 
process”); see also Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 2015 WL 8259548, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015) (court 
urged parties to “engage in further cooperate dialogue in an effort to come to an agreement regarding proportional 
discovery”).  
• 9th Cir. Martinelli v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 WL 1458109, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016) (parties agreed to 
ESI protocol, which provided that “counsel’s zealous representation of them [was] not compromised by 
conducting discovery in a cooperative manner”); see also Wichansky v. Zowine, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37065, at 
*5 (D. Ariz. March 22, 2016) (“‘[P]arties share the responsibility’ to achieve Rule 1’s goal, and emphasizes that 
‘[e]ffective advocacy is consistent with – and indeed depends upon – cooperative and proportional use’ of the 
rules of procedure. The parties should cooperate during trial to minimize delay and wasted time.”); Roberts v. 
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2016) (Chief Justice Robert’s year-end Report said 
that “Rule 1 was expanded . . . to emphasize ‘the obligation of judges and lawyers to work cooperatively in 
controlling the expense and time demands of litigation’”). 
 
42 Lawyers should work together.  
• 9th Cir. D.F. v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 2016 WL 3360515, at *7 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) (in light of third-
party’s cooperation and good-faith attempts to provide requested information, court declined to require 
submission of formal privilege log or affidavit evidence to support privilege claim); Roberts v. Clark County Sch. 
Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2016) (Chief Justice Robert’s Year-End report stated that lawyers 
representing adverse parties “have an affirmative duty to work together, and with the court, to achieve prompt and 
efficient resolutions of disputes”).  
• 10th Cir. Digital Ally, Inc. v. Util. Assocs. Inc., 2016 WL 1535979, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2016) (parties 
“engaged in discussions to resolve the issues of whether the information sought was, in fact, responsive to the 
previous discovery and whether Defendant was required to produce it. Those communications between the parties 
led to resolution of six categories of requests”). 
 
43 Specific evidence required to refute claim that discovery is burdensome.  
• 7th Cir. Acheron Med. Supply, LLC v. Cook Med. Inc., 2016 WL 5466309, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 9, 2016) (court 
found general estimates of discovery burden did “not refute the specific evidence submitted by responding 
party”). 
 
44 Technology can affect proportionality analysis. 
• 6th Cir. Kitchen v. Corizon Health Inc., 2017 WL 5099892, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 5, 2017) (court denied 
plaintiff’s discovery requests because he “ignore[d] defendant’s objections”).   
• 9th Cir. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Auburn & Bradford at Providence Homeowners' Ass'n, __ WL __ (D. Nev. Aug. 1, 
2016) (motion for protective order granted, requiring Rule 30(b)(6) deposition to be video-conferenced in Dallas, 
location of corporate designees, to avoid unnecessary expense). 
 






                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 3d Cir. Capetillo v. Primecare Med., Inc., 2016 WL 3551625, at *3, n.2 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2016) (finding 
discovery request for inmate medical care complaints over 5-10 year period unduly burdensome and limiting it to 
18-months and by subject matter because it triggered onerous manual review of database).  
• 6th Cir. Suzette Scott-Warren v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 2016 WL 5661774, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 
2016) (because defendant did not possess aggregate data on insurance claims, court limited number of claims to 
be reviewed manually). 
 
46 Prioritization of discovery.  
• 3d Cir. U.S. ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC. v. Victaulic Co., 2016 WL 5799660, at *13 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“The instant matter . . . require[d] the active involvement of the District Court, in conjunction with counsel and 
their clients, to limit the expense and burden of discovery while still providing enough information to allow CFI to 
test its claims on the merits.”) 
• 9th Cir. Loop AI Labs Inc v. Gatti, 2016 WL 1273914, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (court ordered parties to 
“prioritize determining what can be provided without controversy first, and then produce that material 
expeditiously, rather than using formalistic discovery disputes and objections at the margins as an excuse to delay 
any production”).  
 
47 Ordering parties to meet and confer. 
• 1st Cir. Sigui v. M+M Commc’n, Inc., 2017 WL 1025789, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar. 15, 2017) (court ordered parties to 
meet and confer to determine if limited sampling warrants further production). 
• 9th Cir. Timothy v. Oneida Cty., 2016 WL 2910270, at *5 (D. Idaho May 18, 2016) (court “expect[ed] counsel to 
meet immediately and confer in good faith to identify a limited number of examples where the parties disagree[d] 
as to whether certain discovery [was or was] not relevant and proportional to the needs of the case”); see also 
Bank of Am., N.A. v. SFR Invs. Pool 1 LLC, 2016 WL 2843802, at *1 (D. Nev. May 12, 2016) (court ordered 
parties to meet and confer to discuss whether defendant could seek “supplementation of . . . written responses, 
conduct a follow-up Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, or possibly both”); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Directv, Inc., 2016 
WL 1741137, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 2016) (court ordered parties to meet-and-confer to determine if they could 
agree on narrower production). 
• 10th Cir. Infusaid LLC v. Infusystem Inc., 2018 WL 690996, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 2, 2018) (court ordered parties to 
meet-and-confer to narrow scope of discovery requests and said it would “deny any future motions to compel filed 
before meaningfully conferring with the opposing party”). 
 
48 Court and parties share responsibility for ensuring discovery is proportional. 
• 3d Cir. Williams v. BASF Catalysts, LLC, 2017 WL 3317295, at *11 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2017) (court ordered parties 
to meet and confer; if that process fails to resolve dispute, “the Special Master assigned to the case shall address 
each discovery request and objection”). 
• 5th Cir. First Am. Bankcard, Inc. v. Smart Bus. Tech., Inc., 2017 WL 2267149, at *1 (E.D. La. May 24, 2017) 
(despite defendant’s failure to specify proportionality objections, court limited discovery “in the exercise of the 
court's responsibility to consider the proportionality of all discovery”); Tsanacas v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2018 WL 
324447, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2018) (“the burden falls on both parties and the court to consider the 
proportionality of all discovery”). 
• 6th Cir. Lubahn v. Absolute Software, 2017 WL 6461863, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2017) (court denied 
depositions due to improper notice, but noted that neither party addressed proportionality and said that a “ruling 
on a motion to compel discovery must also address the proportionality factors”). 
• 7th Cir. Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 308–09 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2016) 
(courts and parties share responsibility for applying proportionality requirements to discovery requests).  
• 8th Cir. Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. Top’s Personnel, Inc., 2017 WL 1214413, at *2 (D. Neb. Mar. 31, 2017) 
(“The burden of demonstrating the proportionality of the requested information is a collective responsibility 
between parties and the court.”). 
• 9th Cir. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 2016 WL 736213, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (“Under the Court’s 
reading, the revised rule places a shared responsibility on all parties to consider the factors bearing on 
proportionality before propounding discovery requests, issuing responses and objections, or raising discovery 
disputes before the courts.”); Goes Int’l, AB v. Dodur Ltd., 2016 WL 427369, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) 
(“[P]arties and the court have a collective responsibility to consider proportionality of all discovery and consider it 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 10th Cir. Frick v. Henry Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 6966971, at *3 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 2016) (court noted that 
amendments to Rule 26(b) “reinforced the need for parties, and the Court when necessary, to focus on the 
avoidance of undue expense to parties”). cf. Schueneman v. Arena Pharm., 2017 WL 3118739, at fn.2 (S.D. Cal. 
July 21, 2017) (plaintiff fails to refer to amended Rule 26, omitting consideration of  proportionality factors). 
 
49 Lawyers should rely on common-sense concept of proportionality.  
• 9th Cir. Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2016) (Chief Justice Robert’s 
year-end Report said that “fundamental principle of amended Rule 26(b)(1) is that ‘lawyers must size and shape 
their discovery requests to the requisites of the case’”); see also Ciuffitelli v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2016 WL 
6963039, at *5 (D. Or. Nov. 28, 2016) (same).  
 
50 Court should consider proportionality in absence of motion. 
• 4th Cir. Beasley v. Novant Health, Inc., 2016 WL 4435230, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2016) (court granted 
defendant’s motion to compel discovery production request but limited time period because it was 
“disproportionate to the needs of this routine employment case”).  
• 5th Cir. Orchestratehr, Inc. v. Trombetta, 2016 WL 1555784, at *23 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 18, 2016) (court must 
consider proportionality in absence of motion); see also Harrison v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 1392332, 
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2016) (same); Holmes v. N. Tex. Health Care Laundry Coop. Ass’n, 2016 WL 1366269, 
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2016) (same); Areizaga v. ADW Corp., 314 F.R.D. 428, 365 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 4, 2016) 
(same); Curtis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2016 WL 687164, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2016) (same); Team 
Contractors, LLC v. Waypoint NOLA, LLC, 2017 WL 3216582, at *2 (E.D. La. July 28, 2017) (“neither party . . . 
assessed or included the proportionality component of the applicable legal standard in its motion papers,” and 
court itself weighed  proportionality factors); Homelife in the Gardens, LLC v. Landry, 2018 WL 733213, at *4 
(E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2018) (court evaluated a subpoena sua sponte). 
• 7th Cir. Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC, v. Amex Nooter, LLC, 2016 WL 4077154, at *4 (N.D. Ind. July 8, 2016) 
(“Court's consideration of the controlling, applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on the issue directly before 
the Court does not constitute making ‘a decision outside the adversarial issues presented by the parties.’”).  
• 9th Cir. Williams v. Grant Cty., 2017 WL 3671166, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 25, 2017) (plaintiff did not resist discovery 
or oppose motion to compel; court granted motion to compel after reviewing defendant’s requests and finding 
them relevant and proportional). 
• 10th Cir. Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., 2016 WL 2772210, at *3–4 (D. Kan. May 13, 2016) (even if 
parties did not mention proportionality, court has “obligation to limit the frequency or extent of discovery” where, 
e.g., it is disproportional); see also Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty., 2016 WL 3079740, at 
*4 (D. Utah May 31, 2016) (same). 
Cf. 
• 11th Cir. City of Jacksonville v. Shoppes of Lakeside, Inc., 2016 WL 3447383, at *4 n.8 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2016) 
(parties did not address proportionality and court found no reason to limit discovery on its own based on 
proportionality).  
 
51 Court should communicate its availability to resolve discovery disputes. 
• 9th Cir. In re: AutoZone, Inc., 2016 WL 4136520 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2016) (court stated directed parties to set 
status conference if parties were unable to come to a resolution); see also Timothy v. Oneida Cty., 2016 WL 
2910270, at *5 (D. Idaho May 18, 2016) (court explained that it would be “available for a short conference with 
counsel in an effort to create more meaningful guidelines” after parties conferred on discovery disputes). 
 
52 Approaches to timely and efficiently resolving discovery disputes. 
• 3d Cir. Vay v. Huston, 2016 WL 1408116, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (court gave parties “myriad 
opportunities” to “meet and confer and resolve [discovery disputes] amicably”).  
• 6th Cir. Waters v. Drake, 2016 WL 4264350 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2016) (court listed tools to implement 
proportionality amendments, including: “case management conferences early in the litigation; requiring parties to 
submit joint discovery plans; the judge being available to timely resolve disputes; regular discovery conferences 
or hearings; stays of discovery to resolve pure legal issues; the use of affidavits to determine whether more costly 
avenues of discovery, such as depositions, would be justified; and the rolling submission of information produced 
during discovery to the court so that it can better evaluate the need for additional discovery in light of the 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
2015) (court urged parties to “engage in further cooperate dialogue in an effort to come to an agreement regarding 
proportional discovery”).  
• 7th Cir. Amarei v. City of Chi., 2016 WL 3693425, at *1, n.1 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (court lamented that 
discovery disputes resolved by mutual party consent at court hearing could have been resolved before hearing if 
the parties had held proper meet-and-confer meeting).  
• 9th Cir. 24/7 Customer, Inc. v. Liveperson, Inc., 2016 WL 4054884, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2016) (court denied 
request to compel response to interrogatory on grounds that response was premature because “benefit [was] not 
only minimal, but [was] surely outweighed by the burden imposed by responding to 122 claims when the claims 
[were] in the process of being whittled down”); Medicinova Inc. v. Genzyme Corp., 2017 WL 2829691, at *6 
(S.D. Cal. June 29, 2017) (denying discovery request partly because “no effort was made by plaintiff during the 
parties’ meet and confer sessions to narrow the scope of these requests to the types of documents most likely to 
elicit ‘a complete picture of the facts’”). 
53 Discovery requests can be made before Rule 26(f) meet and confer under Rule 26(d). 
• 6th Cir. D.R. v. Mich. Dept. of Ed., 2017 WL 3642131, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2017) (court 
permitted discovery before Rule 26(f) meeting based on standing order, which is seemingly 
inconsistent with Rule 26(d)(1) that permits such exclusion but only on court order in individual 
case; nonetheless, amended Rule 26(d)(2) permits early submission of Rule 34 request to produce 
documents).    
54 Face-to-face discussions with opposing counsel better than email exchanges. 
• 7th Cir. Infowhyse GmbH v. Fleetwood Grp., 2016 WL 4063168, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2016) (local rule 
required parties to “make ‘good faith attempts to resolve differences’ over discovery issues through ‘consultation 
in person or by telephone’” for Rule 26(f) meet-and-confer purposes). 
 
55 Parties encouraged to agree on facts when appropriate to eliminate discovery. 
• 5th Cir. Rosalez Funez v. E.M.S.P., LLC, 2016 WL 5337981, at *2-3 (E.D. La. Sept. 23, 2016) (defendant agreed 
to admission that it  exceeded FLSA-threshold gross-revenue requirement, eliminating need for discovery of tax 
returns). 
 
56 Party requested targeted discovery.  
• 2d Cir. LightSquared, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 2015 WL 8675377, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015) (defendants asked 
court to order “initial, targeted discovery” concerning one element of cause of action).  
 
57 Targeted discovery. 
• 2d Cir. Sibley v. Choice Hotels Int’l, 2015 WL 9413101, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015) (court defined disputed 
issues and provided for “limited targeted discovery” that was “proportional to the needs of the case”). 
• 3d Cir. Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp., 2017 WL 386646, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017) (“[I]n a products 
liability suit . . . faithful adherence to amended Rule 26(b)(1)'s renewed proportionality mandate is furthered 
considerably by implementation of a sliding scale analysis: material corresponding to alternative designs or 
components that exhibit significant similarities to the design or component at issue should be discoverable in the 
greatest quantities and for the most varied purposes; however, material corresponding to alternative designs or 
components that share less in common with the contested design or component should be incrementally less 
discoverable—and for more limited purposes—as those similarities diminish.”); U.S. ex rel. Customs Fraud 
Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 2016 WL 5799660, at *12 (3d Cir. Oct. 5, 2016) (“It will be up to the 
District Court and counsel to determine an appropriately limited discovery plan, perhaps reviewing the documents 
and duties paid on a representative sample of the shipments identified by CFI.”); In re: XPO Logistics, Inc., 2017 
WL 2226593, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2017) (court denied broad discovery of employee compensation records, 
instead ordering “targeted discovery” regarding assets and business plans). 
• 5th Cir. ING Bank N.V. v. M/V Portland, IMO No. 9497854, 2016 WL 3365426, at *10 (M.D. La. June 16, 2016) 
(granting motion to compel disclosures limited to determining jurisdiction where party failed to produce evidence 
that discovery would be unnecessarily burdensome or futile). 
• 9th Cir. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2015 WL 7775243, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015) (because parties 
represented that they needed “limited targeted discovery” and failed to address proportionality factors, court 
allowed plaintiff to choose ten additional custodians from its original list of 22 custodians to search for relevant 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
defendant’s overly broad discovery request, noting however, that defendant would have been entitled to targeted 
discovery).  
 
58 Identifying discoverable information available at beginning of case. 
• 6th Cir. Waters v. Drake, 2016 WL 4264350 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2016) (“adoption of certain protocols or 
measures will advance” discovery amendments, including “rolling submission of information produced during 
discovery to the court so that it can better evaluate the need for additional discovery in light of the discovered 
facts”). 
• 8th Cir. Design Basics LLC v. Ahmann Design, Inc., 2016 WL 4251076, at *4 (N.D. Iowa Aug. 10, 2016) (before 
permitting additional discovery, plaintiff limited to eight-hour inspection of defendant’s paper files in banker 
boxes, containing 1,100 custom home-design plans over 23-year period, for evidence that defendant had engaged 
in copyright infringement). 
• 10th Cir. Meeker v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2016 WL 1403335, at *7 (D. Colo. Apr. 11, 2016) (court 
explained that had defendant identified information available at beginning of case, “the court could have used its 
judicial resources expended in the informal discovery conferences discussing and evaluating concrete facts about 
the burdens and benefits of the requested discovery, instead of generalities”). 
59 Court may order focused discovery.  
• 2d Cir. Sky Med.l Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claim Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 4703656, at *14 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 
2016) (“Once the production of items (1) and (2) have been completed and have been assessed by the Plaintiff, if 
and only if the Plaintiff can establish ‘good cause’ for any further production may the Plaintiff come back to the 
Court with a further motion.”).  
• 5th Cir. Hahn v. Hunt, 2016 WL 1587405, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2016) (court limited discoverable information 
from third party, including information from his deposition, to materials relevant to disputed issues) 
• 6th Cir. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. v. Anthony, 2016 WL 4076819 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2016) (limiting scope of 
subpoena for production of documents from third party); see also Wilmington Tr. Co. v. AEP Generating Co., 
2016 WL 860693, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2016) (court ordered defendants “to search the records of the four 
persons they believe to be the most likely to have such records”); Smith v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 2017 
WL 2371825, at *7, *8 (W.D. Ky. May 31, 2017) (court limited discovery regarding changes to defendant’s 
policies and driving history to specific date range, January 1, 2010, to April 12, 2016). 
• 7th Cir. Robinson v. Gateway Tech. Coll., 2016 WL 344959, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 26, 2016) (“To further the 
application of the proportionality standard in discovery, requests for production of ESI and related responses 
should be reasonably targeted, clear, and as specific as practicable.”); In re: Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 2017 
WL 4322823, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2017) (“The Court will continue to apply the benefit-burden balancing 
approach . . . that has guided other discovery decisions in this case. . . . The Court understands that ordering full 
document production at this juncture would significantly ratchet up costs for all parties.”). 
• 8th Cir. In re: Fluoroquinolone Prods. Liab. Litig., 2016 WL 4045414, at *1 (D. Minn. July 20, 2016) (court 
limited search in MDL action to existing databases and central repositories, but left open possibility of searching 
individual custodial files “if the information available in these structured databases turns out to be insufficient”).  
• 9th Cir. Lauris v. Novartis, 2016 WL 7178602, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016) (court denied request to expand 
discovery without prejudice, noting that if, after the ordered discovery, the parties still disagreed, court would 
revisit scope of discovery). 
• 10th Cir. Meeker v. Life Care Ctrs. Of Am., Inc., 2016 WL 1403335, at *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 11, 2016) (court ordered 
defendants to search for emails using list of relevant search terms).  
11th Cir. Cerrato v. Nutribullet, LLC, 2017 WL 3608266, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 22, 2017) (in products liability 
suit, plaintiff’s requested discovery of all accident reports and consumer complaints relating to product “contain 
no time limitation and no limitation as to the type of injury at issue, the subject matter of the complaints requested, 
the alleged defect at issue, or the circumstances of the incident in the materials requested” was overly broad). 
 
60 Early focused discovery may make full discovery request unnecessary.  
• 3d Cir. In re: Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4414640, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2016) (court adopted 
“discovery fence” metaphor to “limit the appropriate scope of discovery, at least as to this initial round of 
document requests and interrogatories”); Emp. Ins. Co. of Wasau v. Daybreak Express, Inc., 2017 WL 2443064, 
at *4 (D.N.J. June 5, 2017) (court limited discovery to that which would discredit defendant’s defense before 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 5th Cir. Hernandez v. Baylor Univ., 2017 WL 1628992, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2017) (“approach is often 
referred to as “focused” discovery, and it has two main benefits: (1) focusing on the most important information 
from the most accessible sources naturally keeps those efforts well within the proportionality requirement; and (2) 
the information obtained be very helpful in determining what further discovery efforts would be proportional to 
the needs of the case”). 
6th Cir. D.R. v. Mich. Dept. of Ed., 2017 WL 3642131, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2017) (court ruled that “some 
limited discovery is warranted, even while the jurisdictional motions [potentially vitiating complaint] are 
pending”).  
• 8th Cir. Schultz v. Sentinel Ins. Co., 2016 WL 3149686, at *12 (D.S.D. June 3, 2016) (court compelled search of 
insurance claim file database to retrieve claims “first made within the last ten years” in lieu of broader request). 
• 9th Cir. Wide Voice, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P., 2016 WL 155031, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 12, 2016) (“The 
parties and court should consider sequencing discovery to focus on those issues with the greatest likelihood to 
resolve the case, and the biggest bang-for the buck at the outset, with more discovery, later, as the case deserves.”) 




61 Court may order sequenced discovery. 
• 1st Cir. Primarque Prod. v. Williams West & Witt’s Prod. Co., 2016 WL 6090715, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 18, 2016) 
(To avoid “unnecessarily duplicative or cumulative discovery” and to minimize burden, court permitted discovery 
of records beyond ninety-day period only if no evidence was found in initial discovery.). 
• 6th Cir. Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., 2015 WL 8259548, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015) (court scheduled 
discovery conference to discuss whether discovery would proceed in phases).  
• 9th Cir. Wide Voice, LLC v. Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P., 2016 WL 155031, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 12, 2016) (court 




62 Establishing ESI-production protocols.  
• 2d Cir. Abbott v. Wyo. Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2017 WL 2115381, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 16, 2017) (court “crafted 
discovery based on specific search terms” and ordered parties to comply with those terms). 
• 5th Cir. Brand Serv., LLC v. Irex Corp., 2017 WL 67517, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 6, 2017) (court ordered parties “to 
develop an ESI protocol that contemplates key word searches so as to control costs and to keep discovery 
proportional to the needs of this case”); Mr. Mudbug, Inc. v. Bloomin’ Brands, Inc., 2017 WL 111268, at *3 (E.D. 
La. Jan. 11, 2017) (defendant’s second request for documents in PDF or Word format canceled its initial request 
for documents in their original format, so plaintiff properly complied with defendant’s discovery request by 
providing PDF documents).  
• 6th Cir. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Papanek, 2018 WL 300170, at *5 (S.D. Ohio, Jan. 5, 2018) (court granted discovery of 
ESI for employees, but not contractors, and required that supplying party detail all efforts undertaken to preserve 
ESI).  
• 9th Cir. Martinelli v. Johnson & Johnson, 2016 WL 1458109, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016) (court established 
protocols to “facilitate the just, speedy, and inexpensive completion of discovery of ESI and hardcopy documents 
and to promote, whenever possible, the early resolution of disputes, including any disputes pertaining to scope or 
costs regarding the discovery of ESI without Court intervention”); see also Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Haw. Nut & Bolt, 
Inc., 2017 WL 80248, at *5 (D. Haw. Jan. 9, 2017) (“The parties should put their respective IT representatives in 
contact to see if an understanding can be reached about the format in which ESI can be produced, as well as the 
related metadata.”); Kellgren v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 2017 WL 979045, at *5 (S. D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) 
(denying, as disproportional, plaintiff’s request to expand ESI search terms because plaintiffs did not show “that a 
sampling of responsive information” was “insufficient for them to pursue their theory of the case”). 
 
63 Court should be clear about initial limitations on discovery and opportunities to follow-up discovery 
when setting initial boundaries of scope of discovery.   
• 2d Cir. Sky Med. Supply Inc. v. SCS Support Claim Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 4703656, at *8 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 7, 2016) 
(parties were directed to “focus on the claims that we know about right now that deal specifically with the 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
of discovery”); Black v. Buffalo Meat Serv., 2017 WL 2720080, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017) (court denied full 
discovery of documents regarding which it had previously granted limited discovery). 
• 3d Cir. In re: Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4414640, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2016) (“‘[D]iscovery 
fence’ [initial boundary set for discovery] must be flexible to account for changes in the focus by the parties 
brought on by additional discovery or their own investigation.”). 
• 5th Cir. Hernandez v. Baylor Univ., 2017 WL 1628992, at *5 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2017) (“as Plaintiff has not yet 
gathered the ‘low hanging fruit,’ this Court finds it would be inappropriate to allow her to pursue information 
from less convenient, less relevant sources …. But Plaintiff has more than ten months to continue discovery. In 
the future, if she believes the circumstances warrant, she may request that this Court lift the protective order.”); 
Cain v. City of New Orleans, 2016 WL 7156071, at *7 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2016) (court expressly recognizes that 
plaintiffs are entitled “to file a new motion seeking particularly identified additional responsive materials,” if 
defendant’s original discovery production is insufficient). 
 
64 Deposing same individual twice.  
• 2d Cir. Williams v. Fire Sprinkler Assoc. Inc., 2017 WL 1156012, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017) (“Directing 
deposition to be continued, based on de minimus loss of time (11 minutes fewer than 7 hours) is not warranted and 
is not in accord Rule 26(b)(1)’s requirement that the Court balance relevance with proportionality.”). 
• 7th Cir. Babjak v. Arcelormittal USA, LLC, 2016 WL 4191050, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 9, 2016) (proposed 
deposition of individual under Rule 30(b)(6) after being deposed as fact witness was not duplicative and did not 
violate Rule 26 proportionality requirements “because depositions given by individuals on their own behalf and 
depositions given by organizations’ designees are qualitatively different”). 
• 9th Cir. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 2016 WL 736213, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (court denied request for 
second deposition because it was made too late in litigation, acknowledging that “second deposition may have 
made sense months ago”); see also Cisco Sys. v. Arista Networks, Inc., 2016 WL 632000, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
17, 2016) (court denied request to depose witnesses exceeding ten permitted by rule because defendant failed to 
show particularized need); Youngevity Int’l Corp. v. Smith, 2017 WL 4777318, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2017) 
(reopening four individuals’ depositions was unduly burdensome and requesting party had not demonstrated that 
further questioning would lead to relevant information). 
• 10th Cir. Merlin v. Crawford, 2016 WL 814580, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2016) (court denied defendants’ motion 
to depose non-party witnesses second time so as to videotape their testimony for use at trial because burden 
outweighed likely benefits).  
 
66 Chief Justice Roberts urges greater judicial-case management. 
• 3d Cir. U.S. ex rel. Customs Fraud Investigations, LLC v. Victaulic Co., 2016 WL 5799660, at *12 (3d Cir. Oct. 5, 
2016) (quotes Chief Justice’s statement that: “‘key here is careful and realistic assessment of actual need’ that 
may ‘require the active involvement of a neutral arbiter—the federal judge—to guide decisions respecting the 
scope of discovery’”). 
• 2d Cir. Armstrong Pump, Inc. v. Hartman, 2016 WL 7208753, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) (quoting Report to 
support importance of case management at early trial stages).   
• 6th Cir. Waters v. Drake, 2016 WL 4264350 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2016) (agreeing with Chief Justice’s report, 
“court believes that implementation of the new discovery rules will require improved case management by district 
judges, a culture of cooperation among lawyers, and active and early involvement by judges to fashion discovery 
that is proportional to the needs of the case”); Babcock Power, Inc. v. Kapsalis, 2017 WL 2837019, at *27 (W.D. 
Ky. June 30, 2017) (citing Chief Justice’s report, court noted that “[d]iscovery in this matter has been anything but 
speedy and inexpensive”). 
• 7th Cir. Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 308 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2016) 
(amendments designed to emphasize judicial management of discovery process, “especially for those cases in 
which the parties do not themselves effectively manage discovery”).  
• 8th Cir. Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court, 316 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D.S.D. Feb. 26, 
2016) (Chief Justice Robert’s year-end Report on the federal judiciary addresses 2015 amendments).  
• 9th Cir. McSwain v. United States, 2016 WL 4530461, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2016) (favorable reference to 
Chief Justice’s end-of-year report); Roberts v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 312 F.R.D. 594, 603 (D. Nev. Jan. 11, 2016) 
(as explained by Chief Justice Roberts in his year-end Report, amendments “may not look like a big deal at first 
glance, but they are.” He went on to say that accomplishing the amendments’ goals will only occur “if the entire 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
see also Gibson v. SDCC, 2016 WL 845308, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 2, 2016) (“Chief Justice Roberts asked federal 
judges [in his year-end Report] ‘to take on a stewardship role, managing their cases from the onset rather than 
allowing parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery’ and to actively engage in case management to ‘identify 
the critical issues, determine the appropriate breadth of discovery, and curtail dilatory tactics, gamesmanship, and 
procedural posturing.’”); McCall v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3174914, at *5 (D. Nev. July 26, 
2017) (quoting the Chief Justice’s Report); Heyman v. State of Nev., 2017 WL 4288699, at *7-8 (D. Nev. Sept. 
27, 2017) (“The pretrial process must provide parties with efficient access to what is needed to prove a claim or 
defense, but eliminate unnecessary and wasteful discovery. This requires active involvement of federal judges to 
make decisions regarding the scope of discovery.”). 
• 10th Cir. XTO Energy, Inc. v. ATD, LLC, 2016 WL 1730171, at *18 (D.N.M. Apr. 1, 2016) (Chief Justice Roberts 
explained that proportionality “assessment may, as a practical matter, require ‘judges to be more aggressive in 
identifying and discouraging discovery overuse by emphasizing the need to analyze proportionality before 
ordering production of relevant information’”); see also United States v. Talmage, 2017 WL 1047315, at *2 (D. 
Utah Mar. 17, 2017) (same). 
• D.C. Cir. United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA., Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8, (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2016) (Rule 26 
proportionality factors “‘encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery 
overuse and to make proportionality considerations unavoidable’”). 
67 Preference for pre-motion conference over motion practice.  
• 2d Cir. Vaigasi v. Solow Mgmt. Corp., 2016 WL 616386, at *3–7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2016) (court held multiple 
discovery conferences with parties to resolve discovery disputes). 
• 3d Cir. Fassett v. Sears Holdings Corp., 2017 WL 386646, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2017) (court held two pre-
motion status conferences in unsuccessful attempt to resolve discovery dispute without motions); In re: Domestic 
Drywall Antitrust Litig., 2016 WL 4414640, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2016) (telephone conference with parties 
clarified extent of discovery request); CDK Glob., LLC v. Tulley Auto. Grp., Inc., 2016 WL 1718100, at *2 (D.N.J 
Apr. 29, 2016) (magistrate judge held telephone conference on quashing subpoena seeking discovery); Vay v. 
Huston, 2016 WL 1408116, at *10 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2016) (lawyers’ “reliance on email communications [was] 
unavailing,” as substitute for conferences under local practices); see also Bell v. Reading Hosp., 2016 WL 
162991, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016) (court held telephone discovery conference).  
• 5th Cir. InforMD, LLC v. DocRX, Inc., 2016 WL 2343854, at *2 (M.D. La. May 3, 2016) (court held in-court 
status conference to consider discovery issues); see also Krantz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2016 WL 320148, 
at *1 (M.D. La. Jan. 25, 2016) (parties held discovery conference). 
• 6th Cir. United States v. Quicken Loans Inc., 2017 WL 2306444, at *8 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2017) (court noted 
that “ESI [was] a huge trove of discoverable material in th[e] case,” but that the “rules encourage the [c]ourt to 
address discovery in the less formal setting of a conference”). 
• 8th Cir. Perez v. KDP Hosp., LLC, 2016 WL 2746926, at *1 (W.D. Mo. May 6, 2016) (court held telephone 
conference to hear argument on disputed discovery issues). 
• 9th Cir. Wichansky v. Zowine, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37065, at 3 (D. Ariz. March 22, 2016) (“The Court, which 
seeks to avoid delay and expense by hearing discovery disputes in telephone conferences without the filing of 
motions (allowing expedited briefing where needed), has held 10 separate discovery dispute conference calls with 
parties.”); see also Talavera v. Sun Maid Growers of Cal., 2017 WL 495635, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (court 
held informal telephonic pre-motion conference on discovery disputes regarding class-action certification). 
• 10th Cir. Meeker v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 2016 WL 1403335, at *7 (D. Colo. Apr. 11, 2016) (court held 
several informal discovery conferences). 
Cf.  
• 5th Cir. La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n- W. v. Mallard Basin, Inc., 2015 WL 8074260, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 4, 
2015) (court ordered that “all proposed specific discovery requests not agreed to by the Defendants shall first be 
presented to the Magistrate Judge with a request and justification for the allowance of the discovery.” Defendants 
had not followed practice ordered by judge).  
 
68 Pre-motion conference informal letter in lieu of motion and brief.  
• 3d Cir. Bell v. Reading Hosp., 2016 WL 162991, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016) (plaintiffs submitted “informal 
motion to compel”).  
• 9th Cir. Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, 2016 WL 1273914, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2016) (court ordered parties to 
submit briefs of “no more than 5 pages regarding the Court’s authority to require the parties to bear the cost of a 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
736213, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2016) (parties filed joint letter addressing failure to respond to discovery 
requests); but cf. Kellgren v. Petco Animal Supplies, Inc., 2017 WL 979045, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2017) (court 
denied plaintiff’s request to hold in-person discovery conference because parties had filed 80 pages of briefing 
and additional information was unnecessary). 
 
69 Rule 16(b)(3)(v) contemplates discovery conference requested before motion filed. 
• 8th Cir. Duhigg v. Goodwill Industries, 2016 WL 4991480, at *2 (D. Neb. Sept. 16, 2016) (although court was 
amendable to holding pre-motion discovery conference as provided under Rule 16, opportunity to hold discovery 
conference passed because party filed motion to compel prior to request for conference. 
 
 70 Local rules governing pre-motion conferences. 
• 7th Cir. Acheron Med. Supply, LLC v. Cook Med. Inc., 2016 WL 5466309, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 9, 2016) (court 
cited Local Rule 37-1(a), which states: “counsel are encouraged to contact the chambers of the assigned 
Magistrate Judge to determine whether the Magistrate Judge is available to resolve the discovery dispute by way 
of a telephone conference or other proceeding prior to counsel filing a formal discovery motion”). 
 
71 Granting discovery request in part may satisfy proportionality requirement. 
• 2nd Cir. Benavidez et al. v. Greenwich Hotel Ltd. P’ship, 2017 WL 1051184, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2017) (in 
dispute over whether hotel’s service charge was tip that employees were entitled to receive, court granted 
plaintiff’s discovery request in part to limit production to only documents that would show how hotel calculated 
service charge). 
• 7th Cir. The Surgery Ctr. at 900 N. Mich. Ave., LLC v. Am. Physicians Assurance Corp., Inc., 2016 WL 6962840, 
at *7–8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2016) (Although plaintiff requested discovery of all bad-faith suits against defendants, 
court granted discovery only within 4-year period. Court also found that defendant waived privilege claims 
because privilege log failed to establish elements of privilege, allowing discovery of withheld documents, except 
those pertaining to unrelated claims.).  
• 8th Cir. Orduno v. Pietrzak, 2016 WL 5853723, at *3 (D. Minn. Oct. 5, 2016) (court narrowed discovery search of 
records from 5000 to 200 individuals). 
 
72 Court may order random sampling. 
• 1st Cir. Sigui v. M+M Commc’n, Inc., 2017 WL 1025789, at *2 (D.R.I. Mar. 15, 2017) (court ordered limited 
sampling of documents to determine whether further production was warranted and required discovery 
teleconference with the Court before parties resorted to further discovery motion practice.) 
• 2nd Cir. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 2016 WL 7017356, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 
30, 2016) (after primary custodians produced substantial discovery, court approved parties’ proposed solution to 
select a few additional custodians to test plaintiff’s theory that they possessed relevant non-duplicative 
documents). 
• 6th Cir. Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 2017 WL 85832, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2017) (court ordered 
sampling but noted that if parties were unable to agree on sampling methodology, plaintiff would have the option 
of requesting that defendant product certain information from the relevant time period). 
• 9th Cir. Federal Trade Comm’n v. Directv, Inc., 2016 WL 3351945, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2016) (finding that 
random sampling of electronic documents to identify relevant materials early in discovery process “would achieve 
Rule 26’s demand for proportionality”); see also Talavera v. Sun Maid Growers of Cal., 2017 WL 495635, at *5 
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017) (court ordered ten percent random sampling of defendant’s pay, punch, and time records 
of all employees for relevant time period for class-action certification, in addition to discovery of records for 142 
employees who opted into the case). 
 
73 Alternative discovery tools may be less expensive. 
• 4th Cir. In re: American Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic Repair Systems Prod. Liability Litig., 2016 WL 4411506, at *4 
(S.D. W. Va. Aug.17, 2016) (court rejected plaintiff’s argument that cost and burdens incurred in orally deposing 
non-party witnesses, instead of deposing witnesses under Rule 31 with written questions, were significantly 
greater); Brown v. Mountainview Cutters, LLC, 2016 WL 3045349, at *4 (W.D. Va. May 27, 2016) (court 
quashed defendant’s subpoena duces tecum as being overly broad and instead ordered plaintiff to produce answers 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
• 8th Cir. Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 642 (W.D. Mo. 2016) (party ordered to respond 
to interrogatories in lieu of producing documents, which it claimed would be burdensome). 
• 9th Cir. Ballentine v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 2016 WL 2743504, at *7 (D. Nev. May 9, 2016) (“Where 
responsive information can be provided more accurately and with less burden through one method of discovery, 
that method should be used.”); cf. HSBC Bank USA v. Green Valley Pecos Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2016 WL 
6915301 (D. Nev. Nov. 21, 2016) (“The general statement . . . regarding a party’s right to pursue less efficient or 
duplicative discovery avenues can no longer be justified under amended Rule 26(b) given its greater emphasis on 
the need for proportionality in discovery.”).  
• 10th Cir. Hinzo v. N.M. Corr. Dep’t, 2016 WL 3156071, at *4 (D.N.M. May 19, 2016) (court determined that 
plaintiff’s request to interview prison staff and inmates was acceptable method of gathering factual information to 
be used in forming and offering an expert opinion” in lieu of depositions); 
Cf.  
• 9th Cir. Gilbert v. Money Mut., LLC, 2016 WL 3196605, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 9, 2016) (denying motion to 
depose attorney only where party did not establish that discovery had not, or could not, be obtained by other 
means).  
• 10th Cir. Fasesin v. Henry Indus., Inc., 2016 WL 3654740, at *5 (D. Kan. July 8, 2016) (ordering parties to obtain 
free tax-return transcripts instead of requested completed tax returns because of cost concerns). 
 
74 Court may order cost-shifting. 
• 4th Cir. Ashmore v. Allied Energy, Inc., 2016 WL 301169, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2016) (court may order cost-
shifting under Rule 26(c)).  
• 5th Cir. Butler v. Craft, 2017 WL 1429896, at *6 (W.D. La. Apr. 19, 2017) (discovery requested by plaintiffs, 
which would have required defendant to “analyze, redact, and produce” records “simply to explore events which 
occurred more than a decade ago and which have little or no probative value,” would significantly burden 
defendant and thus would be “grossly disproportionate to the benefits of allowing discovery,” even though 
plaintiffs offered to reimburse defendants). 
• 7th Cir. Knauf Insulation, LLC v. Johns Manville Corp., 2015 WL 7089725, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2015) (court 
ordered plaintiff to bear costs of responding to discovery request from 38 email custodians if search did not yield 
at least 500 relevant documents).  
• 9th Cir. Arias v. Ruan Transp. Corp, 2017 WL 1427018, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2017) (court granted 
defendant’s motion for second deposition and shifted cost to plaintiff, not including defendant’s attorney’s fees, 
because plaintiff had withheld relevant documents and needed to be deposed again). 
• 10th Cir. Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v. San Juan Cty., 2016 WL 3079740, at *4 (D. Utah May 31, 
2016) (court ordered plaintiffs to bear cost of expedited document discovery because information was available 
from other less expensive sources, such as previously provided e-mail responses).  
• D.C. Cir. Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2017 WL 4011136, at *7 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 
2017) (court acknowledged amended Rule 26(c)(1)(B) permitting cost shifting but refused to order cost shifting 
because resisting party “failed to rebut the presumption . . . that it should bear the cost of complying with 
proposed discovery”). 
Cf.  
• 2d Cir. Woodward v. Afify, 2017 WL 279555, at *7–8 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (court denied discovery because 
burden and expense outweighed benefits when plaintiff-inmate requested discovery of publicly available 
information seemingly to shift cost of printing court documents to defendant and non-party lawyers). 
• 6th Cir. Brown v. Mohr, 2017 WL 2832631, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2017) (court denied pro se plaintiff’s 
request for his medical records because plaintiff previously had access to them, and the apparent purpose of 
plaintiff’s request was to shift cost to defendant). 
• 11th Cir. Graham & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2016 WL 1319697, at *11 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 5, 2016) (court 
refused to order cost-shifting and “[deferred] to the parties to work out payment of complying with discovery 
costs”).   
 
75 Presumption that responding party bears costs of complying with discovery requests.  
• 4th Cir. Ashmore v. Allied Energy, Inc., 2016 WL 301169, at *2 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2016) (“In determining whether 
to shift the costs of discovery to the requesting party, factors to consider include: (1) the specificity of the 
discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering critical information; (3) the availability of such information 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
benefit to the parties of obtaining the information; (6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative 
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the resources available to each party.”). 
• 7th Cir. Knauf Insulation, LLC v. Johns Manville Corp., 2015 WL 7089725, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 13, 2015) 
(“[P]resumption is that the responding party pays for discovery requests.”). 
• 8th Cir. Labrier v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 314 F.R.D. 637, 642 (W.D. Mo. May 9, 2016) (because of its 
interest in keeping its computer system secret, defendant was ordered to bear “cost of doing any additional 
programming to pull out the information required by the [plaintiff’s] interrogatories”). 
 
76 Proportionality distinct from grounds for issuing Rule 26(c) protective order. 
• 2d Cir. Uni-Sys., LLC v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 2017 WL 4081904, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2017) (court granted 
discovery of source code, despite proportionality objection, because code was important and readily available, and 
objecting party failed to address why protective order would be insufficient).  
• 6th Cir. MicroTechnologies, LLC v. Autonomy, Inc., 2016 WL 1273266, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2016) (question 
of proportionality is distinct from grounds for issuing Rule 26(c) protective order, including oppression); see also 
Kacmarik v. Mitchell, 2017 WL 131582, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 13, 2017) (discovery granted because parts of 
requested discovery might lead to discovery of relevant information and privacy concerns could adequately be 
addressed in a protective order). 
Cf. 
• 4th Cir. Prusin v. Canton’s Pearls, LLC, 2016 WL 7408840, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 22, 2016) (“[I]f the discovery 
sought has no bearing on an issue of material fact—i.e., if it is not relevant—a protective order is proper.”) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation omitted); Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. v. J.A.B.-Columbia, Inc., 2017 WL 
75746, at *1, 3 (D. Md. Jan. 6, 2017) (granting in part plaintiff’s motion for a protective order because requested 
discovery would be unduly burdensome under Rule 26(b)). 
• 5th Cir. In re: Wright, 2017 WL 685562, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2017) (granting in part defendants’ motion for 
protective order under Rule 26(c), in part “pursuant to the proportionality requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(b)(1)”).  
• 9th Cir. Birch v. Lombardo, 2017 WL 6063068, at *6 (D. Nev. Dec. 6, 2017) (“Even if . . . discovery is relevant 
and proportional to the needs of the case, the court may, for ‘good cause,’ enter a protective order.”). 
 
 
77 Party must state if documents being withheld.  
• 5th Cir. Fidelis Grp. Holdings, LLC v. Chalmers Auto., LLC, 2016 WL 6157601, at *6 (E.D. La. Oct. 24, 2016) 
(“[M]erely responding ‘Defendants will provide such documents that exist’” does not identify which documents 
are responsive); Keycorp v. Holland, 2016 WL 6277813, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2016) (“[R]esponding to a 
document request or interrogatory ‘subject to’ and ‘without waiving’ objections is not consistent with the Federal 
Rules or warranted by existing law.”). 
• 7th Cir. Crabtree v. Angie’s List, Inc., 2017 WL 413242, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 31, 2017) (parties “have no 
obligation to affirmatively state that they are not withholding documents”). 
• 8th Cir. Sprint Commc’ns. Co. L.P. v. Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court316 F.R.D. 254, 263 (D.S.D. Feb. 26, 2016) 
(objecting party must “state with specificity the grounds for objecting, including the reasons” and “whether any 
responsive materials are being withheld”).  
• 9th Cir. Brown v. Dobler, 2015 WL 9581414, at *4 (D. Idaho Dec. 29, 2015) (party must state if there are 
documents withheld because of objections to discovery requests).  
• 10th Cir. Echon v. Sackett, 2016 WL 943485, at *4 (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2016) (party must state if there are 
documents withheld because of objections to discovery requests); see also Hibu Inc. v. Peck, 2016 WL 4702422, 
at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016) (court found “conditional objections [invalid, which] occur when ‘a party asserts 
objections, but then provides a response ‘subject to’ or ‘without waiving’ the stated objections”). 
 
78 Technology assisted review. 
• 2d Cir. Hyles v. N.Y.C., 2016 WL 4077114, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2016) (although court believed that TAR was 
“the best and most efficient search tool” and that “there may come a time when TAR is so widely used that it 
might be unreasonable for a party to decline to use TAR,” it declined to compel defendant to use it instead of key-
word searching). 
• 11th Cir. Digital Assurance Certification, LLC v. Pendolino, 2017 WL 4342316, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 29, 2017) 




                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Sedona Conference’s proportionality principles, including that “technologies to reduce cost and burden should be 
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